90 research outputs found

    AI-powered Fraud Detection in Decentralized Finance: A Project Life Cycle Perspective

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    In recent years, blockchain technology has introduced decentralized finance (DeFi) as an alternative to traditional financial systems. DeFi aims to create a transparent and efficient financial ecosystem using smart contracts and emerging decentralized applications. However, the growing popularity of DeFi has made it a target for fraudulent activities, resulting in losses of billions of dollars due to various types of frauds. To address these issues, researchers have explored the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) approaches to detect such fraudulent activities. Yet, there is a lack of a systematic survey to organize and summarize those existing works and to identify the future research opportunities. In this survey, we provide a systematic taxonomy of various frauds in the DeFi ecosystem, categorized by the different stages of a DeFi project's life cycle: project development, introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. This taxonomy is based on our finding: many frauds have strong correlations in the stage of the DeFi project. According to the taxonomy, we review existing AI-powered detection methods, including statistical modeling, natural language processing and other machine learning techniques, etc. We find that fraud detection in different stages employs distinct types of methods and observe the commendable performance of tree-based and graph-related models in tackling fraud detection tasks. By analyzing the challenges and trends, we present the findings to provide proactive suggestion and guide future research in DeFi fraud detection. We believe that this survey is able to support researchers, practitioners, and regulators in establishing a secure and trustworthy DeFi ecosystem.Comment: 38 pages, update reference

    Why Trick Me: The Honeypot Traps on Decentralized Exchanges

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    Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) are one of the most important infrastructures in the world of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and are generally considered more reliable than centralized exchanges (CEXs). However, some well-known decentralized exchanges (e.g., Uniswap) allow the deployment of any unaudited ERC20 tokens, resulting in the creation of numerous honeypot traps designed to steal traders' assets: traders can exchange valuable assets (e.g., ETH) for fraudulent tokens in liquidity pools but are unable to exchange them back for the original assets. In this paper, we introduce honeypot traps on decentralized exchanges and provide a taxonomy for these traps according to the attack effect. For different types of traps, we design a detection scheme based on historical data analysis and transaction simulation. We randomly select 10,000 pools from Uniswap V2 \& V3, and then utilize our method to check these pools.Finally, we discover 8,443 abnormal pools, which shows that honeypot traps may exist widely in exchanges like Uniswap. Furthermore, we discuss possible mitigation and defense strategies to protect traders' assets

    Towards Usable Protection Against Honeypots

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    The Ethereum blockchain enables the execution of so-called smart contracts. These are programs that facilitate the automated transfer of funds according to a given business logic without the participants requiring to trust one another. However, recently attackers started using smart contracts to lure users into traps by deploying contracts that pretend to give away funds but in fact contain hidden traps. This new type of scam is commonly referred to as honeypots. In this paper, we propose a system that aims to protect users from falling into these traps. The system consists of a plugin for MetaMask and a back-end service that continuously scans the Ethereum blockchain for honeypots. Whenever a user is about to perform a transaction through MetaMask, our plugin sends a request to the back-end and warns the user if the target contract is a honeypot

    Consolidation of Ground Truth Sets for Weakness Detection in Smart Contracts

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    Smart contracts are small programs on the blockchain that often handle valuable assets. Vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be costly, as time has shown over and over again. Countermeasures are high in demand and include best practice recommendations as well as tools supporting development, program verification, and post-deployment analysis. Many tools focus on detecting the absence or presence of a subset of the known vulnerabilities, delivering results of varying quality. Most comparative tool evaluations resort to selecting a handful of tools and testing them against each other. In the best case, the evaluation is based on a smallish ground truth. For Ethereum, there are commendable efforts by several author groups to manually classify contracts. However, a comprehensive ground truth is still lacking. In this work, we construct a ground truth based on publicly available benchmark sets for Ethereum smart contracts with manually checked ground truth data. We develop a method to unify these sets. Additionally, we devise strategies for matching entries that pertain to the same contract, such that we can determine overlaps and disagreements between the sets and consolidate the disagreements. Finally, we assess the quality of the included ground truth sets. Our work reduces inconsistencies, redundancies, and incompleteness while increasing the number of data points and heterogeneity

