20,849 research outputs found
Network hierarchy evolution and system vulnerability in power grids
(c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.The seldom addressed network hierarchy property and its relationship with vulnerability analysis for power transmission grids from a complex-systems point of view are given in this paper. We analyze and compare the evolution of network hierarchy for the dynamic vulnerability evaluation of four different power transmission grids of real cases. Several meaningful results suggest that the vulnerability of power grids can be assessed by means of a network hierarchy evolution analysis. First, the network hierarchy evolution may be used as a novel measurement to quantify the robustness of power grids. Second, an antipyramidal structure appears in the most robust network when quantifying cascading failures by the proposed hierarchy metric. Furthermore, the analysis results are also validated and proved by empirical reliability data. We show that our proposed hierarchy evolution analysis methodology could be used to assess the vulnerability of power grids or even other networks from a complex-systems point of view.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
The failure tolerance of mechatronic software systems to random and targeted attacks
This paper describes a complex networks approach to study the failure
tolerance of mechatronic software systems under various types of hardware
and/or software failures. We produce synthetic system architectures based on
evidence of modular and hierarchical modular product architectures and known
motifs for the interconnection of physical components to software. The system
architectures are then subject to various forms of attack. The attacks simulate
failure of critical hardware or software. Four types of attack are
investigated: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality
and random attack. Failure tolerance of the system is measured by a 'robustness
coefficient', a topological 'size' metric of the connectedness of the attacked
network. We find that the betweenness centrality attack results in the most
significant reduction in the robustness coefficient, confirming betweenness
centrality, rather than the number of connections (i.e. degree), as the most
conservative metric of component importance. A counter-intuitive finding is
that "designed" system architectures, including a bus, ring, and star
architecture, are not significantly more failure-tolerant than interconnections
with no prescribed architecture, that is, a random architecture. Our research
provides a data-driven approach to engineer the architecture of mechatronic
software systems for failure tolerance.Comment: Proceedings of the 2013 ASME International Design Engineering
Technical Conferences & Computers and Information in Engineering Conference
IDETC/CIE 2013 August 4-7, 2013, Portland, Oregon, USA (In Print
Optimization of Robustness of Complex Networks
Networks with a given degree distribution may be very resilient to one type
of failure or attack but not to another. The goal of this work is to determine
network design guidelines which maximize the robustness of networks to both
random failure and intentional attack while keeping the cost of the network
(which we take to be the average number of links per node) constant. We find
optimal parameters for: (i) scale free networks having degree distributions
with a single power-law regime, (ii) networks having degree distributions with
two power-law regimes, and (iii) networks described by degree distributions
containing two peaks. Of these various kinds of distributions we find that the
optimal network design is one in which all but one of the nodes have the same
degree, (close to the average number of links per node), and one node is
of very large degree, , where is the number of nodes in
the network.Comment: Accepted for publication in European Physical Journal
Greedy Forwarding in Dynamic Scale-Free Networks Embedded in Hyperbolic Metric Spaces
We show that complex (scale-free) network topologies naturally emerge from
hyperbolic metric spaces. Hyperbolic geometry facilitates maximally efficient
greedy forwarding in these networks. Greedy forwarding is topology-oblivious.
Nevertheless, greedy packets find their destinations with 100% probability
following almost optimal shortest paths. This remarkable efficiency sustains
even in highly dynamic networks. Our findings suggest that forwarding
information through complex networks, such as the Internet, is possible without
the overhead of existing routing protocols, and may also find practical
applications in overlay networks for tasks such as application-level routing,
information sharing, and data distribution
Reducing Cascading Failure Risk by Increasing Infrastructure Network Interdependency
Increased coupling between critical infrastructure networks, such as power
and communication systems, will have important implications for the reliability
and security of these systems. To understand the effects of power-communication
coupling, several have studied interdependent network models and reported that
increased coupling can increase system vulnerability. However, these results
come from models that have substantially different mechanisms of cascading,
relative to those found in actual power and communication networks. This paper
reports on two sets of experiments that compare the network vulnerability
implications resulting from simple topological models and models that more
accurately capture the dynamics of cascading in power systems. First, we
compare a simple model of topological contagion to a model of cascading in
power systems and find that the power grid shows a much higher level of
vulnerability, relative to the contagion model. Second, we compare a model of
topological cascades in coupled networks to three different physics-based
models of power grids coupled to communication networks. Again, the more
accurate models suggest very different conclusions. In all but the most extreme
case, the physics-based power grid models indicate that increased
power-communication coupling decreases vulnerability. This is opposite from
what one would conclude from the coupled topological model, in which zero
coupling is optimal. Finally, an extreme case in which communication failures
immediately cause grid failures, suggests that if systems are poorly designed,
increased coupling can be harmful. Together these results suggest design
strategies for reducing the risk of cascades in interdependent infrastructure
systems
Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the
challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive,
and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the
service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point
(AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are
required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to
the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that
do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are
connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to
conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other
networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for
WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols
for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all
assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does
not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in
WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First,
it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and
the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality,
data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed.
Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed.
After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network
layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for
these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table
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