1,054 research outputs found
Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Referential π-Institutions
Wójcicki introduced in the late 1970s the concept of a referential semantics for propositional logics. Referential semantics incorporate features of the Kripke possible world semantics for modal logics into the realm of algebraic and matrix semantics of arbitrary sentential logics. A well-known theorem of Wójcicki asserts that a logic has a referential semantics if and only if it is selfextensional. Referential semantics was subsequently studied in detail by Malinowski and the concept of selfextensionality has played, more recently, an important role in the field of abstract algebraic logic in connection with the operator approach to algebraizability. We introduce and review some of the basic definitions and results pertaining to the referential semantics of π-institutions, abstracting corresponding results from the realm of propositional logics
Suszko's Problem: Mixed Consequence and Compositionality
Suszko's problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values
needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko
proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only
two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of
Tarski's structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced
a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated
value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. In this
paper we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko's problem and on mixed
consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating
structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic
interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance,
and establishing that (intersective) mixed consequence is fundamentally the
semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those
to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French
and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos and Wansing, for logics with various
structural properties (reflexivity, transitivity, none, or both). We strengthen
these results into exact rank results for non-permeable logics (roughly, those
which distinguish the role of premises and conclusions). We discuss the
underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently
by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve
compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer
truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction,
allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular
connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of
truth-functionality and additional semantic properties.Comment: Keywords: Suszko's thesis; truth value; logical consequence; mixed
consequence; compositionality; truth-functionality; many-valued logic;
algebraic logic; substructural logics; regular connective
From Many-Valued Consequence to Many-Valued Connectives
Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be
defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator
internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this
paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for
the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends
the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer
extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional
operators, but on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation,
conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a
multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence
relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence
relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives.
Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed
consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence
relations.Comment: Updated version [corrections of an incorrect claim in first version;
two bib entries added
Some Concerns Regarding Ternary-relation Semantics and Truth-theoretic Semantics in General
This paper deals with a collection of concerns that, over a period of time, led the author away from the Routley–Meyer semantics, and towards proof- theoretic approaches to relevant logics, and indeed to the weak relevant logic MC of meaning containment
A 4-valued logic of strong conditional
How to say no less, no more about conditional than what is needed? From a logical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (Section 1), we argue that a stronger account of conditional can be obtained in two steps: firstly, by reminding its historical roots inside modal logic and set-theory (Section 2); secondly, by revising the meaning of logical values, thereby getting rid of the paradoxes of material implication whilst showing the bivalent roots of conditional as a speech-act based on affirmations and rejections (Section 3). Finally, the two main inference rules for conditional, viz. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, are reassessed through a broader definition of logical consequence that encompasses both a normal relation of truth propagation and a weaker relation of falsity non-propagation from premises to conclusion (Section 3)
Two Indian dialectical logics: saptabhangi and catuskoti
A rational interpretation is proposed for two ancient Indian logics: the Jaina saptabhaṅgī, and the Mādhyamika catuṣkoṭi. It is argued that the irrationality currently imputed to these logics relies upon some philosophical preconceptions inherited from Aristotelian metaphysics. This misunderstanding can be corrected in two steps: by recalling their assumptions about truth; by reconstructing their ensuing theory of judgment within a common conceptual framewor
Categories of First-Order Quantifiers
One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder
quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations.
The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories
of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the
so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko,
referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic
and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle
is introduced for categorial languages generated by the Ajdukiewicz’s classical
categorial grammar. The 1st-order quantifiers are typically ambiguous. Every
1st-order quantifier of the type k \u3e 0 is treated as a two-argument functorfunction
defined on the variable standing at this quantifier and its scope (the
sentential function with exactly k free variables, including the variable bound
by this quantifier); a binary function defined on denotations of its two arguments
is its denotation. Denotations of sentential functions, and hence also
quantifiers, are defined separately in Fregean and in situational semantics.
They belong to the ontological categories that correspond to the syntactic
categories of these sentential functions and the considered quantifiers. The
main result of the paper is a solution of the problem of categories of the
1st-order quantifiers based on the principle of categorial compatibility
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