352 research outputs found
An auction framework for DaaS in cloud computing and its evaluation
Data-as-a-service (DaaS) is the next emerging technology in cloud computing research. Small clouds operating as a group may exploit the DaaS efficiently to perform the substantial amount of work. In this paper, an auction framework is studied and evaluated when the small clouds are strategic in nature. We present the system model and formal definition of the problem and its experimental evaluation. Several auction DaaS-based mechanisms are proposed and their correctness and computational complexity is analysed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and realistic attempt to study the DaaS in a strategic setting. We have evaluated the proposed approach under various simulation scenarios to judge on its usefulness and efficiencyPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial Part 1- Key concepts and classical results
Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a social planner faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision when the agents exhibit strategic behaviour. The objective of this paper is to provide a tutorial introduction to the foundations and key results in mechanism design theory. The paper is in two parts. Part 1 focuses on basic concepts and classical results which form the foundation of mechanism design theory. Part 2 presents key advanced concepts and deeper results in mechanism design
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Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties
The widespread deployment of high-speed internet access is ushering in
a new era of distributed computing, in which parties both contribute to a global pool of shared resources and access the pooled resources to support their own computing needs. We argue that system designers must explicitly address the self-interest of individual parties if these next-generation computing systems are to flourish. We propose strategyproof computing, a vision for an open computing infrastructure in which resource allocation and negotiation schemes are incentive-compatible, and individual parties can treat other resources as their own. In this paper we outline key guiding principles for the vision of strategyproof computing, define the strategyproof computing paradigm, and lay out a systems-related research agenda.Engineering and Applied Science
Decentralized Resource Scheduling in Grid/Cloud Computing
In the Grid/Cloud environment, applications or services and resources belong to different organizations with different objectives. Entities in the Grid/Cloud are autonomous and self-interested; however, they are willing to share their resources and services to achieve their individual and collective goals. In such open environment, the scheduling decision is a challenge given the decentralized nature of the environment. Each entity has specific requirements and objectives that need to achieve. In this thesis, we review the Grid/Cloud computing technologies, environment characteristics and structure and indicate the challenges within the resource scheduling. We capture the Grid/Cloud scheduling model based on the complete requirement of the environment. We further create a mapping between the Grid/Cloud scheduling problem and the combinatorial allocation problem and propose an adequate economic-based optimization model based on the characteristic and the structure nature of the Grid/Cloud. By adequacy, we mean that a comprehensive view of required properties of the Grid/Cloud is captured. We utilize the captured properties and propose a bidding language that is expressive where entities have the ability to specify any set of preferences in the Grid/Cloud and simple as entities have the ability to express structured preferences directly. We propose a winner determination model and mechanism that utilizes the proposed bidding language and finds a scheduling solution. Our proposed approach integrates concepts and principles of mechanism design and classical scheduling theory. Furthermore, we argue that in such open environment privacy concerns by nature is part of the requirement in the Grid/Cloud. Hence, any scheduling decision within the Grid/Cloud computing environment is to incorporate the feasibility of privacy protection of an entity. Each entity has specific requirements in terms of scheduling and privacy preferences. We analyze the privacy problem in the Grid/Cloud computing environment and propose an economic based model and solution architecture that provides a scheduling solution given privacy concerns in the Grid/Cloud. Finally, as a demonstration of the applicability of the approach, we apply our solution by integrating with Globus toolkit (a well adopted tool to enable Grid/Cloud computing environment). We also, created simulation experimental results to capture the economic and time efficiency of the proposed solution
Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges
In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging
technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing
online activities over public networks. As an essential market process,
auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to
their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features
between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research
and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can
provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the
auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design
incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These
opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in
both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of
existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive
state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing
solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some
application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open
research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction
models
Mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems and application to procurement auction design
In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent, known as the leader, makes the first move and this action is followed by the actions of the remaining agents, which are known as the followers. These problems are also known as single leader rest follower (SLRF) problems. There are many examples of such problems in the areas of electronic commerce, supply chain management, manufacturing systems, distributed computing, transportation networks, and multiagent systems. The game induced among the agents for these problems is a Bayesian Stackelberg game, which is more general than a Bayesian game. For this reason, classical mechanism design, which is based on Bayesian games, cannot be applied as is for solving SLRF mechanism design problems. In this paper, we extend classical mechanism design theory to the specific setting of SLRF problems. As a significant application of the theory developed, we explore two examples from the domain of electronic commerce-first-price and second-price electronic procurement auctions with reserve prices. Using an SLRF model for these auctions, we derive certain key results using the SLRF mechanism design framework developed in this paper. The theory developed has many promising applications in modeling and solving emerging game theoretic problems in engineering
Mechanism design for distributed task and resource allocation among self-interested agents in virtual organizations
The aggregate power of all resources on the Internet is enormous. The Internet can
be viewed as a massive virtual organization that holds tremendous amounts of information
and resources with different ownerships. However, little is known about how to run this
organization efficiently.
This dissertation studies the problems of distributed task and resource allocation
among self-interested agents in virtual organizations. The developed solutions are not
allocation mechanisms that can be imposed by a centralized designer, but decentralized
interaction mechanisms that provide incentives to self-interested agents to behave
cooperatively. These mechanisms also take computational tractability into consideration
due to the inherent complexity of distributed task and resource allocation problems.
Targeted allocation mechanisms can achieve global task allocation efficiency in a
virtual organization and establish stable resource-sharing communities based on agentsâÃÂÃÂ
own decisions about whether or not to behave cooperatively. This high level goal requires
solving the following problems: synthetic task allocation, decentralized coalition formation
and automated multiparty negotiation. For synthetic task allocation, in which each task needs to be accomplished by a
virtual team composed of self-interested agents from different real organizations, my
approach is to formalize the synthetic task allocation problem as an algorithmic mechanism
design optimization problem. I have developed two approximation mechanisms that I prove
are incentive compatible for a synthetic task allocation problem.
This dissertation also develops a decentralized coalition formation mechanism,
which is based on explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. Each agent makes its
own decisions about whether or not to join a candidate coalition. The resulting coalitions
are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality. I have applied this mechanism to
form resource sharing coalitions in computational grids and buyer coalitions in electronic
markets.
The developed negotiation mechanism in the decentralized coalition formation
mechanism realizes automated multilateral negotiation among self-interested agents who
have symmetric authority (i.e., no mediator exists and agents are peers).
In combination, the decentralized allocation mechanisms presented in this
dissertation lay a foundation for realizing automated resource management in open and
scalable virtual organizations
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