Development of a fusion adaptive algorithm for marine debris detection within the post-Sandy restoration framework

Recognition of marine debris represent a difficult task due to the extreme variability of the marine environment, the possible targets, and the variable skill levels of human operators. The range of potential targets is much wider than similar fields of research such as mine hunting, localization of unexploded ordnance or pipeline detection. In order to address this additional complexity, an adaptive algorithm is being developing that appropriately responds to changes in the environment, and context. The preliminary step is to properly geometrically and radiometrically correct the collected data. Then, the core engine manages the fusion of a set of statistically- and physically-based algorithms, working at different levels (swath, beam, snippet, and pixel) and using both predictive modeling (that is, a high-frequency acoustic backscatter model) and phenomenological (e.g., digital image processing techniques) approaches. The expected outcome is the reduction of inter-algorithmic cross-correlation and, thus, the probability of false alarm. At this early stage, we provide a proof of concept showing outcomes from algorithms that dynamically adapt themselves to the depth and average backscatter level met in the surveyed environment, targeting marine debris (modeled as objects of about 1-m size). The project relies on a modular software library, called Matador (Marine Target Detection and Object Recognition)

Complex natural disasters and the role of the university

This repository item contains a single issue of Issues in Brief, a series of policy briefs that began publishing in 2008 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future.What is the potential and future role of the university in disaster mitigation and humanitarian emergencies? The complexity and imminence of disasters and humanitarian emergencies demand multidisciplinary and innovative approaches, as has been seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the Haitian earthquake. In this brief, Enrique Silva suggests that universities need to harness the wealth of knowledge and interest within and across their institutions to think critically about and work creatively on “natural” disasters, and cites examples of how this effort has begun at Boston University and elsewhere

Enhancing Coastal Resilience: Perspectives on Valuing RI Coastal Lands

This paper discusses coastal resilience as an organizing framework for future policymaking, coastal planning, and insurance decisions, and explores the different perspectives of the value of ecosystems held by various stakeholders in Rhode Island’s coastal communities. A grounded theory approach was used in an effort to abstract general insights from the substantive but isolated areas of coastal management and economics. Special attention is given to the perspectives of municipal decision makers, the National Flood Insurance Program, natural economists, and real estate developers. We have (1) conducted a statistical analysis of environmental spending of RI towns, (2) identified key models for ecosystem services valuation, (3) researched the major threats to coastal ecosystems, and (4) explored how the coastal resilience theme might shape the future of the coast. Elements of the study rely on the formulation and testing of hypotheses. However, the analysis was primarily a demonstration of the inter-disciplinary emergent thinking that this paper proposes will provide solutions for coastal communities’ most pressing issues. The framing question is how social, personal, and environmental goals align when coastal resilience is enhanced, and how stakeholders can utilize these new decision-making tools to achieve increased communication and a more accurate understanding of the perceived value of ecosystem services

An Asian Option to the Valuation of Insurance Futures Contracts

While insurers have a variety of instruments readily available to hedge the risk of assets and interest rate sensitive liabilities, until recently reinsurance was the only mechanism for hedging underwriting risk. The insurance futures contracts introduced in December 1992 by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) offer insurers an alternative to reinsurance as a hedging device for under-writing risk. These instruments have the usual features of liquidity, anonymity, and low transaction costs that characterize futures contracts. Unlike reinsurance, hedging through futures has the advantage of reversibility since any position may be closed before the maturity of the futures contract if the overall exposure of the insurer has diminished. Reversing a reinsurance transaction exposes the insurer to relatively high transactions costs as well as additional charges to protect the reinsurer against adverse selection. Because futures contracts are based on losses incurred by a pool of a least 10 insurance companies selected by the Insurance Services Officer, the potential for adverse selection and the accompanying administrative costs are greatly diminished relative to a reinsurance contract. Unlike most futures contracts traded on the CBOT, insurance futures are based on an accumulation of insurance loss payments over a period of time rather than the price of a commodity or asset at the end of a period of time. The classical relationships between the spot price and the futures price do not hold. The fact that the futures price at maturity will reflect a sum of claim payments entails a structural similarity between this contract and an Asian option, for which the underlying asset is an average, i.e., a sum of spot prices (up to a multiplicative constant). Thus, it would be incorrect to price these instruments using standard futures pricing techniques. Geman and Yor (1992, 1993) investigate the exact solution of this problem. The authors apply the Geman-Yor approach to the valuation of the insurance catastrophe futures contracts offered by the CBOT. In their model, the state variable is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion - the claims process. The payoff on the insurance futures contract is determined by the accumulation or integral of the state variable. The authors believe there is a significant systematic component to insurance losses, especially those involving catastrophes. Insurers should be able to reduce risk by trading futures contracts. In their view the primary reason for limited trading of insurance futures is the lack of information on the loss index. There is very little information to support parameter estimation or to assist traders in forming expectations. In the authors' view, the CBOT's current offerings are unlikely to be successful unless the information problem is solved.

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

The Supply of Catastrophe Insurance Under Regulatory Constraints

Klein and Kleindorfer provide a brief overview of the current extent of their research on this topic. The intent of this research is to empirically address interactions across the multiple stakeholders in the Catastrophe Insurance Business, i.e. homeowners, businesses, insurers, reinsurers, the construction and real estate sector, and regulatory institutions. Their analysis is aimed at addressing three questions: What is the structure and performance of the catastrophe insurance market? How do factors such as, interdependencies, profits, risk exposures, and distribution impact the performance of the market? What is the impact of regulation of this market on pricing adequacy, pricing precision, and financial risk? What is the current state of the market, and what future sustainable states of the market are possible? This paper is primarily devoted to describing what authors consider to be the structural drivers of supply and demand and the impact of regulatory controls. These drivers are: "Demand structure" (i.e. why consumers buy what they do) obviously contains several components. Items such as location, demography, price, policy features such as the presence of absence of bundling, "quality" effects such as perceived solvency and claims processes, and finally, how products are distributed, all impact consumer choice. In addition, consumers have other risk management options open to them, the most obvious being where to live, what type of construction to choose and what type of "mitigation", if any to employ. "Supply Structure" describes how the consumer business of insurance is conducted. Salient features would be the degree of competition, geography, profitability, solvency, exposure, loss costs, marketing costs, organizational form, financial structure, and regulatory/solvency constraints. Obviously, insurance companies attempt to maximize profits in the face of these variables "Regulatory Impact" on such things as pricing adequacy, pricing precision, and financial risk has important effects on all parties. In particular the freedom to manage ones risk exposure is critical to everyone from the individual consumer to the largest company, and regulation may produce. In an analysis to come later, the researchers will utilize detailed premium record data obtained from ISO on insurance transactions, supplemented by information on expected costs for different policies and risk characteristics. The data will, for the first time, provide and empirically grounded understanding of the supply and demand for CAT-related coverage provided in residential insurance policies. The study will seek to identify the factors that most affect supply and demand and the magnitudes of their relative effects, including the pricing of CAT coverage and alternative policy provisions.