57 research outputs found
IPTV Service Framework Based on Secure Authentication and Lightweight Content Encryption for Screen-Migration in Cloud Computing
These days, the advancing of smart devices (e.g. smart phones, tablets, PC, etc.) capabilities and the increase of internet bandwidth enables IPTV service provider to extend their services to smart mobile devices. User can just receive their IPTV service using any smart devices by accessing the internet via wireless network from anywhere anytime in the world which is convenience for users. However, wireless network communication has well a known critical security threats and vulnerabilities to user smart devices and IPTV service such as user identity theft, reply attack, MIM attack, and so forth. A secure authentication for user devices and multimedia protection mechanism is necessary to protect both user devices and IPTV services. As result, we proposed framework of IPTV service based on secure authentication mechanism and lightweight content encryption method for screen-migration in Cloud computing. We used cryptographic nonce combined with user ID and password to authenticate user device in any mobile terminal they passes by. In addition we used Lightweight content encryption to protect and reduce the content decode overload at mobile terminals. Our proposed authentication mechanism reduces the computational processing by 30% comparing to other authentication mechanism and our lightweight content encryption reduces encryption delay to 0.259 second
Securing IP Mobility Management for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
The proliferation of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) applications, such as
Internet access and Infotainment, highlights the requirements for improving the underlying
mobility management protocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Mobility
management protocols in VANETs are envisioned to support mobile nodes (MNs), i.e.,
vehicles, with seamless communications, in which service continuity is guaranteed while
vehicles are roaming through different RoadSide Units (RSUs) with heterogeneous wireless
technologies.
Due to its standardization and widely deployment, IP mobility (also called Mobile IP
(MIP)) is the most popular mobility management protocol used for mobile networks including
VANETs. In addition, because of the diversity of possible applications, the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) issues many MIP's standardizations, such as MIPv6 and
NEMO for global mobility, and Proxy MIP (PMIPv6) for localized mobility. However,
many challenges have been posed for integrating IP mobility with VANETs, including the
vehicle's high speeds, multi-hop communications, scalability, and ef ficiency. From a security
perspective, we observe three main challenges: 1) each vehicle's anonymity and location
privacy, 2) authenticating vehicles in multi-hop communications, and 3) physical-layer
location privacy.
In transmitting mobile IPv6 binding update signaling messages, the mobile node's Home
Address (HoA) and Care-of Address (CoA) are transmitted as plain-text, hence they can
be revealed by other network entities and attackers. The mobile node's HoA and CoA
represent its identity and its current location, respectively, therefore revealing an MN's HoA
means breaking its anonymity while revealing an MN's CoA means breaking its location
privacy. On one hand, some existing anonymity and location privacy schemes require
intensive computations, which means they cannot be used in such time-restricted seamless
communications. On the other hand, some schemes only achieve seamless communication
through low anonymity and location privacy levels. Therefore, the trade-off between the
network performance, on one side, and the MN's anonymity and location privacy, on the
other side, makes preservation of privacy a challenging issue. In addition, for PMIPv6
to provide IP mobility in an infrastructure-connected multi-hop VANET, an MN uses a
relay node (RN) for communicating with its Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). Therefore,
a mutual authentication between the MN and RN is required to thwart authentication
attacks early in such scenarios. Furthermore, for a NEMO-based VANET infrastructure,
which is used in public hotspots installed inside moving vehicles, protecting physical-layer
location privacy is a prerequisite for achieving privacy in upper-layers such as the IP-layer. Due to the open nature of the wireless environment, a physical-layer attacker can easily
localize users by employing signals transmitted from these users.
In this dissertation, we address those security challenges by proposing three security
schemes to be employed for different mobility management scenarios in VANETs, namely,
the MIPv6, PMIPv6, and Network Mobility (NEMO) protocols.
First, for MIPv6 protocol and based on the onion routing and anonymizer, we propose
an anonymous and location privacy-preserving scheme (ALPP) that involves two complementary
sub-schemes: anonymous home binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return
routability (ARR). In addition, anonymous mutual authentication and key establishment
schemes have been proposed, to authenticate a mobile node to its foreign gateway and
create a shared key between them. Unlike existing schemes, ALPP alleviates the tradeoff
between the networking performance and the achieved privacy level. Combining onion
routing and the anonymizer in the ALPP scheme increases the achieved location privacy
level, in which no entity in the network except the mobile node itself can identify this
node's location. Using the entropy model, we show that ALPP achieves a higher degree of
anonymity than that achieved by the mix-based scheme. Compared to existing schemes,
the AHBU and ARR sub-schemes achieve smaller computation overheads and thwart both
internal and external adversaries. Simulation results demonstrate that our sub-schemes
have low control-packets routing delays, and are suitable for seamless communications.
