Extending the Carrel system to mediate in the organ and tissue allocation processes: a first approach

In this paper we extend the formalization of Carrel, a virtual organization for the procurement of tissues for transplantation purposes, in order to model also the procurement of human organs for transplants. We will focus in the organ allocation process to show how it can be formalized with the ISLANDER formalism. Also we present a first mechanism to federate the institution in several geographically-distributed platforms.Postprint (published version

An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

This paper describes an agent-based platform for the allocation of loads in distributed transportation logistics, developed as a collaboration between CWI, Dutch National Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam and Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. The platform follows a real business scenario proposed by Vos, and it involves a set of agents bidding for transportation loads to be distributed from a central depot in the Netherlands to different locations across Germany. The platform supports both human agents (i.e. transportation planners), who can bid through specialized planning and bidding interfaces, as well as automated, software agents. We exemplify how the proposed platform can be used to test both the bidding behaviour of human logistics planners, as well as the performance of automated auction bidding strategies, developed for such settings. The paper first introduces the business problem setting and then describes the architecture and main characteristics of our auction platform. We conclude with a preliminary discussion of our experience from a human bidding experiment, involving Vos planners competing for orders both against each other and against some (simple) automated strategies

Reallocation Problems in Agent Societies: A Local Mechanism to Maximize Social Welfare

Resource reallocation problems are common in real life and therefore gain an increasing interest in Computer Science and Economics. Such problems consider agents living in a society and negotiating their resources with each other in order to improve the welfare of the population. In many studies however, the unrealistic context considered, where agents have a flawless knowledge and unlimited interaction abilities, impedes the application of these techniques in real life problematics. In this paper, we study how agents should behave in order to maximize the welfare of the society. We propose a multi-agent method based on autonomous agents endowed with a local knowledge and local interactions. Our approach features a more realistic environment based on social networks, inside which we provide the behavior for the agents and the negotiation settings required for them to lead the negotiation processes towards socially optimal allocations. We prove that bilateral transactions of restricted cardinality are sufficient in practice to converge towards an optimal solution for different social objectives. An experimental study supports our claims and highlights the impact of a realistic environment on the efficiency of the techniques utilized.Resource Allocation, Negotiation, Social Welfare, Agent Society, Behavior, Emergence

Using Distributed Agents to Create University Course Timetables Addressing Essential & Desirable Constraints and Fair Allocation of Resources

In this study, the University Course Timetabling Problem (UCTP) has been investigated. This is a form of Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) and belongs to the NP-complete class. The nature of a such problem is highly descriptive, a solution therefore involves combining many aspects of the problem. Although various timetabling algorithms have been continuously developed for nearly half a century, a gap still exists between the theoretical and practical aspects of university timetabling. This research is aimed to narrow the gap. We created an agent-based model for solving the university course timetabling problem, where this model not only considers a set of essential constraints upon the teaching activities, but also a set of desirable constraints that correspond to real-world needs. The model also seeks to provide fair allocation of resources. The capabilities of agents are harnessed for the activities of decision making, collaboration, coordination and negotiation by embedding them within the protocol designs. The resulting set of university course timetables involve the participation of every element in the system, with each agent taking responsibility for organising of its own course timetable, cooperating together to resolve problems. There are two types of agents in the model; these are Year-Programme Agent and Rooms Agent. In this study, we have used four different principles for organising the interaction between the agents: First-In-First-Out & Sequential (FIFOSeq), First-In-First-Out & Interleaved (FIFOInt), Round-Robin & Sequential (RRSeq) and Round-Robin & Interleaved (RRInt). The problem formulation and data instances of the third track of the Second International Timetabling Competition (ITC-2007) have been used as benchmarks for validating these implemented timetables. The validated results not only compare the four principles with each other; but also compare them with other timetabling techniques used for ITC-2007. The four different principles were able to successfully schedule all lectures in different periods, with no instances of two lectures occupying the same room at the same time. The lectures belonging to the same curriculum or taught by the same teacher do not conflict. Every lecture has been assigned a teacher before scheduling. The capacity of every assigned room is greater than, or equal to, the number of students in that course. The lectures of each course have been spread across the minimum number of working days with more than 98 percent success, and for more than 75 percent of the lectures under the same curriculum, it has been possible to avoid isolated deliveries. We conclude that the RRInt principle gives the most consistent likelihood of ensuring that each YPA in the system gets the best and fairest chance to obtain its resources