9,168 research outputs found
Computational Soundness for Dalvik Bytecode
Automatically analyzing information flow within Android applications that
rely on cryptographic operations with their computational security guarantees
imposes formidable challenges that existing approaches for understanding an
app's behavior struggle to meet. These approaches do not distinguish
cryptographic and non-cryptographic operations, and hence do not account for
cryptographic protections: f(m) is considered sensitive for a sensitive message
m irrespective of potential secrecy properties offered by a cryptographic
operation f. These approaches consequently provide a safe approximation of the
app's behavior, but they mistakenly classify a large fraction of apps as
potentially insecure and consequently yield overly pessimistic results.
In this paper, we show how cryptographic operations can be faithfully
included into existing approaches for automated app analysis. To this end, we
first show how cryptographic operations can be expressed as symbolic
abstractions within the comprehensive Dalvik bytecode language. These
abstractions are accessible to automated analysis, and they can be conveniently
added to existing app analysis tools using minor changes in their semantics.
Second, we show that our abstractions are faithful by providing the first
computational soundness result for Dalvik bytecode, i.e., the absence of
attacks against our symbolically abstracted program entails the absence of any
attacks against a suitable cryptographic program realization. We cast our
computational soundness result in the CoSP framework, which makes the result
modular and composable.Comment: Technical report for the ACM CCS 2016 conference pape
A Rational Approach to Cryptographic Protocols
This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a
rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to
represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties.
Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party cryptographic
protocols are here combined in order to model the latters as the formers. One
of the main advantages of analysing a cryptographic protocol in the game-theory
setting is the possibility of describing improved and stronger cryptographic
solutions because possible adversarial behaviours may be taken into account
directly. With those tools, protocols can be studied in a malicious model in
order to find equilibrium conditions that make possible to protect honest
parties against all possible strategies of adversaries
Reexamination of Quantum Bit Commitment: the Possible and the Impossible
Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum
mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a
strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much
larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in
which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may
include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be
bound to a fixed "honest" strategy, so that "anonymous state protocols", which
were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results are
also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a
cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any
strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only
approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we
explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two
party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and a new
estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum
channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that
fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology, and thus
may allow secure bit commitment. We present a new such protocol whose security,
perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's lab.Comment: v1: 26 pages, 4 eps figures. v2: 31 pages, 5 eps figures; replaced
with published version; title changed to comply with puzzling Phys. Rev.
regulations; impossibility proof extended to protocols with infinitely many
rounds or a continuous communication tree; security proof of decoherence
monster protocol expanded; presentation clarifie
An Experiment in Ping-Pong Protocol Verification by Nondeterministic Pushdown Automata
An experiment is described that confirms the security of a well-studied class
of cryptographic protocols (Dolev-Yao intruder model) can be verified by
two-way nondeterministic pushdown automata (2NPDA). A nondeterministic pushdown
program checks whether the intersection of a regular language (the protocol to
verify) and a given Dyck language containing all canceling words is empty. If
it is not, an intruder can reveal secret messages sent between trusted users.
The verification is guaranteed to terminate in cubic time at most on a
2NPDA-simulator. The interpretive approach used in this experiment simplifies
the verification, by separating the nondeterministic pushdown logic and program
control, and makes it more predictable. We describe the interpretive approach
and the known transformational solutions, and show they share interesting
features. Also noteworthy is how abstract results from automata theory can
solve practical problems by programming language means.Comment: In Proceedings MARS/VPT 2018, arXiv:1803.0866
Computational Extensive-Form Games
We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players
playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a
\emph{computational game}, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some
appropriate sense, to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game.
Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially
the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are
indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game
may correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in
the computational game. We define a computational version of both Nash
equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational games, and show that
every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds
to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational
game. One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol
represents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the
abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol
from the strategic analysis
Safe abstractions of data encodings in formal security protocol models
When using formal methods, security protocols are usually modeled at a high level of abstraction. In particular, data encoding and decoding transformations are often abstracted away. However, if no assumptions at all are made on the behavior of such transformations, they could trivially lead to security faults, for example leaking secrets or breaking freshness by collapsing nonces into constants. In order to address this issue, this paper formally states sufficient conditions, checkable on sequential code, such that if an abstract protocol model is secure under a Dolev-Yao adversary, then a refined model, which takes into account a wide class of possible implementations of the encoding/decoding operations, is implied to be secure too under the same adversary model. The paper also indicates possible exploitations of this result in the context of methods based on formal model extraction from implementation code and of methods based on automated code generation from formally verified model
A Spatial-Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Security Protocols
Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the
information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most
security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information
locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general
language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and
knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for
security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our
computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications
are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator.
We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the
expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We
also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for
any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to
reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a
model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an
extension to the SLMC system.Comment: In Proceedings SecCo 2010, arXiv:1102.516
Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical
effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known
example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many
other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two-
and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum
cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum
adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the
difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models
for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at
cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of
theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and
limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference
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