A multi-demand negotiation model based on fuzzy rules elicited via psychological experiments

This paper proposes a multi-demand negotiation model that takes the effect of human users’ psychological characteristics into consideration. Specifically, in our model each negotiating agent's preference over its demands can be changed, according to human users’ attitudes to risk, patience and regret, during the course of a negotiation. And the change of preference structures is determined by fuzzy logic rules, which are elicited through our psychological experiments. The applicability of our model is illustrated by using our model to solve a problem of political negotiation between two countries. Moreover, we do lots of theoretical and empirical analyses to reveal some insights into our model. In addition, to compare our model with existing ones, we make a survey on fuzzy logic based negotiation, and discuss the similarities and differences between our negotiation model and various consensus models

A logical multidemand bargaining model with integrity constraints

This paper proposes a logical model of multi-demand bargaining with integrity constraints. We also construct a simultaneous concession solution to bargaining games of this kind and show that the solution is uniquely characterized by a set of logical properties. Moreover, we prove that the solution also satisfies the most fundamental game theoretic properties such as symmetry and Pareto optimality. In addition, by lots of simulation experiments we study how the number of conflicting demands, bargainers' risk attitude, and bargainer number influence the bargaining success rate and efficiency as well as the agreement quality