A Game-Theoretic Approach to Multi-Objective Resource Sharing and Allocation in Mobile Edge Clouds

Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources to different delay-sensitive applications. However, allocating the limited edge resources to a number of applications is a challenging problem. To alleviate the resource scarcity problem, we propose sharing of resources among multiple edge computing service providers where each service provider has a particular utility to optimize. We model the resource allocation and sharing problem as a multi-objective optimization problem and present a \emph{Cooperative Game Theory} (CGT) based framework, where each edge service provider first satisfies its native applications and then shares its remaining resources (if available) with users of other providers. Furthermore, we propose an $\mathcal{O}(N)$ algorithm that provides allocation decisions from the \emph{core}, hence the obtained allocations are \emph{Pareto} optimal and the grand coalition of all the service providers is stable. Experimental results show that our proposed resource allocation and sharing framework improves the utility of all the service providers compared with the case where the service providers are working alone (no resource sharing). Our $\mathcal{O}(N)$ algorithm reduces the time complexity of obtaining a solution from the core by as much as 71.67\% when compared with the \emph{Shapley value}.Comment: The paper has been accepted for publication in ACM Mobicom workshop "Technologies for the Wireless Edge" 201

A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Optimal association of mobile users to multi-access edge computing resources

Multi-access edge computing (MEC) plays a key role in fifth-generation (5G) networks in bringing cloud functionalities at the edge of the radio access network, in close proximity to mobile users. In this paper we focus on mobile-edge computation offloading, a way to transfer heavy demanding, and latency-critical applications from mobile handsets to close-located MEC servers, in order to reduce latency and/or energy consumption. Our goal is to provide an optimal strategy to associate mobile users to access points (AP) and MEC hosts, while contextually optimizing the allocation of radio and computational resources to each user, with the objective of minimizing the overall user transmit power under latency constraints incorporating both communication and computation times. The overall problem is a mixed-binary problem. To overcome its inherent computational complexity, we propose two alternative strategies: i) a method based on successive convex approximation (SCA) techniques, proven to converge to local optimal solutions; ii) an approach hinging on matching theory, based on formulating the assignment problem as a matching game

A Game-theoretic Framework for Revenue Sharing in Edge-Cloud Computing System

We introduce a game-theoretic framework to ex- plore revenue sharing in an Edge-Cloud computing system, in which computing service providers at the edge of the Internet (edge providers) and computing service providers at the cloud (cloud providers) co-exist and collectively provide computing resources to clients (e.g., end users or applications) at the edge. Different from traditional cloud computing, the providers in an Edge-Cloud system are independent and self-interested. To achieve high system-level efficiency, the manager of the system adopts a task distribution mechanism to maximize the total revenue received from clients and also adopts a revenue sharing mechanism to split the received revenue among computing servers (and hence service providers). Under those system-level mechanisms, service providers attempt to game with the system in order to maximize their own utilities, by strategically allocating their resources (e.g., computing servers). Our framework models the competition among the providers in an Edge-Cloud system as a non-cooperative game. Our simulations and experiments on an emulation system have shown the existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game. We find that revenue sharing mechanisms have a significant impact on the system-level efficiency at Nash equilibria, and surprisingly the revenue sharing mechanism based directly on actual contributions can result in significantly worse system efficiency than Shapley value sharing mechanism and Ortmann proportional sharing mechanism. Our framework provides an effective economics approach to understanding and designing efficient Edge-Cloud computing systems