Numerical modelling of cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems under learning by doing in Three Gorges Reservoir Area

In this paper, we investigate cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems in Three Gorges Reservoir Area where emission permits trading and abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. The abatement cost depends on two key factors: the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use the optimal control theory to study the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems, respectively. By using the actual economic data of Wanzhou District, Kaizhou District and Yunyang County, we obtain the abatement level and the pollution stock of cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems based on the four order Runge-Kutta method. We also discuss the influence of the change of parameter for the abatement level and the pollution stock

International Trade and Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition

The objective of the present paper is to review the literature on the link between environmental policy and international trade, with a focus on imperfect competition on the world output markets. Special attention will be paid to the literature on oligopoly and strategic government policy and its potential consequences for the ecological dumping debate. We address partial equilibrium as well as general equilibrium approaches, and emphasize the fact that opposing conclusions can be reached

The economic design of a potential tradable permit system for SO2 emissions in the European Union

published in European Economy, (Reports and Studies Series) (1), DG 2 of European Commission, 1998,This paper contains two main parts. The first develops the issues of the European acid policy, and sets out the general background of the related regulatory regime. It also gives an overview of the theoretical and actual features of emissions trading mechanisms. It then considers the potential attractiveness of SO2 trading in the EU. This background throws light on the more specific analyses and proposals described in the second part of the paper, which is devoted to a presentation of possible frameworks for SO2 trading in the power generation sector in the EU. In section 2.1., we look at some key design variables. In section 2.2., we present three alternative ways of designing a trading scheme. In section 2.3., we consider specific issues related to zoning and scaling

The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.climate change, coalition theory, integrated assessment model, Kyoto protocol.

Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries

Although developing countries face a drastic increase in their greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation actions against climate change do not rank high among their priorities. The obvious reason lies in the necessity for them to continue the development process, which is characterised by pressing needs other than emission control. For developing countries the real problem is thus not emissions but economic growth. Therefore the key question is whether or not the Kyoto Protocol provides an opportunity for growth and thus for their economic development. The only way to accelerate the participation of developing countries in climate agreements - and therefore to come closer to the goal of a global climate control - is to design strategies which enable their economic development. The dilemma of reducing emissions on a global scale while ensuring growth in the poorer regions can only be solved if there are possibilities embedded in the agreements which can contribute to the sustainable development of those regions. As a consequence, greater emphasis must be placed on the economic development dimension of the Kyoto Protocol as far as the impact on developing countries is concerned.Climate Policy, Environmental Modeling, Integrated Assessment, Technical Change