Architecture for Cooperative Prefetching in P2P Video-on- Demand System

Most P2P VoD schemes focused on service architectures and overlays optimization without considering segments rarity and the performance of prefetching strategies. As a result, they cannot better support VCRoriented service in heterogeneous environment having clients using free VCR controls. Despite the remarkable popularity in VoD systems, there exist no prior work that studies the performance gap between different prefetching strategies. In this paper, we analyze and understand the performance of different prefetching strategies. Our analytical characterization brings us not only a better understanding of several fundamental tradeoffs in prefetching strategies, but also important insights on the design of P2P VoD system. On the basis of this analysis, we finally proposed a cooperative prefetching strategy called "cooching". In this strategy, the requested segments in VCR interactivities are prefetched into session beforehand using the information collected through gossips. We evaluate our strategy through extensive simulations. The results indicate that the proposed strategy outperforms the existing prefetching mechanisms.Comment: 13 Pages, IJCN

Sensor networks security based on sensitive robots agents. A conceptual model

Multi-agent systems are currently applied to solve complex problems. The security of networks is an eloquent example of a complex and difficult problem. A new model-concept Hybrid Sensitive Robot Metaheuristic for Intrusion Detection is introduced in the current paper. The proposed technique could be used with machine learning based intrusion detection techniques. The new model uses the reaction of virtual sensitive robots to different stigmergic variables in order to keep the tracks of the intruders when securing a sensor network.Comment: 5 page

Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom asserts that the protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups, i.e., it incentivizes miners to follow the protocol as prescribed. We show that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners. We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1/2 bound, but better than the current reality where a group of any size can compromise the system