“An ethnographic seduction”: how qualitative research and Agent-based models can benefit each other

We provide a general analytical framework for empirically informed agent-based simulations. This methodology provides present-day agent-based models with a sound and proper insight as to the behavior of social agents — an insight that statistical data often fall short of providing at least at a micro level and for hidden and sensitive populations. In the other direction, simulations can provide qualitative researchers in sociology, anthropology and other fields with valuable tools for: (a) testing the consistency and pushing the boundaries, of specific theoretical frameworks; (b) replicating and generalizing results; (c) providing a platform for cross-disciplinary validation of results

An information theory based behavioral model for agent-based crowd simulations

Crowds must be simulated believable in terms of their appearance and behavior to improve a virtual environment’s realism. Due to the complex nature of human behavior, realistic behavior of agents in crowd simulations is still a challenging problem. In this paper, we propose a novel behavioral model which builds analytical maps to control agents’ behavior adaptively with agent-crowd interaction formulations. We introduce information theoretical concepts to construct analytical maps automatically. Our model can be integrated into crowd simulators and enhance their behavioral complexity. We made comparative analyses of the presented behavior model with measured crowd data and two agent-based crowd simulators

Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-$k$ candidates receiving the most votes. An agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics to strategize, instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in multi-winner approval voting scenarios with complete information. We show that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. Instead, voters tend to prioritize the candidates with the highest utilities. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of these heuristics in situations where agents only have access to partial information