The difference constitutions make: a global inquiry into the impacts of institutional design

This dissertation provides an international perspective on the problem of constitutional engineering. At its heart it is an assessment of the direction and magnitude of constitutional effects on the quality and robustness of government, taken from two major constitutional paradigms: that of constitutional regime types and that of inclusive-versus-exclusive democratic competitiveness. Constitutional performance is evaluated in terms of effects on measurements of governance across dimensions such as rule of law, social welfare and fiscal management, which are measured based on citizen perceptions and other aggregates. The analysis moves in four stages. First, an analysis of regime types treated endogenously. Second, an estimation of regime type effects on three dimensions of good governance. This is proceeded by another estimation exercise, this time on the regime type effects on fiscal management. Finally, there is an assessment of the social welfare effects of power-sharing institutions. I find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that alloy constitutional models attenuate the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The presidential system is also found to perform well with respect to fiscal management. Power-sharing institutions generally have positive effects on social welfare but these remarks must be qualified by the extent to which power-sharing institutions tend toward rent-seeking and inefficiency, and by the extent to which under stronger controls, related to making national aggregates more commensurable, this evidence appears to dissolve

COALITIONS IN ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PARTY POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN HUNG COUNCILS

This work takes a multi-method approach to the study of hung English councils. Insights and suppositions from a variety of approaches are utilised, including formal coalition theory and case studies of local authorities. A major aim of the thesis is to analyse questionnaire and case study data which will further improve our understanding of coalitional activity. Although the primary purpose is to inform the student of hung councils, formal coalition theories are also tested. This study provides the first clear evidence that elected political elites lose power to the body of councillors in most hung councils. However, the power of the bureaucratic elite, unlike their political counterparts, appears to remain relatively constant. Contrary to previous proposals, decision making is not characterised by uncertainty and confusion; a learning process takes place in hung councils, and the views of participants become more favourable over time. The influence of the centre party is a recurring theme of the study. Whether payoffs are office or policy, the Liberal Democrats are the primary beneficiary in hung English councils. Their commitment to a more open form of decision making and willingness to bargain with other parties may be contributing reasons for their success, but it is their ideological position in the middle of the two main parties which is offered as the primary reason for the influence they wield. None of the formal theories of coalition formation and duration perform well in predictive terms. Overall, the most accurate prediction of administrative formation would posit a minority administration formed by the largest party group, although majority coalitions are becoming more prevalent. Contrary to expectations, minority administrations are also more durable than coalitions. The large number of minority administrations demonstrates that not all politicians are 'office-driven', and that policy pay-offs are crucial. Policy closeness appears to be a greater influence on duration than either ideological connectedness or coalition size.UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, GALWA

Governing together: the Concertacin administrations in Chile (1990-2009)

Achieving stability in government coalitions within presidential systems is not a common political phenomenon. On March 11, 2010, the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD - Concertacin de Partidos por la Democracia), a coalition created in Chile to defeat Pinochet, ended twenty years in power. Its continuity is particularly surprising if we consider that this coalition was formed by parties and political leaders who, in the sixties and at the beginning of the seventies, were political enemies. Why was the Concertacin one of the most successful coalitions in Latin American political history? From a political science point of view, the most common explanations provided to understand this phenomenon have mainly been external, focused on institutions and context. We argue that the success of the Concertacin was also due to its ability to sustain coalition governability, in itself understood as the maintaining of coalitions and cabinet stability. We analyze two dependent variables: one at a party level (maintaining coalitions) and the other at an individual level (cabinet stability). We have two sets of explanations or independent variables for coalition and cabinet stability: long-term ones, related to political learning, and short-term contextual ones, related to presidential autonomy (suprapartidismo), the informal rules of power sharing and the political use of technocrats. In developing our argument, we build on hypotheses drawn from the literature on technocrats as well as different findings regarding coalition theory and informal rules. Using descriptive statistics, we analyze all the Concertacin cabinets as a single case study, contrasting it to earlier periods. We also explore variation across the four Concertacin administrations. Our main finding is that, in comparison to pre-1973 democracy, the Concertacin administrations were more stable, with the Aylwin administration the most stable. We also observe that the patterns of power distribution and cabinet administration in the other Concertacin administrations vary in relation to how Presidents administer their autonomy (suprapartidismo), apply informal rules of power sharing and appoint technocrats. Suprapartidismo is the independent variable that most explains change