Second, for the multi-hop authentication problem in PMIPv6-based VANET, we propose
EM3A, a novel mutual authentication scheme that guarantees the authenticity of both
MN and RN. EM3A thwarts authentication attacks, including Denial of service (DoS), collusion,
impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks. EM3A works in conjunction
with a proposed scheme for key establishment based on symmetric polynomials, to generate
a shared secret key between an MN and an RN. This scheme achieves lower revocation
overhead than that achieved by existing symmetric polynomial-based schemes. For a PMIP
domain with n points of attachment and a symmetric polynomial of degree t, our scheme
achieves t x 2^n-secrecy, whereas the existing symmetric polynomial-based authentication
schemes achieve only t-secrecy. Computation and communication overhead analysis as well
as simulation results show that EM3A achieves low authentication delay and is suitable
for seamless multi-hop IP communications. Furthermore, we present a case study of a
multi-hop authentication PMIP (MA-PMIP) implemented in vehicular networks. EM3A
represents the multi-hop authentication in MA-PMIP to mutually authenticate the roaming
vehicle and its relay vehicle. Compared to other authentication schemes, we show that our
MA-PMIP protocol with EM3A achieves 99.6% and 96.8% reductions in authentication
delay and communication overhead, respectively.
Finally, we consider the physical-layer location privacy attacks in the NEMO-based
VANETs scenario, such as would be presented by a public hotspot installed inside a moving
vehicle. We modify the obfuscation, i.e., concealment, and power variability ideas and
propose a new physical-layer location privacy scheme, the fake point-cluster based scheme,
to prevent attackers from localizing users inside NEMO-based VANET hotspots. Involving
the fake point and cluster based sub-schemes, the proposed scheme can: 1) confuse
the attackers by increasing the estimation errors of their Received Signal Strength (RSSs)
measurements, and 2) prevent attackers' monitoring devices from detecting the user's transmitted
signals. We show that our scheme not only achieves higher location privacy, but
also increases the overall network performance. Employing correctness, accuracy, and certainty
as three different metrics, we analytically measure the location privacy achieved by
our proposed scheme. In addition, using extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the
fake point-cluster based scheme can be practically implemented in high-speed VANETs'
scenarios
Protocols and Architecture for Privacy-preserving Authentication and Secure Message Dissemination in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
The rapid development in the automotive industry and wireless communication technologies have enhanced the popularity of Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Today, the automobile industry is developing sophisticated sensors that can provide a wide range of assistive features, including accident avoidance, automatic lane tracking, semi-autonomous driving, suggested lane changes, and more. VANETs can provide drivers a safer and more comfortable driving experience, as well as many other useful services by leveraging such technological advancements. Even though this networking technology enables smart and autonomous driving, it also introduces a plethora of attack vectors. However, the main issues to be sorted out and addressed for the widespread deployment/adoption of VANETs are privacy, authenticating users, and the distribution of secure messages. These issues have been addressed in this dissertation, and the contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows: Secure and privacy-preserving authentication and message dissemination in VANETs: Attackers can compromise the messages disseminated within VANETs by tampering with the message content or sending malicious messages. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the legitimacy of the vehicles participating in the VANETs as well as the integrity and authenticity of the messages transmitted in VANETs. In VANET communication, the vehicle uses pseudonyms instead of its real identity to protect its privacy. However, the real identity of a vehicle must be revealed when it is determined to be malicious. This dissertation presents a distributed and scalable privacy-preserving authentication and message dissemination scheme in VANET. Low overhead privacy-preserving authentication scheme in VANETs: The traditional pseudonym-based authentication scheme uses Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to store the certificates of revoked and malicious entities in VANETs. However, the size of CRL increases significantly with the increased number of revoked entities. Therefore, the overhead involved in maintaining the revoked certificates is overwhelming in CRL-based solutions. This dissertation presents a lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme that reduces the overhead associated with maintaining CRLs in VANETs. Our scheme also provides an efficient look-up operation for CRLs. Efficient management of pseudonyms for privacy-preserving authentication in VANETs: In VANETs, vehicles change pseudonyms frequently to avoid the traceability of attackers. However, if only one vehicle out of 100 vehicles changes its pseudonym, an intruder can easily breach the privacy of the vehicle by linking the old and new pseudonym. This dissertation presents an efficient method for managing pseudonyms of vehicles. In our scheme, vehicles within the same region simultaneously change their pseudonyms to reduce the chance of linking two pseudonyms to the same vehicle
Authentication enhancement in command and control networks: (a study in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks)
Intelligent transportation systems contribute to improved traffic safety by facilitating real time communication between vehicles. By using wireless channels for communication, vehicular networks are susceptible to a wide range of attacks, such as impersonation, modification, and replay. In this context, securing data exchange between intercommunicating terminals, e.g., vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, constitutes a technological challenge that needs to be addressed. Hence, message authentication is crucial to safeguard vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) from malicious attacks. The current state-of-the-art for authentication in VANETs relies on conventional cryptographic primitives, introducing significant computation and communication overheads. In this challenging scenario, physical (PHY)-layer authentication has gained popularity, which involves leveraging the inherent characteristics of wireless channels and the hardware imperfections to discriminate between wireless devices. However, PHY-layerbased authentication cannot be an alternative to crypto-based methods as the initial legitimacy detection must be conducted using cryptographic methods to extract the communicating terminal secret features. Nevertheless, it can be a promising complementary solution for the reauthentication problem in VANETs, introducing what is known as “cross-layer authentication.” This thesis focuses on designing efficient cross-layer authentication schemes for VANETs, reducing the communication and computation overheads associated with transmitting and verifying a crypto-based signature for each transmission. The following provides an overview of the proposed methodologies employed in various contributions presented in this thesis.
