Essays on Quantitative Methods for Consequences of Political Institutions

In this dissertation, I develop and apply sophisticated Bayesian models to the analysis of institutional effects on electoral and legislative behavior in the policy making process. Leveraging the flexibility of Bayesian methods for statistical modeling, I deal with several methodological problems encountered by political scientists, and social scientists in general, in some established research agenda. This dissertation shows the improvement of the ability to evaluate the success of conflicting theories when these methodological issues are properly dealt with. The consequences of political institutions are investigated at three different levels in this dissertation: countries, political parties, and individual legislators. First of all, at the country level, I investigate whether there is a difference between the performances of democratic and nondemocratic regimes in social provision policy in 18 Latin American countries by focusing on the rarely changing property of political regimes. An appropriate model for the dynamic nature of rarely changing variables is built to thoroughly explore how democratic institutions improve social welfare. Second, at the party level, I develop a Bayesian structural equation model to examine the interdependence between party policy strategies and party support in multiparty systems, in an effort to illustrate the endogenous dynamics of multiparty systems. The results show that party manifestos do not provide clear-cut division of party policy positions. Instead, party labels are more important information than changes in party manifestos to the electorate. Finally, at the level of legislators, I focus on the role of the president and political parties in Brazilian legislative process, in which political exchanges between the government and legislature is an essential feature. By recognizing the existence of the non-ideological effect on voting behavior, I develop a random item-difficulty ideal-point model implied by the spatial voting model to analyze the relationship between coalition dynamics and party-based voting behavior of legislators

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationIn large part due to the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has emerged as a predominant object of study within the sociological community. This dissertation observes terrorist violence through the lens of social movement theory in order to prevent its decoupling from contentious politics more broadly defined. The concepts of political opportunity structures (POS) form the theoretical underpinnings for three analyses. First, domestic terrorism is observed as part of the extralegal POS. This analysis compares the effects of corruption and terrorism as dual paths for goal attainment. Second, domestic terrorism is analyzed based on the more conventional POS tenets of regime type and repressive capacity. Finally, the models outlined in the previous analyses are re-evaluated with respect to several distinct forms of contentious politics. Results indicate that domestic terrorism can be observed to operate similar to corruption in extralegal POS. Mainstream models of POS also support the prevalence of domestic terrorism, though they are not substantially predictive of the severity of that violence. Finally, support exists for the inclusion of many forms of contentious politics within the social movement repertoire--including domestic terrorist violence--but further research must be accomplished in order to improve the models' predictive capacity with respect to each individual form

Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reform

The author explains how recent developments in political economics improve our understanding of macroeconomic policy - especially the timing, design, and likelihood of stabilization's success through monetary and fiscal reform. The author reviews the literature on political business cycles and emphasizes several issues involving the relationship between the timing of elections and the timing of macroeconomic policies and outcomes. He also addresses how models can be useful in studying non-democratic systems. Two forces are crucial factors in both democratic and dictatorial systems, although they may manifest themselves differently: (1) the policymakers'incentive to retain power; and (2) society's polarization and the degree of social conflict. The author then analyzes why economic stabilization is delayed, even when it is obvious that sooner or later a stabilization program will have to be adopted. Some points made in the paper follow. Certain institutional characteristics make quick and successful stabilization more or less likely. The more unequal the distribution of stabilization's costs, the more likely that stabilization will be delayed. An increase in the cost of postponing stabilization reduces the delay. Political institutions that make it easier for small interest groups to veto legislation make delay more likely. If political and economic resources are unequally distributed, and it is obvious which group is stronger and has resources to wait longer, a war of attrition ends immediately, as there is no uncertainty about who will win it. Delay is more likely when information about who will bear the cost of delays is uncertain or unevenly distributed. Delay is also more likely when there is agreement about the need for fiscal change but a political stalemate about distribution - about how the burden of higher taxes or spending cuts should be allocated. Stabilization usually occurs when there is political consolidation. The burden of stabilization is sometimes unequal, with the politically weaker group (often the lower classes) bearing a larger burden (often regressive measures). If it is in the interest of the current government to do nothing for fear of failure because of government incompetence, the public may have no incentive to vote for the opposition because the opposition may also do nothing; the crucial factor here is how aware the government is of its own incompetence and thus its reasons for not attempting reform. Successful stabilization usually comes after several failed attempts, and the successful program is often very much like one that failed.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,ICT Policy and Strategies,Health Economics&Finance

Digital China: from cultural presence to innovative nation

The rapid development of digital technology infrastructure in the People’s Republic of China, together with the government’s recent support of grassroots innovation, has led to a growing mood of techno-nationalism as well as a feeling that digital technology can play an important role in renovating China’s international image. Powerful internet companies are challenging the dominance of traditional state-owned media. Cultural products are digitized, distributed, and consumed on online platforms. Such platforms offer consumers a choice of content through subscription, either free or paid. With China’s media and culture striving to ‘go out’ (zou chuqu 走出去), typified by CCTV and Confucius Institutes, we pose the question: Can China use the ‘digital power’ of the internet to achieve international recognition as an ‘innovative nation’ or will the internet perpetuate a stereotype of China as a copycat nation

Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions, in contrast to what would be suggested by a reasoning extending the Coase Theorem to politics? Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions because of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of their peoples or leaders? Or are inefficiencies in politics and economics the outcome of social and distributional conflicts? This paper discusses these various approaches to political economy, and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent, and that they are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups holding political power, at the expense of the society at large. At the center of the theoretical case are the commitment problems inherent in politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements.

