A CryptoCubic Protocol for Hacker-Proof Off-Chain Bitcoin Transactions

Off-Chain transactions allow for the immediate transfer of Cryptocurrency between two parties, without delays or unavoidable transaction fees. Such capabilities are critical for mainstream Cryptocurrency adaption. They allow for the "Coffee-Coin Criteria"; under which a customer orders a coffee and pays for that coffee in bitcoins. This is not possible with On-Chain transactions today. Unfortunately, all existing Off-Chain transaction protocols are notoriously unreliable The current generation of third-party facilitators are vulnerable to hacker-based attacks. As Mt. Gox tragically demonstrated, centralized-transaction institutions are easy targets for Cryptocurrency thieves. The slightest security flaw in a third-party system will pounced on by hackers, who will proceed to devour it like ants devouring a crab. Under such circumstances, it no wonder that the Public treats most Cryptocurrency services with a constant shadow of suspicion. For Bitcoin to flourish, its anti-hierarchy principles must be applied to safe Off-Chain transactions. First and foremost, we need a new hacker-proof protocol that can easily be executed by any experienced developer. Preferably, the protocol will be open-sourced for full reliability and transparency. This paper presents one such procedure, which allows for he safe transmission of Bitcoin private key control by way of Cryptocubic transactions

k-Root-n: An Efficient Algorithm for Avoiding Short Term Double-Spending Alongside Distributed Ledger Technologies such as Blockchain

Blockchains such as the bitcoin blockchain depend on reaching a global consensus on the distributed ledger; therefore, they suffer from well-known scalability problems. This paper proposes an algorithm that avoids double-spending in the short term with just O(√n) messages instead of O(n); each node receiving money off-chain performs the due diligence of consulting k√n random nodes to check if any of them is aware of double-spending. Two nodes receiving double-spent money will in this way consult at least one common node with very high probability, because of the ‘birthday paradox’, and any common honest node consulted will detect the fraud. Since the velocity of money in the real world has coins circulating through at most a few wallets per day, the size of the due diligence communication is small in the short term. This ‘k-root-n’ algorithm is suitable for an environment with synchronous or asynchronous (but with fairly low latency) communication and with Byzantine faults. The presented k-root-n algorithm should be practical to avoid double-spending with arbitrarily high probability, while feasibly coping with the throughput of all world commerce. It is resistant to Sybil attacks even beyond 50% of nodes. In the long term, the k-root-n algorithm is less efficient. Therefore, it should preferably be used as a complement, and not a replacement, to a global distributed ledger technology.</jats:p