2,379 research outputs found
Actor Network Procedures as Psi-calculi for Security Ceremonies
The actor network procedures of Pavlovic and Meadows are a recent graphical
formalism developed for describing security ceremonies and for reasoning about
their security properties. The present work studies the relations of the actor
network procedures (ANP) to the recent psi-calculi framework. Psi-calculi is a
parametric formalism where calculi like spi- or applied-pi are found as
instances. Psi-calculi are operational and largely non-graphical, but have
strong foundation based on the theory of nominal sets and process algebras. One
purpose of the present work is to give a semantics to ANP through psi-calculi.
Another aim was to give a graphical language for a psi-calculus instance for
security ceremonies. At the same time, this work provides more insight into the
details of the ANPs formalization and the graphical representation.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163
Actor-network procedures: Modeling multi-factor authentication, device pairing, social interactions
As computation spreads from computers to networks of computers, and migrates
into cyberspace, it ceases to be globally programmable, but it remains
programmable indirectly: network computations cannot be controlled, but they
can be steered by local constraints on network nodes. The tasks of
"programming" global behaviors through local constraints belong to the area of
security. The "program particles" that assure that a system of local
interactions leads towards some desired global goals are called security
protocols. As computation spreads beyond cyberspace, into physical and social
spaces, new security tasks and problems arise. As networks are extended by
physical sensors and controllers, including the humans, and interlaced with
social networks, the engineering concepts and techniques of computer security
blend with the social processes of security. These new connectors for
computational and social software require a new "discipline of programming" of
global behaviors through local constraints. Since the new discipline seems to
be emerging from a combination of established models of security protocols with
older methods of procedural programming, we use the name procedures for these
new connectors, that generalize protocols. In the present paper we propose
actor-networks as a formal model of computation in heterogenous networks of
computers, humans and their devices; and we introduce Procedure Derivation
Logic (PDL) as a framework for reasoning about security in actor-networks. On
the way, we survey the guiding ideas of Protocol Derivation Logic (also PDL)
that evolved through our work in security in last 10 years. Both formalisms are
geared towards graphic reasoning and tool support. We illustrate their workings
by analysing a popular form of two-factor authentication, and a multi-channel
device pairing procedure, devised for this occasion.Comment: 32 pages, 12 figures, 3 tables; journal submission; extended
references, added discussio
Intruder deducibility constraints with negation. Decidability and application to secured service compositions
The problem of finding a mediator to compose secured services has been
reduced in our former work to the problem of solving deducibility constraints
similar to those employed for cryptographic protocol analysis. We extend in
this paper the mediator synthesis procedure by a construction for expressing
that some data is not accessible to the mediator. Then we give a decision
procedure for verifying that a mediator satisfying this non-disclosure policy
can be effectively synthesized. This procedure has been implemented in CL-AtSe,
our protocol analysis tool. The procedure extends constraint solving for
cryptographic protocol analysis in a significative way as it is able to handle
negative deducibility constraints without restriction. In particular it applies
to all subterm convergent theories and therefore covers several interesting
theories in formal security analysis including encryption, hashing, signature
and pairing.Comment: (2012
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