Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics

We use ideas from distributed computing to study dynamic environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, follow adaptive heuristics (Hart 2005), i.e., simple and unsophisticated rules of behavior, e.g., repeatedly "best replying" to others' actions, and minimizing "regret", that have been extensively studied in game theory and economics. We explore when convergence of such simple dynamics to an equilibrium is guaranteed in asynchronous computational environments, where nodes can act at any time. Our research agenda, distributed computing with adaptive heuristics, lies on the borderline of computer science (including distributed computing and learning) and game theory (including game dynamics and adaptive heuristics). We exhibit a general non-termination result for a broad class of heuristics with bounded recall---that is, simple rules of behavior that depend only on recent history of interaction between nodes. We consider implications of our result across a wide variety of interesting and timely applications: game theory, circuit design, social networks, routing and congestion control. We also study the computational and communication complexity of asynchronous dynamics and present some basic observations regarding the effects of asynchrony on no-regret dynamics. We believe that our work opens a new avenue for research in both distributed computing and game theory.Comment: 36 pages, four figures. Expands both technical results and discussion of v1. Revised version will appear in the proceedings of Innovations in Computer Science 201

Unconstrained Online Linear Learning in Hilbert Spaces: Minimax Algorithms and Normal Approximations

We study algorithms for online linear optimization in Hilbert spaces, focusing on the case where the player is unconstrained. We develop a novel characterization of a large class of minimax algorithms, recovering, and even improving, several previous results as immediate corollaries. Moreover, using our tools, we develop an algorithm that provides a regret bound of $\mathcal{O}\Big(U \sqrt{T \log(U \sqrt{T} \log^2 T +1)}\Big)$, where $U$ is the $L_2$ norm of an arbitrary comparator and both $T$ and $U$ are unknown to the player. This bound is optimal up to $\sqrt{\log \log T}$ terms. When $T$ is known, we derive an algorithm with an optimal regret bound (up to constant factors). For both the known and unknown $T$ case, a Normal approximation to the conditional value of the game proves to be the key analysis tool.Comment: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT 2014

Stochastic approximations and differential inclusions II: applications

We apply the theoretical results on "stochastic approximations and differential inclusions" developed in Benaim, Hofbauer and Sorin (2005) to several adaptive processes used in game theory including: classical and generalized approachability, no-regret potential procedures (Hart and Mas-Colell), smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine