Middleware’s message : the financial technics of codata

In this paper, I will argue for the relevance of certain distinctive features of messaging systems, namely those in which data (a) can be sent and received asynchronously, (b) can be sent to multiple simultaneous recipients and (c) is received as a “potentially infinite” flow of unpredictable events. I will describe the social technology of the stock ticker, a telegraphic device introduced at the New York Stock Exchange in the 1860s, with reference to early twentieth century philosophers of synchronous experience (Bergson), simultaneous sign interpretations (Mead and Peirce), and flows of discrete events (Bachelard). Then, I will show how the ticker’s data flows developed into the 1990s-era technologies of message queues and message brokers, which distinguished themselves through their asynchronous implementation of ticker-like message feeds sent between otherwise incompatible computers and terminals. These latter systems’ characteristic “publish/subscribe” communication pattern was one in which conceptually centralized (if logically distributed) flows of messages would be “published,” and for which “subscribers” would be spontaneously notified when events of interest occurred. This paradigm—common to the so-called “message-oriented middleware” systems of the late 1990s—would re-emerge in different asynchronous distributed system contexts over the following decades, from “push media” to Twitter to the Internet of Things

Vertical Integration and Dis-integration of Computer Firms: A History Friendly Model of the Co-evolution of the Computer and Semiconductor Industries

In this paper we present a history-friendly model of the changing vertical scope of computer firms during the evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries. The model is "history friendly", in that it attempts at replicating some basic, stylized qualitative features of the evolution of vertical integration on the basis of the causal mechanisms and processes which we believe can explain the history. The specific question addressed in the model is set in the context of dynamic and uncertain technological and market environments, characterized by periods of technological revolutions punctuating periods of relative technological stability and smooth technical progress. The model illustrates how the patterns of vertical integration and specialization in the computer industry change as a function of the evolving levels and distribution of firms' capabilities over time and how they depend on the co-evolution of the upstream and downstream sectors. Specific conditions in each of these markets - the size of the external market, the magnitude of the technological discontinuities, the lock-in effects in demand - exert critical effects and feedbacks on market structure and on the vertical scope of firms as time goes by

CAHRS hrSpectrum (November - December 2002)

HRSpec02_12.pdf: 85 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

CAHRS hrSpectrum (March - April 2003)

HRSpec03_04.pdf: 123 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Special Libraries, December 1966

Volume 57, Issue 10https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1966/1009/thumbnail.jp

Special Libraries, February 1962

Volume 53, Issue 2https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1962/1001/thumbnail.jp

Too far ahead of its time: Barclays, Burroughs and real-time banking

The historiography of computing has until now considered real-time computing in banking as predicated on the possibilities of networked ATMs in the 1970s. This article reveals a different story. It exposes the failed bid by Barclays and Burroughs to make real time a reality for British banking in the 1960s

'Too far ahead of its time': Britain, Burroughs and real-time banking in the 1960s

In 1969, the popular British television programme, Tomorrow's World, featured an item that predicted point of sale terminals in every high street shop ushering in the country's computerised cashless economy. The basis for the show's prediction was a succession of ambitious projects initiated by the British banks, each with the aim of introducing a new real-time computer banking system to its network of branches by 15 February 1971. The banks, threatened by state-sponsored competition, inspired by the success of SABRE, American Airlines' real-time airline reservations system, and pressured by forthcoming decimalisation, all chose 'D-Day' as their immovable deadline. And, in each case, US computer manufacturer, Burroughs, promised a B8500 central super computer linked to a nationwide network of TC500 intelligent terminal satellites. Perhaps unsurprisingly for Tomorrow's World, the programme's predicted coming of the cashless society was wildly optimistic. But so too, it turned out, were the plans of the banks. Real-time banking in Britain never materialised in the 1970s, let alone by February 1971, as one by one the banks abandoned their plans. In this paper, I revisit the case of Burroughs and Barclays Bank. Blending oral testimonies with archival sources, I explore a consumer perspective of coterminous computing labour as the two companies set about making the idea of real-time banking a reality. I reveal how a community of practice made up of Barclays' computer programmers and Burroughs' engineers was able to transgress established business boundaries in pursuit of a technical ideal, only to eventually become architect of its own fate. The co-construction and 'interpretive flexibility' of this technological failure is considered in light of the existing literature, with particular attention given to the attribution of blame. In this case, where there was attribution, it was judged to have lain with the technology, which was simply regarded as 'too far ahead of its time.ï¿