    TRIDEnT: Building Decentralized Incentives for Collaborative Security

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    Sophisticated mass attacks, especially when exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, have the potential to cause destructive damage to organizations and critical infrastructure. To timely detect and contain such attacks, collaboration among the defenders is critical. By correlating real-time detection information (alerts) from multiple sources (collaborative intrusion detection), defenders can detect attacks and take the appropriate defensive measures in time. However, although the technical tools to facilitate collaboration exist, real-world adoption of such collaborative security mechanisms is still underwhelming. This is largely due to a lack of trust and participation incentives for companies and organizations. This paper proposes TRIDEnT, a novel collaborative platform that aims to enable and incentivize parties to exchange network alert data, thus increasing their overall detection capabilities. TRIDEnT allows parties that may be in a competitive relationship, to selectively advertise, sell and acquire security alerts in the form of (near) real-time peer-to-peer streams. To validate the basic principles behind TRIDEnT, we present an intuitive game-theoretic model of alert sharing, that is of independent interest, and show that collaboration is bound to take place infinitely often. Furthermore, to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we instantiate our design in a decentralized manner using Ethereum smart contracts and provide a fully functional prototype.Comment: 28 page

    Deep Smart Contract Intent Detection

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    Nowadays, security activities in smart contracts concentrate on vulnerability detection. Despite early success, we find that developers' intent to write smart contracts is a more noteworthy security concern because smart contracts with malicious intent have caused significant users' financial loss. Unfortunately, current approaches to identify the aforementioned malicious smart contracts rely on smart contract security audits, which entail huge manpower consumption and financial expenditure. To resolve this issue, we propose a novel deep learning-based approach, SmartIntentNN, to conduct automated smart contract intent detection. SmartIntentNN consists of three primary parts: a pre-trained sentence encoder to generate the contextual representations of smart contracts, a K-means clustering method to highlight intent-related representations, and a bidirectional LSTM-based (long-short term memory) multi-label classification network to predict the intents in smart contracts. To evaluate the performance of SmartIntentNN, we collect more than 40,000 real smart contracts and perform a series of comparison experiments with our selected baseline approaches. The experimental results demonstrate that SmartIntentNN outperforms all baselines by up to 0.8212 in terms of the f1-score metric.Comment: 12 pages, 9 figures, conferenc

    EF/CF: High Performance Smart Contract Fuzzing for Exploit Generation

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    Smart contracts are increasingly being used to manage large numbers of high-value cryptocurrency accounts. There is a strong demand for automated, efficient, and comprehensive methods to detect security vulnerabilities in a given contract. While the literature features a plethora of analysis methods for smart contracts, the existing proposals do not address the increasing complexity of contracts. Existing analysis tools suffer from false alarms and missed bugs in today's smart contracts that are increasingly defined by complexity and interdependencies. To scale accurate analysis to modern smart contracts, we introduce EF/CF, a high-performance fuzzer for Ethereum smart contracts. In contrast to previous work, EF/CF efficiently and accurately models complex smart contract interactions, such as reentrancy and cross-contract interactions, at a very high fuzzing throughput rate. To achieve this, EF/CF transpiles smart contract bytecode into native C++ code, thereby enabling the reuse of existing, optimized fuzzing toolchains. Furthermore, EF/CF increases fuzzing efficiency by employing a structure-aware mutation engine for smart contract transaction sequences and using a contract's ABI to generate valid transaction inputs. In a comprehensive evaluation, we show that EF/CF scales better -- without compromising accuracy -- to complex contracts compared to state-of-the-art approaches, including other fuzzers, symbolic/concolic execution, and hybrid approaches. Moreover, we show that EF/CF can automatically generate transaction sequences that exploit reentrancy bugs to steal Ether.Comment: To be published at Euro S&P 202
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