An Abductive Argument for Theism: A Comparative Analysis

A theistic ontological foundation and authority for moral obligations is an essential element of theism. And, any replacement of theism must provide an explanation for moral obligations. As such, the core claims of both theism and atheism depend heavily on the research question of this thesis - What is the foundation and authority of moral obligations? Theism provides a better explanation for the foundation and authority of moral obligations than the atheist worldview, or the utilitarian and robust normative realist ethical systems. Furthermore, it seems that moral obligations are real, objective, universal and human, and as such are best explained by theism. Four worldviews, or ethical systems, are interrogated since an essential element to them is their explanation of moral obligations. The conclusion reached, was that theism was found to be more consistent in its internal logic and it was also more coherent. Moreover, in explaining the foundation and authority for moral obligations, theism also was more adequate factually in addition to being more viable in an existential sense, or more livable. One of the objections to moral obligations, explained in a theistic sense, is leveled at Divine Command Theory. This objection is formed in the sense of indicating God’s commands are either arbitrary or God reports on obligations that exist in a Platonic sense. This arbitrariness and Platonic objection, often referred to as the Euthyphro Dilemma, is not a true dilemma. Rather, the answer provided to the dilemma is the Divine commands of the deontic nature from a perfectly good God in alignment with his perfectly good character. This project concluded that many of the moral facts and informal arguments presented provide support for both an abductive and deductive argumentative form. The project presented both an informal abductive syllogism and an informal deductive syllogism. It concluded that in open discussion or informal argumentation the abductive version and approach is far humbler and welcoming to dialogue and consideration of interlocutors. However, since the moral facts presented also support a deductive version it is worth considering this argument as well

Metaphysical Coherentism

I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call metaphysical explanation or grounding . If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment. Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed. In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other. In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world. In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms

Formulación de temas en investigación cualitativa : procedimentos lógicos y vías analíticas

Thematic analysis is one of the qualitative methods most widely used in psychological research. The aim of this paper is to situate the thematic analysis within the inferential diversity that characterizes qualitative research methods. We first present the schools of thematic analysis and their respective inferential logics, emphasizing the logical and analytical procedures that support the constitution of themes in these modalities of analysis. Secondly, in order to exemplify aspects of the technique, the article presents the steps of a thematic analysis conducted in a narrative study regarding impacts of incarceration on the lives of people released from the Brazilian prison system. We then highlight the logical process of formulating the themes from the participants’ narratives. Finally, the article presents a description of the different analytical steps involved in the thematization process and proposes a new classification of the steps of identification of themes in qualitative research to develop higher analytical quality.A análise temática tem se notabilizado como um dos métodos qualitativos mais utilizados na pesquisa em Psicologia. O objetivo deste artigo é situar a análise temática na diversidade inferencial que caracteriza o conjunto de métodos qualitativos de pesquisa. Para isso, as escolas de análise temática são apresentadas com suas respectivas lógicas inferenciais, enfatizando os procedimentos lógicos e analíticos que subsidiam a constituição de temas. Com o intuito de exemplificar aspectos da técnica, o artigo apresenta os passos da análise temática em uma pesquisa narrativa com egressos do sistema prisional sobre os impactos do encarceramento em suas vidas, com destaque para o processo lógico de formulação dos temas a partir das narrativas dos egressos. Por fim, o artigo apresenta uma descrição de diferentes passos analíticos integrantes do processo de tematização e propõe uma nova classificação dos passos de identificação de temas em pesquisa qualitativa, a fim de garantir maior qualidade analítica.El análisis temático se ha señalado como uno de los métodos cualitativos más utilizados en investigación en psicología. El objetivo de este artículo es situar el análisis temático en la diversidad inferencial que caracteriza el conjunto de métodos de investigación cualitativa. Para esto, las escuelas de análisis temático son presentadas con sus respectivas lógicas inferenciales, enfatizando los procedimientos lógicos y analíticos que apoyan la constitución de temas en estas modalidades de análisis. Con el fin de ejemplificar aspectos de la técnica, el artículo presenta los pasos del análisis temático en una investigación narrativa con egresos del sistema penitenciario sobre los impactos del encarcelamiento en sus vidas, destacando el proceso lógico de formulación de los temas basado en las narrativas de los participantes. Finalmente, el artículo presenta una descripción de los diferentes pasos analíticos que forman parte del proceso de tematización y propone una nueva clasificación de los pasos de identificación de temas en la investigación cualitativa, a fin de garantizar una mayor calidad analítica

Joy Beyond the Walls of the World: How Christianity Ably Explains the Moral Facts

