4,106 research outputs found
Information Leakage Games
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker
and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their
optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the
utility of a mixed strategy is a convex function of the distribution on the
defender's pure actions, rather than the expected value of their utilities.
Nevertheless, the important properties of game theory, notably the existence of
a Nash equilibrium, still hold for our (zero-sum) leakage games, and we provide
algorithms to compute the corresponding optimal strategies. As typical in
(simultaneous) game theory, the optimal strategy is usually mixed, i.e.,
probabilistic, for both the attacker and the defender. From the point of view
of information flow, this was to be expected in the case of the defender, since
it is well known that randomization at the level of the system design may help
to reduce information leaks. Regarding the attacker, however, this seems the
first work (w.r.t. the literature in information flow) proving formally that in
certain cases the optimal attack strategy is necessarily probabilistic
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links
A survey on pseudonym changing strategies for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
The initial phase of the deployment of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) has
begun and many research challenges still need to be addressed. Location privacy
continues to be in the top of these challenges. Indeed, both of academia and
industry agreed to apply the pseudonym changing approach as a solution to
protect the location privacy of VANETs'users. However, due to the pseudonyms
linking attack, a simple changing of pseudonym shown to be inefficient to
provide the required protection. For this reason, many pseudonym changing
strategies have been suggested to provide an effective pseudonym changing.
Unfortunately, the development of an effective pseudonym changing strategy for
VANETs is still an open issue. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey
and classification of pseudonym changing strategies. We then discuss and
compare them with respect to some relevant criteria. Finally, we highlight some
current researches, and open issues and give some future directions
Network Design in Games with Spillovers
How should an organization be designed in order to provide its members with minimal incentives to defect? And how does the optimal design depend on the type of strategic interaction between defectors and remaining organizational members? This paper addresses such issues in a game theoretic model of cooperation, in which an organization is formally represented by a connected network, and where gains from cooperation are given by a partition function. We show that critical structural features of the organization depend in a clear-cut way on the sign of spillovers. In particular, positive spillovers favor the adoption of dispersed and centralized forms, while negative spillovers favor cohesive and horizontal ones. Moreover, if the organizational form determines all the communication possibilities of members, a highly centralized organization - the star - emerges under positive spillovers, whereas two horizontal architectures - the circle and the complete - emerge under negative spillovers.Organizational design, networks, group stability, spillovers.
Promoting cooperation by preventing exploitation: The role of network structure
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative
behavior can be affected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the
existence of state-based decision-making mechanisms that may have emerged by
evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a simple mechanism of
anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity
- a concept organized around the premise "help anyone if helped by someone",
and study its dynamics on random graphs. In the presence of such mechanism, the
evolution of cooperation is related to the dynamics of the levels of
investments (i.e. probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes
engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is
determined by a network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood
importance index and discuss relevant implications to natural and artificial
systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies to an invasion
of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results
for the case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figure
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