Enhancing RFID tag resistance against cloning attack

In its current form, RFID system are susceptible to a range of malevolent attacks. With the rich business intelligence that RFID infrastructure could possibly carry, security is of paramount importance. In this paper, we formalise various threat models due tag cloning on the RFID system. We also present a simple but efficient and cost effect technique that strengthens the resistance of RFID tags to cloning attacks. Our techniques can even strengthen tags against cloning in environments with untrusted reading devices.<br /

Criptografía ligera en dispositivos de identificación por radiofrecuencia- RFID

Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la tecnología de identificación por radiofrecuencia (RFID), la cual puede ser considerada como una de las tecnologías más prometedoras dentro del área de la computación ubicua. La tecnología RFID podría ser el sustituto de los códigos de barras. Aunque la tecnología RFID ofrece numerosas ventajas frente a otros sistemas de identificación, su uso lleva asociados riesgos de seguridad, los cuales no son fáciles de resolver. Los sistemas RFID pueden ser clasificados, atendiendo al coste de las etiquetas, distinguiendo principalmente entre etiquetas de alto coste y de bajo coste. Nuestra investigación se centra fundamentalmente en estas últimas. El estudio y análisis del estado del arte nos ha permitido identificar la necesidad de desarrollar soluciones criptográficas ligeras adecuadas para estos dispositivos limitados. El uso de soluciones criptográficas estándar supone una aproximación correcta desde un punto de vista puramente teórico. Sin embargo, primitivas criptográficas estándar (funciones resumen, código de autenticación de mensajes, cifradores de bloque/flujo, etc.) exceden las capacidades de las etiquetas de bajo coste. Por tanto, es necesario el uso de criptografía ligera._______________________________________This thesis examines the security issues of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to address. RFID systems can be classified according to tag price, with distinction between high-cost and low-cost tags. Our research work focuses mainly on low-cost RFID tags. An initial study and analysis of the state of the art identifies the need for lightweight cryptographic solutions suitable for these very constrained devices. From a purely theoretical point of view, standard cryptographic solutions may be a correct approach. However, standard cryptographic primitives (hash functions, message authentication codes, block/stream ciphers, etc.) are quite demanding in terms of circuit size, power consumption and memory size, so they make costly solutions for low-cost RFID tags. Lightweight cryptography is therefore a pressing need. First, we analyze the security of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard, which is considered the universal standard for low-cost RFID tags. Secondly, we cryptanalyze two new proposals, showing their unsuccessful attempt to increase the security level of the specification without much further hardware demands. Thirdly, we propose a new protocol resistant to passive attacks and conforming to low-cost RFID tag requirements. In this protocol, costly computations are only performed by the reader, and security related computations in the tag are restricted to very simple operations. The protocol is inspired in the family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (UMAP: M2AP, EMAP, LMAP) and the recently proposed SASI protocol. The thesis also includes the first published cryptanalysis of xi SASI under the weakest attacker model, that is, a passive attacker. Fourthly, we propose a new protocol resistant to both passive and active attacks and suitable for moderate-cost RFID tags. We adapt Shieh et.’s protocol for smart cards, taking into account the unique features of RFID systems. Finally, because this protocol is based on the use of cryptographic primitives and standard cryptographic primitives are not supported, we address the design of lightweight cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we propose a lightweight hash function (Tav-128) and a lightweight Pseudo-Random Number Generator (LAMED and LAMED-EPC).We analyze their security level and performance, as well as their hardware requirements and show that both could be realistically implemented, even in low-cost RFID tags

Cryptographic Approaches To Security and Privacy Issues In Pervasive Computing

Technological innovation has enabled tiny devices to participate in pervasive com- puting. Such devices are particularly vulnerable to security and privacy threats, because of their limited computing resources and relatively weak physical security. We investigate possible cryptographic solutions to security and privacy problems arising in two kinds of emerging pervasive computing networks: Personal Area Net- works (PANs) and the EPCglobal Network. A number of key management schemes have been proposed for use in PANs, but these schemes only support key management within a PAN. However, as people are increasingly equipped with multiple wireless devices, PANs are likely to be intercon- nected to share information or services. We introduce a term, iPANs, to name such interconnected PANs. We define system models and design goals for key manage- ment in iPANs, and propose a novel security initialisation scheme for use in iPANs. The proposed scheme achieves desirable security and efficiency properties by making use of the unique characteristics of PANs. The EPCglobal Network is designed to give efficiency and cost savings in and beyond the supply chain using Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology; however, privacy threats affecting such networks are particularly serious. We construct a formal privacy model for RFID systems accurately reflecting adversarial threats and power. We then give brief privacy analysis for the existing privacy-enhanced RFID schemes which have received wide attention in the literature. We then construct a secure refresh-based RFID system based on re-encryption techniques, and prove its privacy using the defined privacy model. Finally, we show that the proposed scheme can greatly enhance the security and privacy of EPC tags, making the maximum use of given tag functionalities as specified in the standards

