Model Creation and Equivalence Proofs of Cellular Automata and Artificial Neural Networks

Computational methods and mathematical models have invaded arguably every scientific discipline forming its own field of research called computational science. Mathematical models are the theoretical foundation of computational science. Since Newton's time, differential equations in mathematical models have been widely and successfully used to describe the macroscopic or global behaviour of systems. With spatially inhomogeneous, time-varying, local element-specific, and often non-linear interactions, the dynamics of complex systems is in contrast more efficiently described by local rules and thus in an algorithmic and local or microscopic manner. The theory of mathematical modelling taking into account these characteristics of complex systems has to be established still. We recently presented a so-called allagmatic method including a system metamodel to provide a framework for describing, modelling, simulating, and interpreting complex systems. Implementations of cellular automata and artificial neural networks were described and created with that method. Guidance from philosophy were helpful in these first studies focusing on programming and feasibility. A rigorous mathematical formalism, however, is still missing. This would not only more precisely describe and define the system metamodel, it would also further generalise it and with that extend its reach to formal treatment in applied mathematics and theoretical aspects of computational science as well as extend its applicability to other mathematical and computational models such as agent-based models. Here, a mathematical definition of the system metamodel is provided. Based on the presented formalism, model creation and equivalence of cellular automata and artificial neural networks are proved. It thus provides a formal approach for studying the creation of mathematical models as well as their structural and operational comparison.Comment: 13 pages, 1 tabl

On the possible Computational Power of the Human Mind

The aim of this paper is to address the question: Can an artificial neural network (ANN) model be used as a possible characterization of the power of the human mind? We will discuss what might be the relationship between such a model and its natural counterpart. A possible characterization of the different power capabilities of the mind is suggested in terms of the information contained (in its computational complexity) or achievable by it. Such characterization takes advantage of recent results based on natural neural networks (NNN) and the computational power of arbitrary artificial neural networks (ANN). The possible acceptance of neural networks as the model of the human mind's operation makes the aforementioned quite relevant.Comment: Complexity, Science and Society Conference, 2005, University of Liverpool, UK. 23 page

Information Processing, Computation and Cognition

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debates’ empirical aspects