Measuring Moral Reasoning using Moral Dilemmas: Evaluating Reliability, Validity, and Differential Item Functioning of the Behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT)

We evaluated the reliability, validity, and differential item functioning (DIF) of a shorter version of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1), the behavioral DIT (bDIT), measuring the development of moral reasoning. 353 college students (81 males, 271 females, 1 not reported; age M = 18.64 years, SD = 1.20 years) who were taking introductory psychology classes at a public University in a suburb area in the Southern United States participated in the present study. First, we examined the reliability of the bDIT using Cronbach’s α and its concurrent validity with the original DIT-1 using disattenuated correlation. Second, we compared the test duration between the two measures. Third, we tested the DIF of each question between males and females. Findings reported that first, the bDIT showed acceptable reliability and good concurrent validity. Second, the test duration could be significantly shortened by employing the bDIT. Third, DIF results indicated that the bDIT items did not favour any gender. Practical implications of the present study based on the reported findings are discussed

Visualizing Probabilistic Proof

The author revisits the Blue Bus Problem, a famous thought-experiment in law involving probabilistic proof, and presents simple Bayesian solutions to different versions of the blue bus problem. In addition, the author expresses his solutions in standard and visual formats, i.e. in terms of probabilities and natural frequencies

Cognitive coherence in the evluation of a novel single item

Article published in Judgement and Decision-Makin

Criminal Adjudication, Error Correction, and Hindsight Blind Spots

Concerns about hindsight in the law typically arise with regard to the bias that outcome knowledge can produce. But a more difficult problem than the clear view that hindsight appears to provide is the blind spot that it actually has. Because of the conventional wisdom about error review, there is a missed opportunity to ensure meaningful scrutiny. Beyond the confirmation biases that make convictions seem inevitable lies the question whether courts can see what they are meant to assess when they do look closely for error. Standards that require a retrospective showing of materiality, prejudice, or harm turn on what a judge imagines would have happened at trial under different circumstances. The interactive nature of the fact-finding process, however, means that the effect of error can rarely be assessed with confidence. Moreover, changing paradigms in criminal procedure scholarship make accuracy and error correction newly paramount. The empirical evidence of known innocents found guilty in the criminal justice system is mounting, and many of those wrongful convictions endured because errors were reviewed under hindsight standards. New insights about the cognitive psychology of decision-making, taken together with this heightened awareness of error, suggest that it is time to reevaluate some thresholds for reversal. The problem of hindsight blindness is particularly evident in the rules concerning the discovery of exculpatory evidence, the adequacy of defense counsel, and the harmfulness of erroneous rulings at trial. The standards applied in each of those contexts share a common flaw: a barrier between the mechanism for evaluation and the source of error. This essay concludes that reviewing courts should consider the trial that actually occurred rather than what “might have been” in a different proceeding and proposes some new vocabulary for weighing error

Above the Law: The Prosecutor\u27s Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements

We study the gravitational-wave (GW) signatures of clouds of ultralight bosons around black holes (BHs) in binary inspirals. These clouds, which are formed via superradiance instabilities for rapidly rotating BHs, produce distinct effects in the population of BH masses and spins, and, for real fields, a continuous monochromatic GW signal. We show that the presence of a binary companion greatly enriches the dynamical evolution of the system, most remarkably through the existence of resonant transitions between the growing and decaying modes of the cloud (analogous to Rabi oscillations in atomic physics). These resonances have rich phenomenological implications for current and future GW detectors. Notably, the amplitude of the GW signal from the clouds may be reduced, and in many cases terminated, much before the binary merger. The presence of a boson cloud can also be revealed in the GW signal from the binary through the imprint of finite-size effects, such as spin-induced multipole moments and tidal Love numbers. The time dependence of the cloud's energy density during the resonance leads to a sharp feature, or at least attenuation, in the contribution from the finite-size terms to the waveforms. The observation of these effects would constrain the properties of putative ultralight bosons through precision GW data, offering new probes of physics beyond the Standard Model

The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments

We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development