Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions

The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies.coalition, strategy, game theory, emission, environment, resource based view, strategic factor market

Trading reliability targets within a supply chain using Shapley's value

The development of complex systems involves a multi-tier supply chain, with each organisation allocated a reliability target for their sub-system or component part apportioned from system requirements. Agreements about targets are made early in the system lifecycle when considerable uncertainty exists about the design detail and potential failure modes. Hence resources required to achieve reliability are unpredictable. Some types of contracts provide incentives for organisations to negotiate targets so that system reliability requirements are met, but at minimum cost to the supply chain. This paper proposes a mechanism for deriving a fair price for trading reliability targets between suppliers using information gained about potential failure modes through development and the costs of activities required to generate such information. The approach is based upon Shapley's value and is illustrated through examples for a particular reliability growth model, and associated empirical cost model, developed for problems motivated by the aerospace industry. The paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility of the method and discuss how it could be extended to other reliability allocation models

The world turned upside-down : architects as subcontractors in design-and-build contracts

The traditional role of the Architect on UK building projects is well-known and has been the subject of much study and comment. However, recent surveys indicate that design-and-build arrangements now exceed traditional procurement in terms of their share of total UK construction. On such projects, architects and other designers are engaged, not by the employer, but under sub-contract to the main contractor. The question arises as to the effect this has had. This has been approached by considering architects and other design consultants as professional contractors, as opposed to trade contractors - a term adopted to describe the more traditional type of subcontractor. Within these distinctions there are contractual, managerial and cultural implications for the relationships between the parties. To explore this further, representatives of five main contractors were questioned on their relationships with the two types. Clear differences emerged in matters such as contract formation, price-setting, payment and claims; the treatment of selection, work scheduling, and defects / omissions was more complicated. Within trade contractors there is a strong argument for recognising a further category of specialist contractors, who include a design service in their work package. Within the professional contractor category, architects were clearly differentiated from other design team members. The findings are analysed to suggest a theoretical framework with four dimensions that relate to process/product, attitude/motivation, working culture and relative power. The concern is not to be definitive at this stage, but to suggest an agenda for future research into the issues that have emerged