A Logic-Based Representation for Coalitional Games with Externalities

We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input

Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities

Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the value of any coalition is independent of other coalitions in the system. However, externalities play a key role in many real-life situations and have been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and economic literature. In this paper, we consider the issue of computing extensions of the Shapley value to coalitional games with externalities proposed by Myerson [21], Pham Do and Norde [23], and McQuillin [17]. To facilitate efficient computation of these extensions, we propose a new representation for coalitional games with externalities, which is based on weighted logical expressions. We demonstrate that this representation is fully expressive and, sometimes, exponentially more concise than the conventional partition function game model. Furthermore, it allows us to compute the aforementioned extensions of the Shapley value in time linear in the size of the input

Courcelle's Theorem - A Game-Theoretic Approach

Courcelle's Theorem states that every problem definable in Monadic Second-Order logic can be solved in linear time on structures of bounded treewidth, for example, by constructing a tree automaton that recognizes or rejects a tree decomposition of the structure. Existing, optimized software like the MONA tool can be used to build the corresponding tree automata, which for bounded treewidth are of constant size. Unfortunately, the constants involved can become extremely large - every quantifier alternation requires a power set construction for the automaton. Here, the required space can become a problem in practical applications. In this paper, we present a novel, direct approach based on model checking games, which avoids the expensive power set construction. Experiments with an implementation are promising, and we can solve problems on graphs where the automata-theoretic approach fails in practice.Comment: submitte

A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games

Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the uniqueness of the cost of each given resource across all Nash equilibria. Our proofs allow for explicit calculation of Nash equilibrium and for explicit and direct calculation of the resulting (unique) costs of resources, and do not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax theorem or any equivalent result, on linear programming, or on the existence of a potential (though our analysis does provide powerful insights into the potential, via a natural concrete physical interpretation). A generalization of resource selection games, called resource selection games with I.D.-dependent weighting, is defined, and the results are extended to this family, showing the existence of strong equilibria, and showing that while resource costs are no longer unique across Nash equilibria in games of this family, they are nonetheless unique across all strong Nash equilibria, drawing a novel fundamental connection between group deviation and I.D.-congestion. A natural application of the resulting machinery to a large class of constraint-satisfaction problems is also described.Comment: Hebrew University of Jerusalem Center for the Study of Rationality discussion paper 67

Minimizing Running Costs in Consumption Systems

A standard approach to optimizing long-run running costs of discrete systems is based on minimizing the mean-payoff, i.e., the long-run average amount of resources ("energy") consumed per transition. However, this approach inherently assumes that the energy source has an unbounded capacity, which is not always realistic. For example, an autonomous robotic device has a battery of finite capacity that has to be recharged periodically, and the total amount of energy consumed between two successive charging cycles is bounded by the capacity. Hence, a controller minimizing the mean-payoff must obey this restriction. In this paper we study the controller synthesis problem for consumption systems with a finite battery capacity, where the task of the controller is to minimize the mean-payoff while preserving the functionality of the system encoded by a given linear-time property. We show that an optimal controller always exists, and it may either need only finite memory or require infinite memory (it is decidable in polynomial time which of the two cases holds). Further, we show how to compute an effective description of an optimal controller in polynomial time. Finally, we consider the limit values achievable by larger and larger battery capacity, show that these values are computable in polynomial time, and we also analyze the corresponding rate of convergence. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results about optimizing the long-run running costs in systems with bounded energy stores.Comment: 32 pages, corrections of typos and minor omission