Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.Comment: Extended version of a paper to appear in the 3rd Workshop on Security, Privacy, and Identity Management in the Cloud (SECPID) 201

State of Alaska Election Security Project Phase 2 Report

A laska’s election system is among the most secure in the country, and it has a number of safeguards other states are now adopting. But the technology Alaska uses to record and count votes could be improved— and the state’s huge size, limited road system, and scattered communities also create special challenges for insuring the integrity of the vote. In this second phase of an ongoing study of Alaska’s election security, we recommend ways of strengthening the system—not only the technology but also the election procedures. The lieutenant governor and the Division of Elections asked the University of Alaska Anchorage to do this evaluation, which began in September 2007.Lieutenant Governor Sean Parnell. State of Alaska Division of Elections.List of Appendices / Glossary / Study Team / Acknowledgments / Introduction / Summary of Recommendations / Part 1 Defense in Depth / Part 2 Fortification of Systems / Part 3 Confidence in Outcomes / Conclusions / Proposed Statement of Work for Phase 3: Implementation / Reference

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this number. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically (in the sense of extracting the key material and loading it into another card). Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. Pre-play attacks may also be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled the flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss countermeasures

Cyber security investigation for Raspberry Pi devices

Big Data on Cloud application is growing rapidly. When the cloud is attacked, the investigation relies on digital forensics evidence. This paper proposed the data collection via Raspberry Pi devices, in a healthcare situation. The significance of this work is that could be expanded into a digital device array that takes big data security issues into account. There are many potential impacts in health area. The field of Digital Forensics Science has been tagged as a reactive science by some who believe research and study in the field often arise as a result of the need to respond to event which brought about the needs for investigation; this work was carried as a proactive research that will add knowledge to the field of Digital Forensic Science. The Raspberry Pi is a cost-effective, pocket sized computer that has gained global recognition since its development in 2008; with the wide spread usage of the device for different computing purposes. Raspberry Pi can potentially be a cyber security device, which can relate with forensics investigation in the near future. This work has used a systematic approach to study the structure and operation of the device and has established security issues that the widespread usage of the device can pose, such as health or smart city. Furthermore, its evidential information applied in security will be useful in the event that the device becomes a subject of digital forensic investigation in the foreseeable future. In healthcare system, PII (personal identifiable information) is a very important issue. When Raspberry Pi plays a processor role, its security is vital; consequently, digital forensics investigation on the Raspberry Pies becomes necessary

IPhone Securtity Analysis

The release of Apple’s iPhone was one of the most intensively publicized product releases in the history of mobile devices. While the iPhone wowed users with its exciting design and features, it also outraged many for not allowing installation of third party applications and for working exclusively with AT&T wireless services for the first two years. Software attacks have been developed to get around both limitations. The development of those attacks and further evaluation revealed several vulnerabilities in iPhone security. In this paper, we examine several of the attacks developed for the iPhone as a way of investigating the iPhone’s security structure. We also analyze the security holes that have been discovered and make suggestions for improving iPhone security