INSTITUTIONS AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF DISTRUST IN THE RUSSIAN HOUSEHOLD DEPOSIT MARKET, 1992-1999

In our analysis of the Russian household deposit market during the 1990s, we show how the initial conditions of market emergence contributed to a vicious circle in which private commercial banks progressively lost the trust of potential depositors. The roots of this destructive dynamic lay in the initial conditions of market emergence. Initial experiences of fraud and financial loss led Russian households to distrust that commercial banks would honor their contractual obligations. As distrust grew and became more ingrained, the competitive conditions in the deposit market changed in a way that further increased the gains to opportunism and decreased the returns to trust production. In a self-reinforcing process, fraud begat more fraud.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39974/3/wp588.pd

Strengthening e-banking security using keystroke dynamics

This paper investigates keystroke dynamics and its possible use as a tool to prevent or detect fraud in the banking industry. Given that banks are constantly on the lookout for improved methods to address the menace of fraud, the paper sets out to review keystroke dynamics, its advantages, disadvantages and potential for improving the security of e-banking systems. This paper evaluates keystroke dynamics suitability of use for enhancing security in the banking sector. Results from the literature review found that keystroke dynamics can offer impressive accuracy rates for user identification. Low costs of deployment and minimal change to users modus operandi make this technology an attractive investment for banks. The paper goes on to argue that although this behavioural biometric may not be suitable as a primary method of authentication, it can be used as a secondary or tertiary method to complement existing authentication systems

Anti Money Laundering Mechanism: An Application of Principal-Agent Model for Pakistan

In this paper anti money laundering policy of the international financial regime is analyzed in principal agent model perspective. The strategy of the principal for formal agents is deliberated for global financial stability. This strategy encompasses incentive and dis-incentive for cooperation of formal agent. Formal agent by cooperating with principal may induce dis-incentive for informal agent. All the integrating stake holders make decision on the basis of comparison of present value of marginal cost of non-cooperation and present value of returns from cooperation. As the desired objective of the principal is to minimize transaction of money through informal channels therefore it has to include informal agents and clients in the strategy. The successful anti money laundering strategy can only be evolved by the cooperation of all the stakeholders.International Financial Regime, Principal Agent model and Money Laundering

Consumer protection in the Kenyan financial sector: A case for a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation

Magister Legum - LLMThe dynamic character of the financial services industry necessitates frequent appraisal of the regulation of the sector. The main objectives for regulation of the financial sector include financial stability, promotion of competition and protection of the consumers. In ensuring consumer protection, there is need to balance this with all the other objectives to ensure optimal protection in the entire financial sector. This can be difficult as it is mostly dependent on the regulatory framework in the financial sector for the basic reason that most of the failures are associated with regulation. Key to the challenges is that consumer protection is served by measures that ensure proper conduct on the part of the service providers. Interests of the providers of the financial services may thus not be sufficiently aligned with those of the consumers of the products. There are three common models of financial regulation. They are the sectoral model, unified or integrated model and the Twin Peaks model. The financial sector in Kenya follows a sectoral model. It is a hodgepodge of institutional and functional regulation. There are five (5) government agencies that regulate specific segments of the financial sector with each of the regulators being established to operate independently within the permits of an Act of Parliament. This is without mentioning the many other segments that have no specific regulators

Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated. Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed. Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together. Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system. Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units