20,229 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping: Some Lessons from MINURSO
YesThis paper sums up the findings from the first comprehensive study on the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. This research project explores the
possibilities of using a Foucualtian analysis to look at the links between peacekeeping
practice and Western policies of conflict containment in the Western Sahara with a view to
enhancing UN conflict resolution capabilities
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.Auctions, spectrum auctions, market design, package auction, clock auction, combinatorial auction
Tolling, Capacity Selection and Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints
An Equilibrium problem with an equilibrium constraint is a mathematical construct that can be applied to private competition in highway networks. In this paper we consider the problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium regarding competition in toll pricing on a network utilising 2 alternative algorithms. In the first algorithm, we utilise a Gauss Siedel fixed point approach based on the cutting constraint algorithm for toll pricing. In the second algorithm, we extend an existing sequential linear complementarity approach for finding Nash equilibrium subject to Wardrop Equilibrium constraints. Finally we consider how the equilibrium may change between the Nash competitive equilibrium and a collusive equilibrium where the two players co-operate to form the equivalent of a monopoly operation
An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions
An auction is combinatorial when bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. Computer scientists are interested in combinatorial auctions because they are concerned with the expressiveness of bidding languages, as well as the algorithmic aspects of the underlying combinatorial problem. The combinatorial problem has attracted attention from operations researchers, especially those working in combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming, who are fascinated by the idea of applying these tools to auctions. Auctions have been studied extensively by economists, of course. Thus, the newly emerging field of combinatorial auctions lies at the intersection of computer science, operations research, and economics. In this article, we present a brief introduction to combinatorial auctions, based on our book, Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press, 2006), in which we look at combinatorial auctions from all three perspectives.Auctions
- …