The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations

This paper argues that success in the struggle for regional integration hinges foremost on the degree of heterogeneity among regional states. Regional organizations therefore must consider how to optimize their leverage to forge convergence that will foster agreement and cooperation. To do so, regional organizations can rely on inclusive designs that admit member states and then seek to mold their behavior ex post, or they can use exclusive designs that condition membership on ex ante changes in state behavior. This paper examines the success of these designs in using various ex ante versus ex post tools in soliciting cooperative behavior among regional states, arguing that ex ante tools generally have greater advantages. However, because the advantages vary by issue areas, regions may benefit from creating layers of institutions with different designs. Finally, even after admitting states, regional organizations have options for varying membership rules across different areas of cooperation. Drawing especially on the European experience, the paper considers these various forms of differentiated rules that organizations can use to forge cooperation among different groups of member states despite remaining differences.Regional integration; international cooperation; membership rules

MANAGING DISSENT: STATE CAPACITY, DEMOCRACY, AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN MEXICO

This dissertation is an exploration of protest and its management in Mexico. It seeks to understand not only the factors that increase the likelihood of protest success, but also those that increase violence - either on the part of state actors in the form of protest event repression or on the part of protesters in the form of protest violence. The central argument is that state capacity plays a key role in shaping protest and its management. Protest management is a complex task, requiring institutional resources and skilled state authorities. In short, state agents must know when and how to intervene. When states have high capacity they are better able to avoid violence and employ a conciliatory approach. When states lack capacity, protest management tends to break down, making both repression and violence on the part of protesters more likely. The argument is tested using original micro-level data on Mexican protest events and responses, and leverages within-country variations in democracy and state capacity. In making the argument, the study also makes a case for a particular conception of state capacity, emphasizing the state's ability to penetrate society and implement binding rules. I demonstrate that there is a greater likelihood of concessions in high capacity states, while repression and protest violence are more likely in low capacity states.Doctor of Philosoph

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationThis dissertation’s foci are the Central Asian states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two postcommunist states that are similar in territorial and population size; per capita income; history of Soviet subjugation; pro-Russian sentiments; reliance on remittances; and ratification of liberal treaties, including the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (UNCAT). Related to the latter, the two states distinctively differ vis-à -vis allowance of independent monitoring of places of detention and ratification of UNCAT’s Optional Protocol (OPCAT). Although torture remains problematic in both states, Kyrgyzstan shows more promise in institutional attempts to combat its practice, including collaboration with international bodies, such as the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ratified UNCAT in the mid-1990s, but only Kyrgyzstan ratified OPCAT (in 2008), and by 2014 formulated its UN-sanctioned National Prevention Mechanism (NPM), a body (in the case of Kyrgyzstan, made up of government and civil society entities) meant to pay unannounced visits to places of detention as a torture prevention instrument. This dissertation reasons that Kyrgyzstan’s relative progress in the liberal antitorture norm is explained through its political culture as manifested in its nomadic past; its historical memory of resistance (as demonstrated by the 1916 Ürkün incidence); less deference to authority (as demonstrated by two “revolutionary” regime changes in 2005 and 2010); and higher degree of syncretism in religion, with the Kyrgyz practice of Islam, as compared to Tajikistan, being far less dogmatic and more pragmatic. The dissertation also argues that Tajikistan’s abysmal record of progress in adhering to UNCAT and its unwillingness to ratify OPCAT, nor allow other bodies, such as the ICRC, access to its places of detention, is linked to its political culture of subservience to authority, the country’s historical memory of defeat (as demonstrated by the anti-Soviet Basmachi losses during the 1920s and 1930s), and the ethnic Tajiks’ far more dogmatic adherence to Islam. Tajikistan’s lack of progress in the liberal antitorture norm is also explained through the Afghanistan contagion effect, which served as a catalyst for the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war that stymied the country’s socioeconomic and political progress. The ongoing malicious drug trade emanating from Afghanistan has also more negatively affected Tajikistan, which shares a 1,350 km border with Afghanistan, than Kyrgyzstan, which shares neither a direct border with Afghanistan nor, as opposed to Tajikistan, has strong cultural ties with Afghanistan

The Strategic Balance between the Public and Allies: A Theory of Authoritarian Distribution in China

This project explores how authoritarian regimes can meet the demands of both the ruling coalition and the public from a perspective of distributional politics. This challenge is particularly severe since authoritarian regimes face increasing pressure to expand public goods and welfare. This project proposes a theory of authoritarian distribution that addresses this challenge in the case of China. First, autocrats adopted a differentiated strategy of distribution. They allocate universalistic benefits that target the large group of people to the public while distributing the particularistic benefits, which is exclusively for a small and specific group of people, to the regime allies. Second, autocrats should offer compensation to the regime allies for their loss in the expansion of public welfare, at the expense of other public interests. Third, autocrats would create new benefits to the regime allies to compensate for their relative loss because their old privilege is no longer exclusives during the expansion of public welfare. This project utilized an original dataset of the People’s Congress, the budgeting and anti-corruption data at provincial level, and a qualitative case study of membership recruitment of the Communist Party of China to test the proposed theory. In general, this project explains how authoritarian regimes maintain balances between different demands of distribution for regime survival. It also contributes to the study of authoritarian politics by bridging the gap between the literature on cooptation and the literature on the loyalty of the ruling coalition, both of which are necessary and critical explanations on the survival of authoritarian regimes