Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical – for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms

Automated Algorithmic Machine-to-Machine Negotiation for Lane Changes Performed by Driverless Vehicles at the Edge of the Internet of Things

This dissertation creates and examines algorithmic models for automated machine-to-machine negotiation in localized multi-agent systems at the edge of the Internet of Things. It provides an implementation of two such models for unsupervised resource allocation for the application domain of autonomous vehicle traffic as it pertains to lane changing and speed setting selection. The first part concerns negotiation via abstract argumentation. A general model for the arbitration of conflict based on abstract argumentation is outlined and then applied to a scenario where autonomous vehicles on a multi-lane highway use expert systems in consultation with private objectives to form arguments and use them to compete for lane positions. The conflict resolution component of the resulting argumentation framework is augmented with social voting to achieve a community supported conflict-free outcome. The presented model heralds a step toward independent negotiation through automated argumentation in distributed multi-agent systems. Many other cyber-physical environments embody stages for opposing positions that may benefit from this type of tool for collaboration. The second part deals with game-theoretic negotiation through mechanism design. It outlines a mechanism providing resource allocation for a fee and applies it to autonomous vehicle traffic. Vehicular agents apply for speed and lane assignments with sealed bids containing their private feasible action valuations determined within the context of their governing objective. A truth-inducing mechanism implementing an incentive-compatible strategyproof social choice functions achieves a socially optimal outcome. The model can be adapted to many application fields through the definition of a domain-appropriate operation to be used by the allocation function of the mechanism. Both presented prototypes conduct operations at the edge of the Internet of Things. They can be applied to agent networks in just about any domain where the sharing of resources is required. The social voting argumentation approach is a minimal but powerful tool facilitating the democratic process when a community makes decisions on the sharing or rationing of common-pool assets. The mechanism design model can create social welfare maximizing allocations for multiple or multidimensional resources

Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion

This Article develops a model for analyzing legal dispute resolution systems as systems for argumentation. Our model meshes two theories of argument conceived centuries apart: contemporary argumentation theory and classical stasis theory. In this Article, we apply the model to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a proof of concept. Specifically, the model analyzes how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a staged argumentative critical discussion designed to permit judge and jury to rationally resolve litigants’ differences in a reasonable manner. At a high level, this critical discussion has three phases: a confrontation, an (extended) opening, and a concluding phase. Those phases are the umbrella under which discrete argumentation phases occur at points we call stases. Whenever litigants seek a ruling or judgment, they reach a stasis—a stopping or standing point for arguing procedural points of disagreement. During these stases, the parties make arguments that fall into predictable “commonplace” argument types. Taken together, these stock argument types form a taxonomy of arguments for all civil cases. Our claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a system for argumentation is novel, as is our claim that civil cases breed a taxonomy of argument types. These claims also mark the beginning of a broader project. Starting here with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we embark on a journey that we expect to follow for several years (and which we hope other scholars will join), exploring our model’s application across dispute resolution systems and using it to make normative claims about those systems. From a birds-eye view, this Article also represents a short modern trek in a much longer journey begun by advocates in city states in and near Greece nearly 2500 years ago

"Freedom" through Repression: Epistemic Closure in Agricultural Trade Negotiations

A central concern of critical theory is that of how the forces of Modern reason cause certain logics to become reified in the name of rational progress. Two such logics – the ongoing spread of liberal capitalism, and territorial particularism – are simultaneously embodied within social institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate the global economy, a phenomenon that occurs on the premise of maximising global welfare. Building upon a critical reading of Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, this article undertakes an empirical immanent critique of the extent to which such logics repress the possibility of normative imperatives being considered within agricultural trade negotiations. Specifically, it argues that the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality, operating as a theoretical heuristic, reveals that the DDA is susceptible to an ethical indictment that arises from its inability to countenance the alternatives to the dual logics of neo-liberalism and state-interest that could otherwise emerge from a free and rational discussion. The nature of the WTO as a site of social action is revealed to be that of a closed epistemic community in which important normative claims are repressed, and as such, one in which the underlying rational bases for communication are fundamentally distorted

Where is the reasonable? Objectivity and bias of practical argument

The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good” argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed

An assessment of inductive coupling roadway powered vehicles

The technical concept underlying the roadway powered vehicle system is the combination of an electrical power source embedded in the roadway and a vehicle-mounted power pickup that is inductively coupled to the roadway power source. The feasibility of such a system, implemented on a large scale was investigated. Factors considered included current and potential transportation modes and requirements, economics, energy, technology, social and institutional issues. These factors interrelate in highly complex ways, and a firm understanding of each of them does not yet exist. The study therefore was structured to manipulate known data in equally complex ways to produce a schema of options and useful questions that can form a basis for further, harder research. A dialectical inquiry technique was used in which two adversary teams, mediated by a third-party team, debated each factor and its interrelationship with the whole of the known information on the topic

Cognition and norms: toward a developmental account of moral agency in social dilemmas

Most recent developments in the study of social dilemmas give an increasing amount of attention to cognition, belief systems, valuations, and language. However, developments in this field operate almost entirely under epistemological assumptions which only recognize the instrumental form of rationality and deny that “value judgments” or “moral questions” have cognitive content. This standpoint erodes the moral aspect of the choice situation and obstructs acknowledgment of the links connecting cognition, inner growth, and moral reasoning, and the significance of such links in reaching cooperative solutions to many social dilemmas. Concurrently, this standpoint places the role of communication and mutual understanding in promoting cooperation in morally relevant conflicts of action in a rather mysterious situation. This paper draws on Habermas’s critique of instrumental action, and on the most recent developments in institutional and behavioral economics with a view to enhancing our knowledge of the interventions used to cope with social dilemmas. We conclude the paper with a brief presentation of a research strategy for examining the capacity of alternative developmental models to predict dissimilar choices under similar incentive conditions in social dilemmas