The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption

In 1997, Professor of Law and Political Science, Susan Rose-Ackerman of Yale University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s seventeenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: The World Bank’s Role in Controlling Corruption. Susan Rose-Ackerman is Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University, and Co-director of the Law School’s Center for Law, Economics, and Public Policy. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from Yale University and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the Fullbright Commission. She was a visiting Research Fellow at the World Bank in 1995-96 where she did research on corruption and economic development. She is the author of Corruption and Government Causes, Consequences and Reform (1999), Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States (1995); Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State (1992); and Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (1978); and joint author of The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (1974) and The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies (1986). She has published widely in law, economics, and policy journals. Her research interests include comparative regulatory law and policy, the political economy of corruption, public policy and administrative law, and law and economics. In this essay Professor Rose-Ackerman discuses how widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning poorly. Ineffective states can retard and misdirect economic growth. International aid and lending organizations have begun to focus on corruption control as part of a general rethinking of their role in the post-Cold War world. Both James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank (Bank), and Michel Camdessus, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have put the control of corruption on their institutions\u27 agendas. Nevertheless, some argue that corruption is a political issue and is, therefore, outside the purview of the World Bank. Corruption, however, has fundamental economic impacts and is thus an appropriate area for World Bank and IMF concern. Bribes represent illegal user fees, taxes, or access charges paid to public agents. These payments influence economic decisions ranging from the size and character of public investment projects to the level of compliance with business regulations. It is difficult to see how a concern for the economic costs of corruption can be responsibly excluded from World Bank lending criteria

Dilemma and Breakthrough: Innovation on Models of Public Legal Education in China Based on Knowledge Graph

In over 30 years, the forms of public legal education activities have become increasingly rich. However, with the technology refresh, the traditional public legal education model characterized by one-way communication has gradually become out of touch, which can not adapt to the return of the people’s subjectivity and meet the personalized needs of different groups of people. As an important part of advancing the Rule of Law in China, public legal education should be timely innovated with the help of new technology. By combining the knowledge graph technology in the era of artificial intelligence with the work of public legal education, this paper studies how to use the knowledge graph technology to build public legal education network platform, introduce customized legal education content, and establish a sound mechanism for intelligent public legal education work, so that users can complete the important transformation from the object of legal education to the subject of law learning. This will enrich the theoretical research results of public legal education

Industrial Park and Foreign Investment for Sustainable Development in Indonesia

In this era of globalization, foreign investment no longer needs to be seen as a threat. On the other hand, foreign investment can be considered as a driving force for national development, including for Indonesia as a developing country, including the construction of Industrial Parks. This study aims to determine the potential and challenges of foreign investment in the development of industrial estates in Indonesia. This paper uses a qualitative descriptive method, where this study describes events that occur and is intended to describe existing phenomena, both natural and human engineering. As a result, this paper finds that the Indonesian government has begun to improve infrastructure so that it is also sufficient to be one of the supporting factors. With a good location and infrastructure, the company's business activities become more effective. And more importantly, the Indonesian government is also willing to provide some fiscal facilities and licensing facilities related to company activities even though they are slightly contrary to sustainable development. Therefore, this research will contribute to the process of increasing foreign investment for sustainable development in Indonesia

The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law

This article describes transnational private law as a decentralized and intermediate form of transnational governance that recognizes and manages the multiplicity of norms generated by plural normative systems in our contemporary world society. These include international and municipal state systems, nonstate social systems, and private ordering by parties. Consistent with an approach that views globalization as changing the nature of the sovereignty of states, the article draws on the rich tradition of private law, considered with its international dimensions, to find both a concrete example of and a model for understanding the complex role of the state in the plural normative orders of the “postnational constellation.” In this task, this article views private law understood in its international context as exemplary of an intermediate level of transnational governance

2008 - The Thirteenth Annual Symposium of Student Scholars

The full program book from the Thirteenth Annual Symposium of Student Scholars, held on April 14, 2008. Includes abstracts from the presentations and posters.https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/sssprograms/1007/thumbnail.jp

Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies

This article proposes a theory of legitimacy tailored to international courts and tribunals. In Part II of this paper, the article defines an international adjudicative body as a dispute resolution mechanism - also called a court or tribunal - which decides disputes between litigants, at least one of whom must be a state, and comments on this definitional choice. The analysis in this article is limited only to adjudicative bodies where states are involved as litigants because a different set of legitimacy-influencing factors may be present when only private parties are involved. Next, it lays out a theory of legitimacy specifically for international adjudicative bodies, and distinguishes from prior theoretical approaches, particularly those reliant on legal legitimacy alone. Borrowing, in part, from Daniel Bodansky and others, the article defines a legitimate international adjudicative body as one whose authority is perceived as justified. The article identifies three factors which influence the perception of justified authority. These factors include (A) the fair and unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, (B) commitment to the underlying normative regime that the body is interpreting and applying, and (C) the body\u27s transparency and relationship to other democratic values. The three categories are deduced or drawn from state practice as embodied in treaty provisions giving rise to or regulating a cross-section of six international adjudicative bodies - what states actually require before consenting to a court\u27s jurisdiction - as well as legal and political science literature on legitimacy, and logic. It is not the purpose of this article to provide empirical support for these hypotheses, but rather to propose a framework for thinking about legitimacy for future debate and possible empirical testing

Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies

This article proposes a theory of legitimacy tailored to international courts and tribunals. In Part II of this paper, the article defines an international adjudicative body as a dispute resolution mechanism - also called a court or tribunal - which decides disputes between litigants, at least one of whom must be a state, and comments on this definitional choice. The analysis in this article is limited only to adjudicative bodies where states are involved as litigants because a different set of legitimacy-influencing factors may be present when only private parties are involved. Next, it lays out a theory of legitimacy specifically for international adjudicative bodies, and distinguishes from prior theoretical approaches, particularly those reliant on legal legitimacy alone. Borrowing, in part, from Daniel Bodansky and others, the article defines a legitimate international adjudicative body as one whose authority is perceived as justified. The article identifies three factors which influence the perception of justified authority. These factors include (A) the fair and unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, (B) commitment to the underlying normative regime that the body is interpreting and applying, and (C) the body\u27s transparency and relationship to other democratic values. The three categories are deduced or drawn from state practice as embodied in treaty provisions giving rise to or regulating a cross-section of six international adjudicative bodies - what states actually require before consenting to a court\u27s jurisdiction - as well as legal and political science literature on legitimacy, and logic. It is not the purpose of this article to provide empirical support for these hypotheses, but rather to propose a framework for thinking about legitimacy for future debate and possible empirical testing