Network destabilization and transition in depression : new methods for studying the dynamics of therapeutic change

The science of dynamic systems is the study of pattern formation and system change. Dynamic systems theory can provide a useful framework for understanding the chronicity of depression and its treatment. We propose a working model of therapeutic change with potential to organize findings from psychopathology and treatment research, suggest new ways to study change, facilitate comparisons across studies, and stimulate treatment innovation. We describe a treatment for depression that we developed to apply principles from dynamic systems theory and then present a program of research to examine the utility of this application. Recent methodological and technological developments are also discussed to further advance the search for mechanisms of therapeutic change

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Cultural Replication Theory and Law

Does law itself evolve? It has been widely suggested that culturally transmitted behavioral information exhibits a Darwinian evolutionary dynamic. The argument is straightforward. Darwinian evolution has three basic elements: (i) replicative descent with (ii) variation, subject to (iii) a form of selection. Bundles of cultural information as diverse as language, religious practices, and how to bake bread pass with imperfect fidelity from generation to generation. Some of the variants created by these imperfections are passed, non-randomly, to the next generation with greater frequency.

Getting to the heart of clinical supervision: a theoretical review of the role of emotions in professional development

Background The importance of supervision is increasingly recognized, yet it remains little understood, impairing research and practice. Specifically, the CBT supervision model provides a relatively “heartless” account of professional development, which may undermine its effectiveness. Method A theoretical review of emotions in supervision and learning is provided, to summarize relevant theoretical and empirical literature. The objectives are to clarify the role of emotions in CBT supervision, and to use this understanding to outline an emotionally-attuned model, illustrating its application to two critical aspects of CBT supervision (the development of a learning alliance and enhancing professional competence). Conclusion The reviewed literature (theory and research evidence) supports the explicit and systematic incorporation of emotions into CBT supervision. Conceptually, this can be achieved by integrating Lazarus's (1991) general theory of emotion with the CBT model. The illustrations of this augmented model indicate its value in understanding and managing both the “rupture-repair” cycle that can affect the supervisory alliance, and the “deskilling-development” pattern that appears to be necessary for the acquisition of competence. We propose that CBT supervision might usefully be guided by our expanded model, as this affords greater internal consistency and may be more effective educationally

Neuroanatomical substrates for the volitional regulation of heart rate

The control of physiological arousal can assist in the regulation of emotional state. A subset cortical and subcortical brain regions are implicated in autonomic control of bodily arousal during emotional behaviors. Here, we combined human functional neuroimaging with autonomic monitoring to identify neural mechanisms that support the volitional regulation of heart rate, a process that may be assisted by visual feedback. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 15 healthy adults performed an experimental task in which they were prompted voluntarily to increase or decrease cardiovascular arousal (heart rate) during true, false, or absent visual feedback. Participants achieved appropriate changes in heart rate, without significant modulation of respiratory rate, and were overall not influenced by the presence of visual feedback. Increased activity in right amygdala, striatum and brainstem occurred when participants attempted to increase heart rate. In contrast, activation of ventrolateral prefrontal and parietal cortices occurred when attempting to decrease heart rate. Biofeedback enhanced activity within occipito-temporal cortices, but there was no significant interaction with task conditions. Activity in regions including pregenual anterior cingulate and ventral striatum reflected the magnitude of successful task performance, which was negatively related to subclinical anxiety symptoms. Measured changes in respiration correlated with posterior insula activation and heart rate, at a more lenient threshold, change correlated with insula, caudate, and midbrain activity. Our findings highlight a set of brain regions, notably ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, supporting volitional control of cardiovascular arousal. These data are relevant to understanding neural substrates supporting interaction between intentional and interoceptive states related to anxiety, with implications for biofeedback interventions, e.g., real-time fMRI, that target emotional regulation

Emotion regulation and delusions

Mounting evidence suggests a causal role of negative emotion in delusions. Particularly, fluctuations in anxiety and self-esteem seem to trigger delusional ideation. Consequently, the ability to down-regulate negative emotions is likely to help to prevent or reduce delusional ideation. Despite the clear theoretical relevance, emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal (i.e. changing the perspective on a situation in order to modify emotional responses) or expressive suppression (i.e. inhibiting facial expressions of emotions; „poker face‟) have not been researched in delusions so far. The present dissertation project fills this gap by investigating emotion regulation in paranoia- and delusion-prone samples. Study 1 revealed bivariate and multivariate associations between emotion regulation difficulties and paranoia-proneness. Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that delusion-prone individuals had difficulties in successfully applying the emotion regulation strategy reappraisal while watching anxiety-eliciting pictures, but not in applying expressive suppression. Furthermore, unsuccessful emotion regulation was correlated with state delusional ideation exclusively during reappraisal. The potentially maladaptive nature of reappraisal in delusion was further corroborated in study 3. Under social stress, paranoia-prone individuals who habitually use reappraisal experienced an increase in state paranoia. Taken together, the present dissertation project provides subclinical evidence for specific difficulties in applying the generally helpful and adaptive emotion regulation strategy reappraisal. A working model of emotion regulation in delusions that incorporates a vulnerability-stress-approach, cognitive models of positive symptoms and the process model of emotion regulation was proposed in order to stimulate further theory-driven research in populations with clinically relevant delusions. A preliminary clinical implication might be that reappraisal in social high-stress situations should be applied with caution in delusion-proneness

Kant’s Newtonianism: a reappraisal

The article examines different aspects of Kant’s Newtonianism, focusing on Kant’s attempt in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft to realize a new “pure part” of physics, complementary to Newton’s “mathematical principles”. The first section regards the philosophical objectives of Kant’s engagement with Newtonian physics, highlighting the role of physics for the “exhibition” of metaphysical concepts and criticizing the view that Kant’s intention would have been to provide a “foundation” of Newton’s physics. The second section provides an example of Kant’s original reappraisal of Newton’s physics, focusing on the concepts of material substance and force. The third section shows how Newton’s thesis about the limited (but sufficient) knowledge of gravity represented for Kant the main example of a general limitation of philosophical knowledge

Sens et temps de la Gestalt (Gestalt theory: critical overview and contemporary relevance)

Rather than mere psychological doctrine, Gestalt theory was conceived of as a general theory of form and organization deemed to lay a unified groundwork for several domains of scientific endeavor. Our aim in this article is to assess the legacy of this framework, and examine its relevance for present-day research in cognitive science. We thus survey the intellectual contexts within which Gestalt theory originated and evolved, and review some of its central features: a phenomenological approach to philosophy and science; grounding in the field theory of physics and in the theory of dynamical systems in mathematics; perception viewed as a general structure of cognition; intrinsic interrelatedness of forms and values; unitary approach to perceiving, acting, and expression. We hope this review will allow for a clarification of the status of Gestalt concepts in cognitive and language sciences, both with respect to fields of inquiry wherein they continue to exert substantial influence as well as in regard to fields from which all reference to Gestalt ideas has long since disappeared. We submit that the legacy of Gestalt theory will be most usefully reappraised with respect to its dynamic principles, although this reappraisal would entail a critical examination of the customary Gestalt concepts of time and psychogenesis, as well as a reconsideration of the status of motion and action in form (and/or meaning) constitution