I argue that Christianity ably explains the moral facts of moral goodness, intrinsic human value, moral rationality, and moral transformation. Chapter 1 provides an explanation of the thesis, a historical overview of the moral argument, a defense of the method, a critique of William Lane Craig’s deductive argument, and a response to some challenges to abduction from a Christian worldview. In chapter 2, I explain how Christianity ably explains moral goodness. I first give some reason to think God should be identified with the Good, following Robert Adams. Next, I summarize some of the issues related to moral goodness. Then, I argue that being loving is an important way of being good. The Bible and Christian reflection upon revelation rightly understand God as consistent with the good. Finally, I suggest that given the importance of love to the good, the specifically Christian understanding of God as a single God in three persons powerfully accounts for this. Chapter 3 argues that the Christian worldview strongly affirms the intrinsic value of human beings because they are made in “the image of God.” I offer a functional account over an ontological one, suggesting that the functional account includes the ontological one and offers an even higher view of human value. Second, I show that the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity in Jesus of Nazareth implies a high view of intrinsic human value, both because of the function of the incarnation and the ontological implications for human beings. In chapter 4, I argue that Christianity ably explains moral rationality because it provides a plausible account of how morality and self-interest are reconciled and because of the natural connection between morality and rationality on the Christian view. Specifically, I develop the idea that the Great White Throne judgment is not about moral rationality, but about the choice between life and death and that moral rationality is only ensured once one enters into life with God. In the penultimate chapter, I argue that Christianity ably explains why there is a moral gap and how to overcome it. Specifically, Christianity offers a realistic depiction of human incapacity. It also reinforces and heightens the moral demand. Finally, Christianity explains how we can overcome the moral gap by addressing moral guilt through God’s forgiveness and through the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit, who graciously cooperates with man in his moral transformation. Finally, I consider the practical import of the moral argument on offer, suggesting it has a potentially eternal consequence and transformative power. I also clarify the force of the argument, proposing that it is more suggestive than coercive

On abduction, dualities and reason

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations. The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two different criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments. This work rests upon the existence of some objective form of reason. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of rational retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the partial detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives

Bolzanian knowing: infallibility, virtue and foundational truth

The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano's epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano's notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one's assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano's notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believin

A Non-Voluntarist Theory: An Alternative Evangelical Apologetic for Dealing with the Euthyphro Dilemma

This dissertation presents an alternative response to the Euthyphro dilemma that will be referred to as the Non-Voluntarist Theory. It offers a critical evaluation of contemporary evangelical divine command theories to demonstrate the inherent ambiguity as they relate to Divine Command Theory, and their lack of apologetic force for answering the Euthyphro dilemma. To accomplish this task, it is important to understand how the Euthyphro Dilemma relates to theology and apologetics in general, and the contemporary attempts to ground objective moral values and duties in particular. The topic relates to theology, since one’s response to the Euthyphro Dilemma can implicitly or explicitly speak to God’s moral sovereignty. The topic relates to apologetics in two primary ways. First, the Euthyphro Dilemma is still offered by contemporary non-theists as a critique of the Christian faith. Therefore, the response one gives, and the method used, is vital to the apologetic enterprise. Second, the Euthyphro Dilemma is meant to challenge the belief that God is the explanatory ultimate for objective moral values and duties. In addition, an examination of the philosophical landscape that surrounds the relationship between the Euthyphro Dilemma and Divine Command Theory is needed. Contemporary formulations of divine command theories of ethics make a distinction between moral values and moral obligations and duties. While this is not an illicit distinction, it is a distinction that weakens the apologetic force of the argument. Therefore, it is imperative that a proposed solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma is able to explain sufficiently moral ontology, moral epistemology, and moral obligation. Contemporary evangelical formulations of Divine Command Theory are not evangelical, per se. Rather, these formulations are moral theories that happen to be ones that evangelicals tend to support. In order to critically evaluate contemporary evangelical divine command theories, one should be aware of the historical development of the Standard Divine Command Theory. In the field of research, special attention is given to one of the most notable representatives of the Standard Divine Command Theory, William of Ockham. Thus, one must be familiar with Ockham’s work. Also, one must be aware of the modifications that have been made to Divine Command Theory that depart from the Ockhamist version and frame the modern perspective. Non-theists tend to understand the Divine Command Theory in Ockhamist terms. Consequently, attempts by contemporary evangelical modified divine command theorists use divine command terminology in a non-standard way, which creates a more cumbersome apologetic. This dissertation will advance a position that moves towards the first horn, or non-voluntarist horn, of the Euthyphro Dilemma. It is thought that those who embrace this horn commit to the existence of a moral standard “outside, or distinct, from God” that guides the divine will. For example, William Lane Craig argues that to embrace the non-voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma is to embrace atheistic moral Platonism. Traditionally, those who affirm this horn argue for the existence of objective moral values and duties that exist independent of God’s existence and are accessible independent of divine revelation or command. This position at times has been referred to as the Guided Will Theory, since God would be guided by these independent moral values and duties. This dissertation advances a Non-Voluntarist Theory of moral values, obligations, and duties by affirming that God’s divine nature is the basis for morality as a whole. It will be argued that a Non-Voluntarist Theory does not commit the theist to a standard of moral values, obligations, and duties that exist independently from God. Furthermore, if a clear methodology is employed a Non-Voluntarist Theory provides common ground with the non-theist, and provides a practical theistic framework for ethics

