82,709 research outputs found

    The Regulation of Transport Price Competition

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    The gas chain: influence of its specificities on the liberalisation process. NBB Working Papers. No. 122, 16 November 2007

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    Like other network industries, the European gas supply industry has been liberalised, along the lines of what has been done in the United Kingdom and the United States, by opening up to competition the upstream and downstream segments of essential transmission infrastructure. The aim of this first working paper is to draw attention to some of the stakes in the liberalisation of the gas market whose functioning cannot disregard the network infrastructure required to bring this fuel to the consumer, a feature it shares with the electricity market. However, gas also has the specific feature of being a primary energy source that must be transported from its point of extraction. Consequently, opening the upstream supply segment of the market to competition is not so obvious in the European context, because, contrary to the examples of the North American and British gas markets, these supply channels are largely in the hands of external suppliers and thus fall outside the scope of EU legislation on the liberalisation and organisation of the internal market in gas. Competition on the downstream gas supply segment must also adapt to the constraints imposed by access to the grid infrastructure, which, in the case of gas in Europe, goes hand in hand with the constraint of dependence on external suppliers. Hence the opening to competition of upstream and downstream markets is not "synchronous", a discrepancy which can weaken the impact of liberalisation. Moreover, the separation of activities necessary for ensuring free competition in some segments of the market is coupled with major changes in the way the gas chain operates, with the appearance of new markets, new price mechanisms and new intermediaries. Starting out from a situation where gas supply was in the hands of vertically-integrated operators, the new regulatory framework that has been set up must, on the one hand, ensure that competitive forces can be given free rein, and, on the other hand, that free and fair competition helps the gas chain to operate coherently, at lower cost and in the interests of consumers, for whom the stakes are high as natural gas is an important input for many industrial manufacturing processes, even a "commodity" almost of basic necessity

    The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation

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    Competition policy has become more prominent while the thinking underlying those policies has undergone substantial revision. We survey advances in antitrust economics and the economics of regulation. Increasing reliance on non-cooperative game theory as a foundation for antitrust has led to rethinking conventional approaches. We review some of these contributions in the context of mergers, vertical restraints, and competition in "network industries." Turning to regulation, we review standard rationales and identify some major contemporary refinements, with examples of the motives behind them and their application. After brief thoughts on privatization, we conclude with suggestions on design and implementation, with some observations on whether these developments are as valuable in the corridors of policy as they may be in the halls of academe.

    Liberalization of trade in services: A CGE analysis for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay

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    In this paper we use two computable general equilibrium models to evaluate gains of liberalization of trade in services for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. We employ two CGE models for the calculations. For the Argentine and Uruguayan cases, we apply a model built by the authors (see Chisari (2009)) based on the MPSGE. For Brazil, our study uses the GTAP model – adapted by Rutherford (2005) that also works on an MPSGE platform. We also consider two basic cases of liberalization of trade in services: 1) mobility of goods, in which there is mobility of services across borders, as it is the traditional case of exports and imports of goods, and 2) trade presence, that is location in the domestic country of new operators with a new technology for producing services. We estimate the gains from improvements in efficiency, quality and productivity of the industries of services, due to more intense competition in the domestic market as well as from reductions in the implicit mark up on domestic services due to barriers to trade. Quality advancements lead to gains in welfare of a similar order, or even higher than expected in the case of productivity improvements. To address the case of trade presence, a latent technology is defined in situ, operative or not depending on relative prices (its market share in the overall equilibrium of the economy is endogenous). This is especially relevant for the case of telecommunications. We also observe that: 1) the economy’s specific endowment of factors will limit the expected gains of the liberalization if the latent technology is unsuitable or incompatible with them, 2) governments can face some dilemmas regarding domestic market regulations, if the liberalization of trade in financial services called for a change in regulations so that the domestic demand for government bonds were to fall.Computable general equilibrium; liberalization of trade; trade in services

    Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers’ Collusion

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    This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains. We show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers' incentives to sustain tacit collusion. First, granting local monopolies to retailers distributing a given brand softens inter- and intrabrand competition in a one-shot game. Hence, punishment profits are larger, thereby rendering deviation more profitable. Second, exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands can adjust their pricing decisions to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer, whilst intrabrand competition prevents such `instantaneous reaction'. We show that the latter effect tends to dominate the former, whereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to sustain upstream cooperation. These insights carry over when manufacturers voluntarily decide whether to disclose contracts and can change the distribution mode every period; moreover, they strengthen under imperfect intrabrand competition. Finally, we extend the model to allow for retailers' service investments. Here a novel effect emerges under exclusive territories: a retailer of the deviant manufacturer increases its service investment as a response to a lower wholesale price. This renders deviation more profitable, thereby softening the pro-collusive effect of exclusive territories.Exclusive territories, supply chains, tacit collusion, information sharing, vertical restraints.

    THE PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING COOPERATIVES IN DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKETS

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    Cooperatives, product differentiation, agricultural marketing, Agribusiness,

    "Regional Specialization, Urban Hierarchy, and Commuting Costs"

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    We consider an economic geography model of a new genre: all firms and workers are mobile and their agglomeration within a city generates rising urban costs through competition on a land market. When commuting costs are high (low), the industry tends to be agglomerated (dispersed). With two sectors, the same tendencies prevail for extreme commuting cost values, but richer patterns arise for intermediate values. When one good is perfectly mobile, the corresponding industry is partially dispersed and the other industry is agglomerated, thus showing regional specialization. When one sector supplies a nontradeable consumption good, this sector is more agglomerated than the other. The corresponding equilibrium involves an urban hierarchy: a larger array of varieties of each good is produced within the same city.

    Foreign direct investment in services and the domestic market for expertise

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    A growing body of evidence suggests that the close availability of diverse business services is important for economic growth. Producer services such as managerial and engineering consulting can provide specialized knowledge to help domestic firms develop at lower unit cost. But these intermediate services are often nontraded, or costly to trade, which may be one reason that cities and industrial complexes form and economic performance differs across regions. Because services are costly to trade, foreign services are best transferred through foreign direct investment. This has important implications for public policy. Policies that affect foreign direct investment differ considerably from those that affect trade in goods. The authors develop a model of services, results from which show that: A) Liberalizing restraints on inward foreign direct investment has a powerful positive impact on the income and welfare of the importing country. The impact is much stronger than in traditional competitive models of trade in goods. B) Policies to protect domestic skilled labor against competition from imported services can have the perverse effect of lowering returns to domestic skilled labor-because while imported services economize on the use of domestic skilled labor (compared with domestic service industries), the positive effects on scale and productivity in the downstream industry can be powerful enough that the real wages of domestic skilled labor rise after the liberalization of foreign direct investment in service industries. In other words, domestic skilled labor and foreign direct investment are partial-equilibrium substitutes in the model but are typically general-equilibrium complements. C)The increase in the variety of imported services leads to increased total factor productivity in downstream industries, but the relative impact on downstream industries depends on how intensively they use intermediate services. The differential in effects on productivity in the production of final goods can be strong enough that permitting foreign direct investment can actually affect whether a good is exported rather than being imported. Policymakers should be aware that protection of a domestic service industry affects different constituencies differently. Although domestic capital owners may be adversely affected by foreign direct investment, domestic skilled workers in the industry are likely to see demand for their skills-and their real wages-rise. Moreover, downstream industries that use the service unambiguously benefit from foreign direct investment and their expansion can be surprisingly strong.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Health Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management
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