Privacy in rfid and mobile objects

Los sistemas RFID permiten la identificación rápida y automática de etiquetas RFID a través de un canal de comunicación inalámbrico. Dichas etiquetas son dispositivos con cierto poder de cómputo y capacidad de almacenamiento de información. Es por ello que los objetos que contienen una etiqueta RFID adherida permiten la lectura de una cantidad rica y variada de datos que los describen y caracterizan, por ejemplo, un código único de identificación, el nombre, el modelo o la fecha de expiración. Además, esta información puede ser leída sin la necesidad de un contacto visual entre el lector y la etiqueta, lo cual agiliza considerablemente los procesos de inventariado, identificación, o control automático. Para que el uso de la tecnología RFID se generalice con éxito, es conveniente cumplir con varios objetivos: eficiencia, seguridad y protección de la privacidad. Sin embargo, el diseño de protocolos de identificación seguros, privados, y escalables es un reto difícil de abordar dada las restricciones computacionales de las etiquetas RFID y su naturaleza inalámbrica. Es por ello que, en la presente tesis, partimos de protocolos de identificación seguros y privados, y mostramos cómo se puede lograr escalabilidad mediante una arquitectura distribuida y colaborativa. De este modo, la seguridad y la privacidad se alcanzan mediante el propio protocolo de identificación, mientras que la escalabilidad se logra por medio de novedosos métodos colaborativos que consideran la posición espacial y temporal de las etiquetas RFID. Independientemente de los avances en protocolos inalámbricos de identificación, existen ataques que pueden superar exitosamente cualquiera de estos protocolos sin necesidad de conocer o descubrir claves secretas válidas ni de encontrar vulnerabilidades en sus implementaciones criptográficas. La idea de estos ataques, conocidos como ataques de “relay”, consiste en crear inadvertidamente un puente de comunicación entre una etiqueta legítima y un lector legítimo. De este modo, el adversario usa los derechos de la etiqueta legítima para pasar el protocolo de autenticación usado por el lector. Nótese que, dada la naturaleza inalámbrica de los protocolos RFID, este tipo de ataques representa una amenaza importante a la seguridad en sistemas RFID. En esta tesis proponemos un nuevo protocolo que además de autenticación realiza un chequeo de la distancia a la cual se encuentran el lector y la etiqueta. Este tipo de protocolos se conocen como protocolos de acotación de distancia, los cuales no impiden este tipo de ataques, pero sí pueden frustrarlos con alta probabilidad. Por último, afrontamos los problemas de privacidad asociados con la publicación de información recogida a través de sistemas RFID. En particular, nos concentramos en datos de movilidad que también pueden ser proporcionados por otros sistemas ampliamente usados tales como el sistema de posicionamiento global (GPS) y el sistema global de comunicaciones móviles. Nuestra solución se basa en la conocida noción de k-anonimato, alcanzada mediante permutaciones y microagregación. Para este fin, definimos una novedosa función de distancia entre trayectorias con la cual desarrollamos dos métodos diferentes de anonimización de trayectorias.Els sistemes RFID permeten la identificació ràpida i automàtica d’etiquetes RFID a través d’un canal de comunicació sense fils. Aquestes etiquetes són dispositius amb cert poder de còmput i amb capacitat d’emmagatzematge de informació. Es per això que els objectes que porten una etiqueta RFID adherida permeten la lectura d’una quantitat rica i variada de dades que els descriuen i caracteritzen, com per exemple un codi únic d’identificació, el nom, el model o la data d’expiració. A més, aquesta informació pot ser llegida sense la necessitat d’un contacte visual entre el lector i l’etiqueta, la qual cosa agilitza considerablement els processos d’inventariat, identificació o control automàtic. Per a que l’ús de la tecnologia RFID es generalitzi amb èxit, es convenient complir amb diversos objectius: eficiència, seguretat i protecció de la privacitat. No obstant això, el disseny de protocols d’identificació segurs, privats