Toward an Analysis of the Abductive Moral Argument for God’s Existence: Assessing the Evidential Quality of Moral Phenomena and the Evidential Virtuosity of Christian Theological Models

The moral argument for God’s existence is perhaps the oldest and most salient of the arguments from natural theology. In contemporary literature, there has been a focus on the abductive version of the moral argument. Although the mode of reasoning, abduction, has been articulated, there has not been a robust articulation of the individual components of the argument. Such an articulation would include the data quality of moral phenomena, the theoretical virtuosity of theological models that explain the moral phenomena, and how both contribute to the likelihood of moral arguments. The goal of this paper is to provide such an articulation. Our method is to catalog the phenomena, sort them by their location on the emergent hierarchy of sciences, then describe how the ecumenical Christian theological model exemplifies evidential virtues in explaining them. Our results show that moral arguments are neither of the highest or lowest quality yet can be assented to on a principled level of investigation, especially given existential considerations

An Arbitrary Death? Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court decided three landmark cases on death penalty laws in the United States. While adjudicating these cases, the Court sought to address one of the central questions regarding capital punishment: can it be applied fairly? My paper attempts to understand how the Court found an answer to this question. I employ complementary frameworks of constitutional interpretation, formalism, and realism to suggest that the Court\u27s focus on judicial restraint and its weak understanding of race and discrimination led it to conclude that capital punishment can be applied fairly enough for our constitutional system

What is “meta-” for? : a Peircean critique of the cognitive theory of metaphor

My thesis aims to anatomize the cognitive theory of metaphor and suggests a Peircean semiotic perspective on metaphor study. As metaphorical essentialists, Lakoff/Johnson tend to universalize a limited number of conceptual metaphors and, by doing this, they overlook the dynamic relation between metaphorical tenor and vehicle. Such notion of metaphor is not compatible with the polysemous nature of the sign. The diversity and multivalency of metaphorical vehicle, in particular, cast serious doubts on the hypothesis of “conceptual metaphors” which, being meta-metaphorical constructs, can tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula “A is B”. Consequently, Lakoff/Johnson’s notion of conceptual metaphor is very much a Chomskyan postulation. Also problematic is the expedient experientialism or embodied philosophy they have put forward as a middle course between objectivism and subjectivism. What is missing from their framework is a structural space for dynamic interpretation on the part of metaphor users. In contrast, cognitive linguists may find in Peirce’s theory of the sign a sound solution to their theoretical impasse. As a logician, Peirce sees metaphor as the realization of iconic reasoning at the language level. His exposition on iconicity and iconic reasoning has laid a solid foundation upon which may be erected a fresh epistemology of metaphor fit for the contemporary study of language and mind. Broadly speaking, metaphor in Peirce can be examined from roughly two perspectives. Macroscopically, metaphor is an icon in general as opposed to index and symbol, whereas, microscopically, it is a subdivided hypoicon on the third level as opposed to image and diagram. Besides, Peirce also emphasized the subjective nature of metaphor. Semioticians after Peirce have further developed his theory on metaphor. For example, through his concept of “arbitrary iconicity”, Ersu Ding stresses the arbitrary nature of metaphorization and tries to shift our attention away from Lakoff/Johnson’s abstract epistemological Gestalt to the specific cultural contexts in which metaphors occur. Umberto Eco, on the other hand, sees interpretation of signs as an open-ended process that involves knowledge of all kinds. Encyclopedic knowledge thus serves as unlimited source for metaphorical association. For Eco, the meaning of a metaphor should be interpreted in the cultural framework based on a specific cultural community. Both Ding’s and Eco’s ideas are in line with Peirce’s theoretical framework where the meaning of a metaphor depends on an interpreter in a particular socio-historical context. They all realize that we should go beyond the ontology of metaphorical expressions to acquire a dynamic perspective on metaphor interpretation. To overcome the need for presupposing an omnipotent subject capable of knowing the metaphor-in-itself, we turn to Habermas’s theory of communicative action in which the meaning of metaphor is intersubjectively established through negotiation and communication. Moreover, we should not overlook the dynamic tension between metaphor and ideology. Aphoristically, we can say that nothing is a metaphor unless it is interpreted as a metaphor, and we need to reconnect metaphors with the specific cultural and ideological contexts in which they appear