MNCs’ Ownership Advantage, Developing Countries, And New Regionalism

Since the mid-1980s, more regional trade arrangements (RTAs) have arisen between developing and developed countries than before. The evidence shows that MNCs are the major driving force of the new regionalism. The puzzle presented in this paper is why MNCs would like to propel new RTAs between developing and developed countries. The paper believes that the emergence and development of new regionalism is, to a great extent, related to the situation that MNCs wish to enter into developing countries markets. However, it is not easy for MNCs to access to this developing market. MNCs still have to be faced with challenges brought about by both their more and more public-good-like ownership advantages and the increasing cost of producing ownership advantages. If MNCs did not extend their market to the developing countries, they would not spread the cost of producing ownership advantages. However, if they did, they would face the risk that their property of public goods is freely ridden by developing countries due to no effective intellectual property protection (IPP). Therefore, MNCs have to produce much demand for building up new RTAs including developing countries to protect their ownership advantages, especially when they meet the difficulties in multinational negotiation in IPP.Regional Trade Agreements, Multi-National Corporations, East Asia

Property and the Construction of the Information Economy: A Neo-Polanyian Ontology

This chapter considers the changing roles and forms of information property within the political economy of informational capitalism. I begin with an overview of the principal methods used in law and in media and communications studies, respectively, to study information property, considering both what each disciplinary cluster traditionally has emphasized and newer, hybrid directions. Next, I develop a three-part framework for analyzing information property as a set of emergent institutional formations that both work to produce and are themselves produced by other evolving political-economic arrangements. The framework considers patterns of change in existing legal institutions for intellectual property, the ongoing dematerialization and datafication of both traditional and new inputs to economic production, and the emerging logics of economic organization within which information resources (and property rights) are mobilized. Finally, I consider the implications of that framing for two very different contemporary information property projects, one relating to data flows within platform-based business models and the other to information commons

Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages

The search for enablers of continued growth of SMS traffic, as well asthe take-off of the more diversified MMS message contents, open up forenterprises the potential of bulk use of mobile messaging , instead ofessentially one-by-one use. In parallel, such enterprises or valueadded services needing mobile messaging in bulk - for spot use or foruse over a prescribed period of time - want to minimize totalacquisition costs, from a set of technically approved providers ofmessaging capacity.This leads naturally to the evaluation of auctioning for bulk SMS orMMS messaging capacity, with the intrinsic advantages therein such asreduction in acquisition costs, allocation efficiency, and optimality.The paper shows, with extensive results as evidence from simulationscarried out in the Rotterdam School of Management e-Auction room, howmulti-attribute reverse auctions perform for the enterprise-buyer, aswell as for the messaging capacity-sellers. We compare 1- and 5-roundauctions, to show the learning effect and the benefits thereof to thevarious parties. The sensitivity will be reported to changes in theenterprise's and the capacity providers utilities and prioritiesbetween message attributes (such as price, size, security, anddelivery delay). At the organizational level, the paper also considersalternate organizational deployment schemes and properties for anoff-line or spot bulk messaging capacity market, subject to technicaland regulatory constraints.MMS;EMS;Mobile commerce;SMS;multi-attribute auctions

The economic impact of cybercrime and cyber espionage

Introduction Is cybercrime, cyber espionage, and other malicious cyber activities what some call “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history,” or is it what others say is a “rounding error in a fourteen trillion dollar economy?” The wide range of existing estimates of the annual loss—from a few billion dollars to hundreds of billions—reflects several difficulties. Companies conceal their losses and some are not aware of what has been taken. Intellectual property is hard to value. Some estimates relied on surveys, which provide very imprecise results unless carefully constructed. One common problem with cybersecurity surveys is that those who answer the questions “self-select,” introducing a possible source of distortion into the results. Given the data collection problems, loss estimates are based on assumptions about scale and effect— change the assumption and you get very different results. These problems leave many estimates open to question. The Components of Malicious Cyber Activity In this initial report we start by asking what we should count in estimating losses from cybercrime and cyber espionage. We can break malicious cyber activity into six parts: The loss of intellectual property and business confidential information Cybercrime, which costs the world hundreds of millions of dollars every year The loss of sensitive business information, including possible stock market manipulation Opportunity costs, including service and employment disruptions, and reduced trust for online activities The additional cost of securing networks, insurance, and recovery from cyber attacks Reputational damage to the hacked company Put these together and the cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage to the global economy is probably measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars. To put this in perspective, the World Bank says that global GDP was about $70 trillion in 2011. A$400 billion loss—the high end of the range of probable costs—would be a fraction of a percent of global income. But this begs several important questions about the full benefit to the acquirers and the damage to the victims from the cumulative effect of cybercrime and cyber espionage

THE STATE OF CHINA-EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Bruegel Working Paper Issue 09 20 November 2019

China and the European Union have an extensive and growing economic relationship. The relationship is problematic because of the distortions caused by China’s state capitalist system and the diversity of interests within the EU’s incomplete federation. More can be done to capture the untapped trade and investment opportunities that exist between the parties. China’s size and dynamism, and its recent shift from an export-led to a domesticdemand- led growth model, mean that these opportunities are likely to grow with time. As the Chinese economy matures, provided appropriate policy steps are taken, it is likely to become a less disruptive force in world markets than during its extraordinary breakout period

Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code

Much of the discussion of bitcoin in the popular press has concentrated on its status as a currency. Putting aside a vocal minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, however, many bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating on how its underlying technology – the blockchain – can be put to use for wide variety of uses. For example, economists at the Fed and other central banks have suggested that they should encourage the evolution of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol which might allow financial transactions to clear much efficiently than under our current systems. As such, it also holds out the possibility of becoming that holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries. In addition, the NASDAQ and a number of issuers are experimenting with using the blockchain to record the issuing and trading of investments securities. In this Article, I examine the implications for bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”). Specifically, I consider three issues. In Part 1, I discuss the characterization of bitcoin – which I am using generically to refer to any virtual or cryptocurrency – under Article 9. The bad news is that it does not, and cannot be made to fit into, the U.C.C.’s definition of “money”. If held directly by the owner, bitcoin constitutes a “general intangible”. Unfortunately, general intangibles are non-negotiable. This could greatly impinge on bitcoin’s liquidity and, therefore, its utility as a payment system. In Part 2, I show how this may be mitigated by the rules of Article 8 governing investment securities. If the owner of bitcoin were to choose to hold it indirectly through a financial intermediary, then she and the intermediary could elect to have it treated as a “financial asset” which is super-negotiable. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of eliminating one of the primary attractions of cryptocurrency, namely the ability to engage in financial transactions directly without a third-party intermediary. However, Article 8, may already provide a legal regime for another contemplated use for the blockchain – namely as a readily searchable means of recording the ownership and transfer of property generally. In Part 3, I explain how cryptosecurities fall squarely within Article 8\u27s definition of “uncertificated securities.” Ironically, therefore, the creation of bitcoin securities may finally breathe life to little used provisions that were invented almost 40 years ago in a failed attempt to solve a completely different problem