Semantic memory

The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Second Edition is a comprehensive three-volume reference source on human action and reaction, and the thoughts, feelings, and physiological functions behind those actions

Advancing Perception in Artificial Intelligence through Principles of Cognitive Science

Although artificial intelligence (AI) has achieved many feats at a rapid pace, there still exist open problems and fundamental shortcomings related to performance and resource efficiency. Since AI researchers benchmark a significant proportion of performance standards through human intelligence, cognitive sciences-inspired AI is a promising domain of research. Studying cognitive science can provide a fresh perspective to building fundamental blocks in AI research, which can lead to improved performance and efficiency. In this review paper, we focus on the cognitive functions of perception, which is the process of taking signals from one's surroundings as input, and processing them to understand the environment. Particularly, we study and compare its various processes through the lens of both cognitive sciences and AI. Through this study, we review all current major theories from various sub-disciplines of cognitive science (specifically neuroscience, psychology and linguistics), and draw parallels with theories and techniques from current practices in AI. We, hence, present a detailed collection of methods in AI for researchers to build AI systems inspired by cognitive science. Further, through the process of reviewing the state of cognitive-inspired AI, we point out many gaps in the current state of AI (with respect to the performance of the human brain), and hence present potential directions for researchers to develop better perception systems in AI.Comment: Summary: a detailed review of the current state of perception models through the lens of cognitive A

Commentary on Jakab's Ineffability of Qualia

Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to the theory of mental representation employed. Jakab's starting assumption is that there is no linguistic description of a given experience such that understanding the description would result in someone who has never had the experience being described undergoing an experience of that type. (In terms of the well-known Mary case: No description could reveal what colors are like to Mary.) This is what Jakab means by the ineffability of qualia. And this is Jakab's explanation: Understanding in the standard sense involves our linguistic- conceptual abilities; but our linguistic-conceptual abilities are notinvolved in undergoing simple sensory experiences; so they cannot deliver knowledge by acquaintance, which means linguistic descriptions of sensory experiences cannot result in someone who understands the description undergoing the experience being described. (We do not agree with the assumption that our linguistic-conceptual abilities are not at all involved in undergoing simple sensory experiences; such processes can be involved in undergoing simple sensory experiences, but they need not be the only thinginvolved in undergoing simple sensory experiences; in undergoing simple sensory experiences something else is involved which cannot be captured by descriptions. The crucial point is that descriptions do not give us knowledge by acquaintance.

TEST: A Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of Cognition

TEST is a novel taxonomy of knowledge representations based on three distinct hierarchically organized representational features: Tropism, Embodiment, and Situatedness. Tropic representational features reflect constraints of the physical world on the agent’s ability to form, reactivate, and enrich embodied (i.e., resulting from the agent’s bodily constraints) conceptual representations embedded in situated contexts. The proposed hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, have tropic features without necessarily having situated and/or embodied features. On the other hand, representations that are situated and/or embodied are likely to be simultaneously tropic. Hence while we propose tropism as the most general term, the hierarchical relationship between embodiment and situatedness is more on a par, such that the dominance of one component over the other relies on the distinction between offline storage vs. online generation as well as on representation-specific properties