Blockchain, Bitcoin, and VAT in the GCC: The Missing Trader Example

Blockchain is coming to tax administration and will cause fundamental change. This article considers the potential for blockchain technology as it applies to the introduction of a value added tax in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Blockchain technology disrupts centralized ledgers. Blockchain improves efficiency, security and transparency. Perhaps no centralized ledger system presents more challenges than that of the modern tax administration. The central data storage system of a modern tax authority contains all return, payment, and audit activity for all taxpayers arranged tax-by-tax for three years or longer periods of time. It is likely that blockchain will come first to jurisdictions like the GCC, where there is no pre-existing tax system to be “disrupted.” This is the familiar technological “leap-frog” effect where jurisdictions without an established infrastructure in place can quickly move to new technologies without needing to pass through the entire development process. This is a common occurrence in African economies. For those who are attentive to the coming blockchain disruption there are some precursor developments already visible. In the restaurant sector, Quebec mandates encryption of transaction data, requires the monthly submission of a digital summary report, performs AI-base risk analysis on the aggregate data streams to identify fraud patterns, and completes most audits remotely. Rwanda has gone further. It implemented a DICE compliance regime for all businesses, and requires full transactional data transmission daily (not just summary reports submitted monthly). Rwanda performs the same AI-based risk analysis for fraud detection. In addition, Rwanda appears ready to adopt a cross-border DICE system with neighboring Tanzania

Bitcoin: the wrong implementation of the right idea at the right time

This paper is a study into some of the regulatory implications of cryptocurrencies using the CAMPO research framework (Context, Actors, Methods, Methods, Practice, Outcomes). We explain in CAMPO format why virtual currencies are of interest, how self-regulation has failed, and what useful lessons can be learned. We are hopeful that the full paper will produce useful and semi-permanent findings into the usefulness of virtual currencies in general, block chains as a means of mining currency, and the profundity of current ‘media darling’ currency Bitcoin as compared with the development of block chain generator Ethereum. While virtual currencies can play a role in creating better trading conditions in virtual communities, despite the risks of non-sovereign issuance and therefore only regulation by code (Brown/Marsden 2013), the methodology used poses significant challenges to researching this ‘community’, if BitCoin can even be said to have created a single community, as opposed to enabling an alternate method of exchange for potentially all virtual community transactions. First, BitCoin users have transparency of ownership but anonymity in many transactions, necessary for libertarians or outright criminals in such illicit markets as #SilkRoad. Studying community dynamics is therefore made much more difficult than even such pseudonymous or avatar based communities as Habbo Hotel, World of Warcraft or SecondLife. The ethical implications of studying such communities raise similar problems as those of Tor, Anonymous, Lulzsec and other anonymous hacker communities. Second, the journalistic accounts of BitCoin markets are subject to sensationalism, hype and inaccuracy, even more so than in the earlier hype cycle for SecondLife, exacerbated by the first issue of anonymity. Third, the virtual currency area is subject to slowly emerging regulation by financial authorities and police forces, which appears to be driving much of the early adopter community ‘underground’. Thus, the community in 2016 may not bear much resemblance to that in 2012. Fourth, there has been relatively little academic empirical study of the community, or indeed of virtual currencies in general, until relatively recently. Fifth, the dynamism of the virtual currency environment in the face of the deepening mistrust of the financial system after the 2008 crisis is such that any research conclusions must by their nature be provisional and transient. All these challenges, particularly the final three, also raise the motivation for research – an alternative financial system which is separated from the real-world sovereign and which can use code regulation with limited enforcement from offline policing, both returns the study to the libertarian self-regulated environment of early 1990s MUDs, and offers a tantalising prospect of a tool to evade the perils of ‘private profit, socialized risk’ which existing large financial institutions created in the 2008-12 disaster. The need for further research into virtual currencies based on blockchain mining, and for their usage by virtual communities, is thus pressing and should motivate researchers to solve the many problems in methodology for exploring such an environment

