35,587 research outputs found

    Information-Driven Housing

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    This paper suggests a new information-driven framework is needed to help consumers evaluate the sustainability of their housing options. The paper provides an outline of this new framework and how it would work

    Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

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    We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study

    Towards the Framing of Venture Capital Policies: a Systems-Evolutionary Perspective with Particular Reference to the UK/Scotland and Israeli Experiences

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    We compare some of the policies that have been attempted in Europe (UK/Scotland) and Israel over the past fifteen years to elaborate a new Systems Evolutionary (SE) framework for rethinking VC policy and related ITP. We argue that this perspective is useful for both real world (‘positive’) analysis and policy (‘normative’) analys is. Our SE framework is shaped by (i) a multidimensional view of VC; (ii) strong between VC, VC policy and the development of EHTCs; and (iii) a strategic approach to policy. In contrast, many VC policies in Europe up to and including the 1990s took a ‘static’ financial view of VC that focused on ‘bridging existng early phase finance gaps of innovative companies’ rather than creating of a new mechanism to assure the timely growth of EHTCs. We aim to present the new framework rather than to provide specific recommendations. The main conclusion is that the success of VC policies depend on factors such as the phase of evolution of (i) VC or related innovation finance organizations; (ii) the underlying segment of start up companies and of high tech industries; (iii) the specific country/region institutional setting. While in some contexts it may be worth considering the targeting of a new VC industry/market (and associated EHTC) in others the focus of policy should center in improving pre-emergence conditions. More specifically it may be, given that VC searches for ‘investment ready opportunities’, that ITP should, in many contexts, precede VC policies. Another key conclusion is that implementing this perspective necessitates the creation of a strategic level of policy, with a view of specifying a set of strategic priorities for Scie nce, Technology, and Innovation, priorities that should precede rather than follow policy design and implementation. A major challenge is to extend the present framework that was initially based on VCs oriented towards ICT to LS.

    Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

    Get PDF
    We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study.
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