i escalables, es un repte difícil d’abordar dades les restriccions computacionals de les etiquetes RFID i la seva naturalesa sense fils. Es per això que, en la present tesi, partim de protocols d’identificació segurs i privats, i mostrem com es pot aconseguir escalabilitat mitjançant una arquitectura distribuïda i col•laborativa. D’aquesta manera, la seguretat i la privacitat s’aconsegueixen mitjançant el propi protocol d’identificació, mentre que l’escalabilitat s’aconsegueix per mitjà de nous protocols col•laboratius que consideren la posició espacial i temporal de les etiquetes RFID. Independentment dels avenços en protocols d’identificació sense fils, existeixen atacs que poden passar exitosament qualsevol d’aquests protocols sense necessitat de conèixer o descobrir claus secretes vàlides, ni de trobar vulnerabilitats a les seves implantacions criptogràfiques. La idea d’aquestos atacs, coneguts com atacs de “relay”, consisteix en crear inadvertidament un pont de comunicació entre una etiqueta legítima i un lector legítim. D’aquesta manera, l’adversari utilitza els drets de l’etiqueta legítima per passar el protocol d’autentificació utilitzat pel lector. Es important tindre en compte que, dada la naturalesa sense fils dels protocols RFID, aquests tipus d’atacs representen una amenaça important a la seguretat en sistemes RFID. En aquesta dissertació proposem un nou protocol que, a més d’autentificació, realitza una revisió de la distància a la qual es troben el lector i l’etiqueta. Aquests tipus de protocols es coneixen com a “distance-boulding protocols”, els quals no prevenen aquests tipus d’atacs, però si que poden frustrar-los amb alta probabilitat. Per últim, afrontem els problemes de privacitat associats amb la publicació de informació recol•lectada a través de sistemes RFID. En concret, ens concentrem en dades de mobilitat, que també poden ser proveïdes per altres sistemes àmpliament utilitzats tals com el sistema de posicionament global (GPS) i el sistema global de comunicacions mòbils. La nostra solució es basa en la coneguda noció de privacitat “k-anonymity” i parcialment en micro-agregació. Per a aquesta finalitat, definim una nova funció de distància entre trajectòries amb la qual desenvolupen dos mètodes diferents d’anonimització de trajectòries.Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology aimed at efficiently identifying and tracking goods and assets. Such identification may be performed without requiring line-of-sight alignment or physical contact between the RFID tag and the RFID reader, whilst tracking is naturally achieved due to the short interrogation field of RFID readers. That is why the reduction in price of the RFID tags has been accompanied with an increasing attention paid to this technology. However, since tags are resource-constrained devices sending identification data wirelessly, designing secure and private RFID identification protocols is a challenging task. This scenario is even more complex when scalability must be met by those protocols. Assuming the existence of a lightweight, secure, private and scalable RFID identification protocol, there exist other concerns surrounding the RFID technology. Some of them arise from the technology itself, such as distance checking, but others are related to the potential of RFID systems to gather huge amount of tracking data. Publishing and mining such moving objects data is essential to improve efficiency of supervisory control, assets management and localisation, transportation, etc. However, obvious privacy threats arise if an individual can be linked with some of those published trajectories. The present dissertation contributes to the design of algorithms and protocols aimed at dealing with the issues explained above. First, we propose a set of protocols and heuristics based on a distributed architecture that improve the efficiency of the identification process without compromising privacy or security. Moreover, we present a novel distance-bounding protocol based on graphs that is extremely low-resource consuming. Finally, we present two trajectory anonymisation methods aimed at preserving the individuals' privacy when their trajectories are released

