A QBF-based Formalization of Abstract Argumentation Semantics

Supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg (LAAMI project) and by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC, UK), grant ref. EP/J012084/1 (SAsSY project).Peer reviewedPostprin

A Paraconsistent Higher Order Logic

Classical logic predicts that everything (thus nothing useful at all) follows from inconsistency. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where an inconsistency does not lead to such an explosion, and since in practice consistency is difficult to achieve there are many potential applications of paraconsistent logics in knowledge-based systems, logical semantics of natural language, etc. Higher order logics have the advantages of being expressive and with several automated theorem provers available. Also the type system can be helpful. We present a concise description of a paraconsistent higher order logic with countable infinite indeterminacy, where each basic formula can get its own indeterminate truth value (or as we prefer: truth code). The meaning of the logical operators is new and rather different from traditional many-valued logics as well as from logics based on bilattices. The adequacy of the logic is examined by a case study in the domain of medicine. Thus we try to build a bridge between the HOL and MVL communities. A sequent calculus is proposed based on recent work by Muskens.Comment: Originally in the proceedings of PCL 2002, editors Hendrik Decker, Joergen Villadsen, Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/). Correcte

Effects and Propositions

The quantum logical and quantum information-theoretic traditions have exerted an especially powerful influence on Bub's thinking about the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. This paper discusses both the quantum logical and information-theoretic traditions from the point of view of their representational frameworks. I argue that it is at this level, at the level of its framework, that the quantum logical tradition has retained its centrality to Bub's thought. It is further argued that there is implicit in the quantum information-theoretic tradition a set of ideas that mark a genuinely new alternative to the framework of quantum logic. These ideas are of considerable interest for the philosophy of quantum mechanics, a claim which I defend with an extended discussion of their application to our understanding of the philosophical significance of the no hidden variable theorem of Kochen and Specker.Comment: Presented to the 2007 conference, New Directions in the Foundations of Physic

Conditionals and modularity in general logics

In this work in progress, we discuss independence and interpolation and related topics for classical, modal, and non-monotonic logics

Suszko's Problem: Mixed Consequence and Compositionality

Suszko's problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of Tarski's structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. In this paper we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko's problem and on mixed consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance, and establishing that (intersective) mixed consequence is fundamentally the semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos and Wansing, for logics with various structural properties (reflexivity, transitivity, none, or both). We strengthen these results into exact rank results for non-permeable logics (roughly, those which distinguish the role of premises and conclusions). We discuss the underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction, allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of truth-functionality and additional semantic properties.Comment: Keywords: Suszko's thesis; truth value; logical consequence; mixed consequence; compositionality; truth-functionality; many-valued logic; algebraic logic; substructural logics; regular connective

A Topos Foundation for Theories of Physics: I. Formal Languages for Physics

This paper is the first in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally new way of constructing theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire to address certain deep issues that arise when contemplating quantum theories of space and time. Our basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that is attached to the system. Classical physics arises when the topos is the category of sets. Other types of theory employ a different topos. In this paper we discuss two different types of language that can be attached to a system, S. The first is a propositional language, PL(S); the second is a higher-order, typed language L(S). Both languages provide deductive systems with an intuitionistic logic. The reason for introducing PL(S) is that, as shown in paper II of the series, it is the easiest way of understanding, and expanding on, the earlier work on topos theory and quantum physics. However, the main thrust of our programme utilises the more powerful language L(S) and its representation in an appropriate topos.Comment: 36 pages, no figure