Emotion in Future Intelligent Machines

Over the past decades, research in cognitive and affective neuroscience has emphasized that emotion is crucial for human intelligence and in fact inseparable from cognition. Concurrently, there has been a significantly growing interest in simulating and modeling emotion in robots and artificial agents. Yet, existing models of emotion and their integration in cognitive architectures remain quite limited and frequently disconnected from neuroscientific evidence. We argue that a stronger integration of emotion in robot models is critical for the design of intelligent machines capable of tackling real world problems. Drawing from current neuroscientific knowledge, we provide a set of guidelines for future research in artificial emotion and intelligent machines more generally

"Involving Interface": An Extended Mind Theoretical Approach to Roboethics

In 2008 the authors held Involving Interface, a lively interdisciplinary event focusing on issues of biological, sociocultural, and technological interfacing (see Acknowledgments). Inspired by discussions at this event, in this article, we further discuss the value of input from neuroscience for developing robots and machine interfaces, and the value of philosophy, the humanities, and the arts for identifying persistent links between human interfacing and broader ethical concerns. The importance of ongoing interdisciplinary debate and public communication on scientific and technical advances is also highlighted. Throughout, the authors explore the implications of the extended mind hypothesis for notions of moral accountability and robotics

Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism

The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, there was an overwhelming consensus among Christian thinkers that some form of mind-body (or soul-body) dualism is true of human beings. Recently, that consensus has eroded, and with it the availability of a shared body of knowledge about spiritual formation. Some Christian physicalists argue that dualism is incompatible with central elements of spiritual formation. Neuroscientist Warren Brown and psychologist Brad Strawn offer the only substantive account of spiritual formation from the view of Christian physicalism and its accompanying objections to dualism. It is on their arguments that this chapter focuses. We argue that Brown and Strawn fail to support their incompatibility thesis. Additionally, we argue that Christian physicalism stands in tension with important philosophical and theological foundations of Christian spiritual formation. In doing so we offer a specific form of dualism, the bodily soul view, and explain how this view illuminates the importance of embodiment, our neurological and social development, and hence the important physical aspects of Christian spiritual formation

The use of emotions in the implementation of various types of learning in a cognitive agent

Les tuteurs professionnels humains sont capables de prendre en considération des événements du passé et du présent et ont une capacité d'adaptation en fonction d'événements sociaux. Afin d'être considéré comme une technologie valable pour l'amélioration de l'apprentissage humain, un agent cognitif artificiel devrait pouvoir faire de même. Puisque les environnements dynamiques sont en constante évolution, un agent cognitif doit pareillement évoluer et s'adapter aux modifications structurales et aux phénomènes nouveaux. Par conséquent, l'agent cognitif idéal devrait posséder des capacités d'apprentissage similaires à celles que l'on retrouve chez l'être humain ; l'apprentissage émotif, l'apprentissage épisodique, l'apprentissage procédural, et l'apprentissage causal. Cette thèse contribue à l'amélioration des architectures d'agents cognitifs. Elle propose 1) une méthode d'intégration des émotions inspirée du fonctionnement du cerveau; et 2) un ensemble de méthodes d'apprentissage (épisodique, causale, etc.) qui tiennent compte de la dimension émotionnelle. Le modèle proposé que nous avons appelé CELTS (Conscious Emotional Learning Tutoring System) est une extension d'un agent cognitif conscient dans le rôle d'un tutoriel intelligent. Il comporte un module de gestion des émotions qui permet d'attribuer des valences émotionnelles positives ou négatives à chaque événement perçu par l'agent. Deux voies de traitement sont prévues : 1) une voie courte qui permet au système de répondre immédiatement à certains événements sans un traitement approfondis, et 2) une voie longue qui intervient lors de tout événement qui exige la volition. Dans cette perspective, la dimension émotionnelle est considérée dans les processus cognitifs de l'agent pour la prise de décision et l'apprentissage. L'apprentissage épisodique dans CELTS est basé sur la théorie du Multiple Trace Memory consolidation qui postule que lorsque l'on perçoit un événement, l'hippocampe fait une première interprétation et un premier apprentissage. Ensuite, l'information acquise est distribuée aux différents cortex. Selon cette théorie, la reconsolidation de la mémoire dépend toujours de l'hippocampe. Pour simuler de tel processus, nous avons utilisé des techniques de fouille de données qui permettent la recherche de motifs séquentiels fréquents dans les données générées durant chaque cycle cognitif. L'apprentissage causal dans CELTS se produit à l'aide de la mémoire épisodique. Il permet de trouver les causes et les effets possibles entre différents événements. Il est mise en œuvre grâce à des algorithmes de recherche de règles d'associations. Les associations établies sont utilisées pour piloter les interventions tutorielles de CELTS et, par le biais des réponses de l'apprenant, pour évaluer les règles causales découvertes. \ud ______________________________________________________________________________ \ud MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : agents cognitifs, émotions, apprentissage épisodique, apprentissage causal

Feel, Don\u27t Think Review of the Application of Neuroscience Methods for Conversational Agent Research

Conversational agents (CAs) equipped with human-like features (e.g., name, avatar) have been reported to induce the perception of humanness and social presence in users, which can also increase other aspects of users’ affection, cognition, and behavior. However, current research is primarily based on self-reported measurements, leaving the door open for errors related to the self-serving bias, socially desired responding, negativity bias and others. In this context, applying neuroscience methods (e.g., EEG or MRI) could provide a means to supplement current research. However, it is unclear to what extent such methods have already been applied and what future directions for their application might be. Against this background, we conducted a comprehensive and transdisciplinary review. Based on our sample of 37 articles, we find an increased interest in the topic after 2017, with neural signal and trust/decision-making as upcoming areas of research and five separate research clusters, describing current research trends