KEDGEN2: A key establishment and derivation protocol for EPC Gen2 RFID systems

International audienceThe EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen2 for short) is a Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology that is gaining a prominent place in several domains. However, the Gen2 standard lacks verifiable security functionalities. Eavesdropping attacks can, for instance, affect the security of applications based on the Gen2 technology. To address this problem, RFID tags must be equipped with a robust mechanism to authenticate readers before authorising them to access their data. In this paper, we propose a key establishment and derivation protocol, which is applied at both identification phase and those remainder operations requiring security. Our solution is based on a pseudorandom number generator that uses a low computational workload, while ensuring long term secure communication to protect the secrecy of the exchanged data. Mutual authentication of the tag and the sensor and strong notions of secrecy such as forward and backward secrecy are analysed, and we prove formally that after being amended, our protocol is secure with respect to these properties

セキュアRFIDタグチップの設計論

In this thesis, we focus on radio frequency identification (RFID) tag. We design, implement, and evaluate hardware performance of a secure tag that runs the authentication protocol based on cryptographic algorithms. The cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator are required to be implemented in the tag. To realize the secure tag, we tackle the following four steps: (A) decision of hardware architecture for the authentication protocol, (B) selection of the cryptographic algorithm, (C) establishment of a pseudorandom number generating method, and (D) implementation and performance evaluation of a silicon chip on an RFID system.(A) The cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator are repeatedly called for each authentication. Therefore, the impact of the time needed for the cryptographic processes on the hardware performance of the tag can be large. While low-area requirements have been mainly discussed in the previous studies, it is needed to discuss the hardware architecture for the authentication protocol from the viewpoint of the operating time. In this thesis, in order to decide the hardware architecture, we evaluate hardware performance in the sense of the operating time. As a result, the parallel architecture is suitable for hash functions that are widely used for tag authentication protocols.(B) A lot of cryptographic algorithms have been developed and hardware performance of the algorithms have been evaluated on different conditions. However, as the evaluation results depend on the conditions, it is hard to compare the previous results. In addition, the interface of the cryptographic circuits has not been paid attention. In this thesis, in order to select a cryptographic algorithm, we design the interface of the cryptographic circuits to meet with the tag, and evaluate hardware performance of the circuits on the same condition. As a result, the lightweight hash function SPONGENT-160 achieves well-balanced hardware performance.(C) Implementation of a pseudorandom number generator based on the performance evaluation results on (B) can be a method to generate pseudorandom number on the tag. On the other hand, as the cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator are not used simultaneously on the authentication protocol. Therefore, if the cryptographic circuit could be used for pseudorandom number generation, the hardware resource on the tag can be exploited efficiently. In this thesis, we propose a pseudorandom number generating method using a hash function that is a cryptographic component of the authentication protocol. Through the evaluation of our proposed method, we establish a lightweight pseudorandom number generating method for the tag.(D) Tag authentication protocols using a cryptographic algorithm have been developed in the previous studies. However, hardware implementation and performance evaluation of a tag, which runs authentication processes, have not been studied. In this thesis, we design and do a single chip implementation of an analog front-end block and a digital processing block including the results on (A), (B), and (C). Then, we evaluate hardware performance of the tag. As a result, we show that a tag, which runs the authentication protocol based on cryptographic algorithms, is feasible.電気通信大学201

Survey on Prominent RFID Authentication Protocols for Passive Tags

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the leading technologies in the Internet of Things (IoT) to create an efficient and reliable system to securely identify objects in many environments such as business, health, and manufacturing areas. Recent RFID authentication protocols have been proposed to satisfy the security features of RFID communication. In this article, we identify and review some of the most recent and enhanced authentication protocols that mainly focus on the authentication between a reader and a tag. However, the scope of this survey includes only passive tags protocols, due to the large scale of the RFID framework. We examined some of the recent RFID protocols in term of security requirements, computation, and attack resistance. We conclude that only five protocols resist all of the major attacks, while only one protocol satisfies all of the security requirements of the RFID system.http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s1810358

RFID Authentification Protocols using Symmetric Cryptography

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is emerging in a variety of applications as an important technology for identifying and tracking goods and assets. The spread of RFID technology, however, also gives rise to significant user privacy and security issues. One possible solution to these challenges is the use of a privacy-enhancing cryptographic protocol to protect RFID communications. This thesis considers RFID authentication protocols that make use of symmetric cryptography. We first identify the privacy, security and performance requirements for RFID systems. We then review recent related work, and assess the capabilities of previously proposed protocols with respect to the identified privacy, security and performance properties. The thesis makes four main contributions. First, we introduce server impersonation attacks as a novel security threat to RFID protocols. RFID tag memory is generally not tamper-proof, since tag costs must be kept low, and thus it is vulnerable to compromise by physical attacks. We show that such attacks can give rise to desynchronisation between server and tag in a number of existing RFID authentication protocols. We also describe possible countermeasures to this novel class of attacks. Second, we propose a new authentication protocol for RFID systems that provides most of the identified privacy and security features. The new protocol resists tag information leakage, tag location tracking, replay attacks, denial of service attacks and backward traceability. It is also more resistant to forward traceability and server impersonation attacks than previously proposed schemes. The scheme requires less tag-side storage than existing protocols and requires only a moderate level of tag-side computation. Next, we survey the security requirements for RFID tag ownership transfer. In some applications, the bearer of an RFID tag might change, with corresponding changes required for the RFID system infrastructure. We propose novel authentication protocols for tag ownership and authorisation transfer. The proposed protocols satisfy the requirements presented, and have desirable performance characteristics. Finally, we address the issue of scalability in anonymous RFID authentication protocols. Many previously proposed protocols suffer from scalability issues because they require a linear search to identify or authenticate a tag. Some RFID protocols, however, only require constant time for tag identification; unfortunately, all previously proposed schemes of this type have serious shortcomings. We propose a novel RFID pseudonym protocol that takes constant time to authenticate a tag, and meets the identified privacy, security and performance requirements. The proposed scheme also supports tag delegation and ownership transfer in an efficient way

Enhancing RFID performance and security in networked environments

In this thesis we propose and present a number of methods by which the performance and security of networked RFID systems can be improved. These include a networked P2P RFID architecture, a comprehensive RFID security framework, a RFID security protocol and an RFID malware detection and Prevention technique