14,992 research outputs found
A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for Mobile Sponsored Content and Service Markets
In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers
are able to subsidize their target mobile users through directly paying the
mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged
by the network operator to the mobile users. The sponsoring mechanism leads to
a surge in mobile data and service demand, which in return compensates for the
sponsoring cost and benefits the content/service providers. In this paper, we
study the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the
mobile users, the content/service providers and the network operator, as a
two-level game with multiple Stackelberg (i.e., leader) players. Our study is
featured by the consideration of global network effects owning to consumers'
grouping. Since the mobile users may have bounded rationality, we model the
service-selection process among them as an evolutionary-population follower
sub-game. Meanwhile, we model the pricing-then-sponsoring process between the
content/service providers and the network operator as a non-cooperative
equilibrium searching problem. By investigating the structure of the proposed
game, we reveal a few important properties regarding the equilibrium existence,
and propose a distributed, projection-based algorithm for iterative equilibrium
searching. Simulation results validate the convergence of the proposed
algorithm, and demonstrate how sponsoring helps improve both the providers'
profits and the users' experience
Competition and Cooperation Analysis for Data Sponsored Market: A Network Effects Model
The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the
cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes
appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the
content provider. In this paper, we consider a sponsored data market with a
monopoly network service provider, a single content provider, and multiple
users. In particular, we model the interactions of three entities as a
two-stage Stackelberg game, where the service provider and content provider act
as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively,
in the first stage, and the users act as the followers deciding on their data
demand in the second stage. We investigate the mutual interaction of the
service provider and content provider in two cases: (i) competitive case, where
the content provider and service provider optimize their strategies separately
and competitively, each aiming at maximizing the profit and revenue,
respectively; and (ii) cooperative case, where the two providers jointly
optimize their strategies, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate
profits. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in both cases. Via
extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the network effects significantly
improve the payoff of three entities in this market, i.e., utilities of users,
the profit of content provider and the revenue of service provider. In
addition, it is revealed that the cooperation between the two providers is the
best choice for all three entities.Comment: 7 pages, submitted to one conferenc
A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market
Data traffic demand over the Internet is increasing rapidly, and it is changing the pricing model between internet service providers (ISPs), content providers (CPs) and end users. One recent pricing proposal is sponsored data plan, i.e., when CP negotiates with the ISP on behalf of the users to remove the network subscription fees so as to attract more users and increase the number of advertisements. As such, a key challenge is how to provide proper sponsorship in the situation of complex interactions among the telecommunication actors, namely, the advertisers, the content provider, and users. To answer those questions, we explore the potential economic impacts of this new pricing model by modeling the interplay among the advertiser, users, and the CPs in a game theoretic framework. The CP may have either a subscription revenue model (charging end-users) or an advertisement revenue model (charging advertisers). In this work, we design and analyze the interaction among CPs having an advertisement revenue as a non-cooperative game, where each CP determines the proportion of data to sponsor and a level of credibility of content. In turn, the end-users demand for the content of a CP depends not only on their strategies but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose an iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Nash equilibrium point in a distributed manner. Numerical investigation shows the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium point and corroborates the fact that sponsoring content may improve the CPs outcome
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
Collaborative and collective! Reflexive coordination and the dynamics of open innovation in clusters
Economic geography increasingly conceptualises "innovation as a collective action" (Storper, 1996). However, cluster literature often reduces the collective dimension to the circulation of knowledge between local-regional organisations based on various forms of (market, organisational, social, institutional or cognitive) coordination. This paper departs from this grass-roots perspective by discussing the role of collective actions in clusters, i.e. actions developed by a large number of cluster members acting as a group. Empirical evidence drawing on a study of three digital clusters in the Paris region shows that the cluster as a collective entity holds agency and - thanks to reflexive coordination - can contribute to open innovation - including innovation-seeking partnerships in the early stages of cluster lifecycles.open innovation; reflexive coordination; collaborative / collective actions; territory
Compatibility promotion for standard development within shared platforms:A rising tide does not lift all boats
Selective promotion entails the exploitation of resources offered by individual complementors to improve a proprietary platformâs competitive position. However, as governance decisions to endorse a particular complementor are made unilaterally, such promotion is less suitable for shared platforms that are ultimately owned and managed by an ecosystem of heterogeneous, autonomous complementors. We explore compatibility promotion, which involves screening a shared stock of infrastructural resources and making a choice as to which complementor to promote in light of the capabilities the platform seeks to develop. Based on a longitudinal study of a shared platform that evolved around a new technology standard in the Swedish road haulage industry, we explicate how elevating one complementor over others unsettled the governance of the platform and denied the promoted complementors the opportunity to generate the kind of value that their elevated status implicitly promised. This made the platform better off at the expense of the promoted complementor. Our surprising insight lets us theorize why compatibility promotion in shared platforms renders outcomes opposite to those of selective promotion in proprietary platforms.</p
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