The Psycho-neurology of Embodiment with Examples from Authentic Movement and Laban Movement Analysis

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Helen Payne, 'The Psycho-neurology of Embodiment with Examples from Authentic Movement and Laban Movement Analysis', American Journal of Dance Therapy, June 2017. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 7 June 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10465-017-9256-2.There is widespread agreement that thought is embodied cognition and that our earliest learning is implicit, through the body, and nonverbal expression. This article advances the proposition that the integration of thought and emotion is felt through the body. Embodiment and embodied simulation (ES) (Gallese in Neuropsychoanalysis 13(2):196–200, 2011) represent controversial topics in both the philosophy of mind (Clark in Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) and cognitive neuroscience (Gallagher in Cognitive Syst Res 34–35:35–43, 2015a; Gallagher in Conscious Cogn 36:452–465, 2015b; Gallese & Sinigaglia in J Conscious Stud 18(7–8):117–143, 2011a; Gallese in Philos Trans R Soc B 369(1644):20130177, 2014). As a result of advances in these areas of research, there is a need to re-conceptualize our understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in dance movement psychotherapy. Could ES be applied to the psychology of movement? This article attempts to apply this theory of embodiment to the practice of Authentic Movement (AM) and Laban Movement Analysis. The theory of ES is proposed as one possible explanation of how the witness in AM comes to know her inner experience in the presence of a mover, which may lead to an “offering” to that mover from the witness’ conscious body (Adler in Offering from the conscious body: The discipline of Authentic Movement, Inner Traditions, Rochester, VT, 2002). Furthermore, there is an examination of how ES connects to the task of movement observation and how meaning is arrived at from the various movement patterns observed.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Motus Animi in Mente Insana: An Emotion-Oriented Paradigm of Legal Insanity Informed by the Neuroscience of Moral Judgments and Decision-Making

Legal insanity is deeply rooted in an intellectualistic conception of the capacity for moral rationality. The vast majority of insanity standards essentially consider the integrity of the defendant’s cognitive faculties at the time of the offense. However, the cognitivist model of legal insanity collides with the body of neuroscientific and behavioral literature about the critical role of emotions in moral judgments and decision-making processes. Drawing upon this scientific knowledge, this Article reforms the intellectualistic substance of the capacity for moral rationality that underlies the insanity doctrine by including emotions in its relevant psychological set. Hence, it provides a revised model of legal insanity, one that gives more prominence to individuals’ emotional faculties in relation to the crime committed. The analysis highlights that the legal reconsideration of the role of emotions within the capacity for moral rationality turns the insanity defense into a tripartite, more dimensional test—one inclusive of emotional, cognitive, and volitional prongs. Normative arguments in support of the proposed alternative paradigm of legal insanity are illustrated and discussed

Responsible Brains: Neuroscience, Law, and Human Culpability

[This download includes the table of contents and chapter 1.] When we praise, blame, punish, or reward people for their actions, we are holding them responsible for what they have done. Common sense tells us that what makes human beings responsible has to do with their minds and, in particular, the relationship between their minds and their actions. Yet the empirical connection is not necessarily obvious. The “guilty mind” is a core concept of criminal law, but if a defendant on trial for murder were found to have serious brain damage, which brain parts or processes would have to be damaged for him to be considered not responsible, or less responsible, for the crime? The authors argue that evidence from neuroscience and the other cognitive sciences can illuminate the nature of responsibility and agency. They go on to offer a novel and comprehensive neuroscientific theory of human responsibility

Afinal de contas, a inteligência artificial não é inteligente: à procura de uma definição neurocientífica compreensível da inteligência

This paper explores a series of thoughts about the meaning of intelligence in neuroscience and computer science. This work aims to present an understandable definition that fits our contemporary artificial intelligence background. The research methodology of this essay lies in existing theories of artificial intelligence, focused on computer science and neuroscience. I analyze the relationship between intelligence and neuroscience and Hawkin’s Thousand Brains Theory, an approach to show what it is an intelligent agent according to neuroscience. Here, the main result relies on the verification that intelligence is only possible in the neocortex. According to this result, the study performs a second critical analysis aiming to demonstrate why there is no artificial intelligence today.Este trabajo explora una serie de reflexiones sobre el significado de la inteligencia en la neurociencia y la informática. El objetivo de este trabajo es presentar una definición comprensible que se ajuste a nuestro entorno contemporáneo de inteligencia artificial. Se analiza la relación entre la inteligencia y la neurociencia y presento la teoría de los mil cerebros de Hawkins, un enfoque para mostrar qué es un agente inteligente según la neurociencia. Aquí, el principal resultado se basa en la comprobación de que la inteligencia sólo es posible en el neocórtex. De acuerdo con este resultado, el estudio hace un segundo análisis crítico con el objetivo de demostrar por qué no existe la inteligencia artificial en la actualidad. La metodología de investigación de este ensayo se basa en las teorías existentes sobre la inteligencia artificial, centradas en la informática y la neurociencia.Este trabalho explora uma série de reflexões sobre o significado da inteligência na neurociência e informática. O objetivo desse trabalho é apresentar uma definição compreensível que se ajuste ao nosso ambiente contemporâneo de inteligência artificial. Analisa-se a relação entre inteligência e a neurociência e a teoria dos mil cérebros de Hawkins, uma abordagem para mostrar que é um agente inteligente segundo a neurociência. O principal resultado se baseia na comprovação de que a inteligência só é possível na neocórtex. De acordo com esse resultado, o estudo faz uma segunda análise crítica com o objetivo de demonstrar por que não existe inteligência artificial na atualidade. A metodologia aplicada a esta pesquisa baseou-se nas teorias existentes sobre a inteligência artificial, centradas na informática e na neurociência