Varieties of Relevant S5

In classically based modal logic, there are three common conceptions of necessity, the universal conception, the equivalence relation conception, and the axiomatic conception. They provide distinct presentations of the modal logic S5, all of which coincide in the basic modal language. We explore these different conceptions in the context of the relevant logic R, demonstrating where they come apart. This reveals that there are many options for being an S5-ish extension of R. It further reveals a divide between the universal conception of necessity on the one hand, and the axiomatic conception on the other: The latter is consistent with motivations for relevant logics while the former is not. For the committed relevant logician, necessity cannot be the truth in all possible worlds

The Strength of Abstraction with Predicative Comprehension

Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence relations in a weak background second-order logic. We show that this predicative Fregean theory interprets second-order Peano arithmetic.Comment: Forthcoming in Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. Slight change in title from previous version, at request of referee

Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze and G\"odel's Constructible Universe

Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to G\"odel's constructible universe of sets, which G\"odel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis. More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe as well as to a weak version of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen's fine structure theory). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension. As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting.Comment: Forthcoming in The Journal of Symbolic Logi

Named Models in Coalgebraic Hybrid Logic

Hybrid logic extends modal logic with support for reasoning about individual states, designated by so-called nominals. We study hybrid logic in the broad context of coalgebraic semantics, where Kripke frames are replaced with coalgebras for a given functor, thus covering a wide range of reasoning principles including, e.g., probabilistic, graded, default, or coalitional operators. Specifically, we establish generic criteria for a given coalgebraic hybrid logic to admit named canonical models, with ensuing completeness proofs for pure extensions on the one hand, and for an extended hybrid language with local binding on the other. We instantiate our framework with a number of examples. Notably, we prove completeness of graded hybrid logic with local binding

A realizability semantics for inductive formal topologies, Church's Thesis and Axiom of Choice

We present a Kleene realizability semantics for the intensional level of the Minimalist Foundation, for short mtt, extended with inductively generated formal topologies, Church's thesis and axiom of choice. This semantics is an extension of the one used to show consistency of the intensional level of the Minimalist Foundation with the axiom of choice and formal Church's thesis in previous work. A main novelty here is that such a semantics is formalized in a constructive theory represented by Aczel's constructive set theory CZF extended with the regular extension axiom