1. The first cross-layer authentication scheme: A four-step process represents this approach: initial crypto-based authentication, shared key extraction, re-authentication via a PHY challenge-response algorithm, and adaptive adjustments based on channel conditions. Simulation results validate its efficacy, especially in low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) scenarios while proving its resilience against active and passive attacks.
2. The second cross-layer authentication scheme: Leveraging the spatially and temporally correlated wireless channel features, this scheme extracts high entropy shared keys that can be used to create dynamic PHY-layer signatures for authentication. A 3-Dimensional (3D) scattering Doppler emulator is designed to investigate the scheme’s performance at different speeds of a moving vehicle and SNRs. Theoretical and hardware implementation analyses prove the scheme’s capability to support high detection probability for an acceptable false alarm value ≤ 0.1 at SNR ≥ 0 dB and speed ≤ 45 m/s.
3. The third proposal: Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) integration for improved authentication: Focusing on enhancing PHY-layer re-authentication, this proposal explores integrating RIS technology to improve SNR directed at designated vehicles. Theoretical analysis and practical implementation of the proposed scheme are conducted using a 1-bit RIS, consisting of 64 × 64 reflective units. Experimental results show a significant improvement in the Pd, increasing from 0.82 to 0.96 at SNR = − 6 dB for multicarrier communications.
4. The fourth proposal: RIS-enhanced vehicular communication security: Tailored for challenging SNR in non-line-of-sight (NLoS) scenarios, this proposal optimises key extraction and defends against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks through selective signal strengthening. Hardware implementation studies prove its effectiveness, showcasing improved key extraction performance and resilience against potential threats.
5. The fifth cross-layer authentication scheme: Integrating PKI-based initial legitimacy detection and blockchain-based reconciliation techniques, this scheme ensures secure data exchange. Rigorous security analyses and performance evaluations using network simulators and computation metrics showcase its effectiveness, ensuring its resistance against common attacks and time efficiency in message verification.
6. The final proposal: Group key distribution: Employing smart contract-based blockchain technology alongside PKI-based authentication, this proposal distributes group session keys securely. Its lightweight symmetric key cryptography-based method maintains privacy in VANETs, validated via Ethereum’s main network (MainNet) and comprehensive computation and communication evaluations.
The analysis shows that the proposed methods yield a noteworthy reduction, approximately ranging from 70% to 99%, in both computation and communication overheads, as compared to the conventional approaches. This reduction pertains to the verification and transmission of 1000 messages in total
A comprehensive survey of V2X cybersecurity mechanisms and future research paths
Recent advancements in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication have notably improved existing transport systems by enabling increased connectivity and driving autonomy levels. The remarkable benefits of V2X connectivity come inadvertently with challenges which involve security vulnerabilities and breaches. Addressing security concerns is essential for seamless and safe operation of mission-critical V2X use cases. This paper surveys current literature on V2X security and provides a systematic and comprehensive review of the most relevant security enhancements to date. An in-depth classification of V2X attacks is first performed according to key security and privacy requirements. Our methodology resumes with a taxonomy of security mechanisms based on their proactive/reactive defensive approach, which helps identify strengths and limitations of state-of-the-art countermeasures for V2X attacks. In addition, this paper delves into the potential of emerging security approaches leveraging artificial intelligence tools to meet security objectives. Promising data-driven solutions tailored to tackle security, privacy and trust issues are thoroughly discussed along with new threat vectors introduced inevitably by these enablers. The lessons learned from the detailed review of existing works are also compiled and highlighted. We conclude this survey with a structured synthesis of open challenges and future research directions to foster contributions in this prominent field.This work is supported by the H2020-INSPIRE-5Gplus project (under Grant agreement No. 871808), the ”Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformacion Digital” and the European Union-NextGenerationEU in the frameworks of the ”Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia” and of the ”Mecanismo de Recuperación y Resiliencia” under references TSI-063000-2021-39/40/41, and the CHIST-ERA-17-BDSI-003 FIREMAN project funded by the Spanish National Foundation (Grant PCI2019-103780).Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
- …