Cryptocurrency: History, Advantages, Disadvantages, and the Future

Cryptocurrency is a digital asset that has seen a large amount of attention within the past five years. Its origin is intriguing to some based upon its newness, yet it has invoked mysticism and skepticism in others. Bitcoin is the most recognizable currency, receiving heavy media attention. There are several other cryptocurrencies as well, less in the spotlight. Most appealing to cryptocurrency could include lack of government oversight, and increased privacy available to the consumer(s) (Bunjaku, Gjorgieva-Trajkovska, and Miteva-Kacarski, 2017, p. 37). Additional advantages include the simplicity in the start-up process, the ease of transferability, and the opportunity to have a seamless process in investing and/or exchanging monies. Cryptocurrency creates the ability to invest for some people groups that could never invest before and diversify investment portfolios (Theron and van Vuure, 2018, p. 2). While the newness of cryptocurrency certainly has been appealing for some, it also has been perceived oppositional by others. There has been concerns identified with regard to the level of trust required, an obvious and significant drawback if valid. Another identified disadvantage to cryptocurrency is its low amount of oversight and liquidity hurt for investing future. The ability for cryptocurrency to be used for illegal and/or evil activity is an ethical drawback (Nian and Chuen, 2015, p. 15). Lastly, the uncertainty of the future is a significant drawback. The future of cryptocurrency requires much economic forecasting. The new changes that cryptocurrency will bring to traditional economic institutes is an area which cryptocurrency needs to explored more. Lastly, is cryptocurrency a fad or an economic bubble

Collection of Cryptocurrency Customer-Information: Tax Enforcement Mechanism or Invasion of Privacy?

After granting permission to the Internal Revenue Service to serve a digital exchange company a summons for user information, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California created some uncertainty regarding the privacy of cryptocurrencies. The IRS views this information gathering as necessary for monitoring compliance with Notice 2014-21, which classifies cryptocurrencies as property for tax purposes. Cryptocurrency users, however, view the attempt for information as an infringement on their privacy rights and are seeking legal protection. This Issue Brief investigates the future tax implications of Notice 2014-21 and considers possible routes the cryptocurrency market can take to avoid the burden of capital gains taxes. Further, this Issue Brief attempts to uncover the validity of the privacy claims made against the customer information summons and will recommend alternative actions for the IRS to take regardless of whether it succeeds in obtaining the information

Collection of Cryptocurrency Customer-Information: Tax Enforcement Mechanism or Invasion of Privacy?

After granting permission to the Internal Revenue Service to serve a digital exchange company a summons for user information, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California created some uncertainty regarding the privacy of cryptocurrencies. The IRS views this information gathering as necessary for monitoring compliance with Notice 2014-21, which classifies cryptocurrencies as property for tax purposes. Cryptocurrency users, however, view the attempt for information as an infringement on their privacy rights and are seeking legal protection. This Issue Brief investigates the future tax implications of Notice 2014-21 and considers possible routes the cryptocurrency market can take to avoid the burden of capital gains taxes. Further, this Issue Brief attempts to uncover the validity of the privacy claims made against the customer information summons and will recommend alternative actions for the IRS to take regardless of whether it succeeds in obtaining the information

Multilateral Transparency for Security Markets Through DLT

For decades, changing technology and policy choices have worked to fragment securities markets, rendering them so dark that neither ownership nor real-time price of securities are generally visible to all parties multilaterally. The policies in the U.S. National Market System and the EU Market in Financial Instruments Directive— together with universal adoption of the indirect holding system— have pushed Western securities markets into a corner from which escape to full transparency has seemed either impossible or prohibitively expensive. Although the reader has a right to skepticism given the exaggerated promises surrounding blockchain in recent years, we demonstrate in this paper that distributed ledger technology (DLT) contains the potential to convert fragmented securities markets back to multilateral transparency. Leading markets generally lack transparency in two ways that derive from their basic structure: (1) multiple platforms on which trades in the same security are matched have separate bid/ask queues and are not consolidated in real time (fragmented pricing), and (2) highspeed transfers of securities are enabled by placing ownership of the securities in financial institutions, thus preventing transparent ownership (depository or street name ownership). The distributed nature of DLT allows multiple copies of the same pricing queue to be held simultaneously by a large number of order-matching platforms, curing the problem of fragmented pricing. This same distributed nature of DLT would allow the issuers of securities to be nodes in a DLT network, returning control over securities ownership and transfer to those issuers and thus, restoring transparent ownership through direct holding with the issuer. A serious objection to DLT is that its latency is very high—with each Bitcoin blockchain transaction taking up to ten minutes. To remedy this, we first propose a private network without cumbersome proof-of-work cryptography. Second, we introduce into our model the quickly evolving technology of “lightning networks,” which are advanced two-layer off-chain networks conducting high-speed transacting with only periodic memorialization in the permanent DLT network. Against the background of existing securities trading and settlement, this Article demonstrates that a DLT network could bring multilateral transparency and thus represent the next step in evolution for markets in their current configuration