A cooperative game approach to a production planning problem

This paper deals with a production planning problem formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model that has a competition component, given that the manufacturers are willing to produce as much products as they can in order to fulfil the market’s needs. This corresponds to a typical game theoretic problem applied to the productive sector, where a global optimization problem involves production planning in order to maximize the utilities for the different firms that manufacture the same type of products and compete in the market. This problem has been approached as a cooperative game, which involves a possible cooperation scheme among the manufacturers. The general problem was approached by Owen (1995) as the “production game” and the core was considered. This paper identifies the cooperative game theoretic model for the production planning MILP optimization problem and Shapley Value was chosen as the solution approach. The results obtained indicate the importance of cooperating among competitors. Moreover, this leads to economic strategies for small manufacturing companies that wish to survive in a competitive environment

Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment

In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Supply chain collaboration

In the past, research in operations management focused on single-firm analysis. Its goal was to provide managers in practice with suitable tools to improve the performance of their firm by calculating optimal inventory quantities, among others. Nowadays, business decisions are dominated by the globalization of markets and increased competition among firms. Further, more and more products reach the customer through supply chains that are composed of independent firms. Following these trends, research in operations management has shifted its focus from single-firm analysis to multi-firm analysis, in particular to improving the efficiency and performance of supply chains under decentralized control. The main characteristics of such chains are that the firms in the chain are independent actors who try to optimize their individual objectives, and that the decisions taken by a firm do also affect the performance of the other parties in the supply chain. These interactions among firms’ decisions ask for alignment and coordination of actions. Therefore, game theory, the study of situations of cooperation or conflict among heterogenous actors, is very well suited to deal with these interactions. This has been recognized by researchers in the field, since there are an ever increasing number of papers that applies tools, methods and models from game theory to supply chain problems

Artificial Intelligence and Systems Theory: Applied to Cooperative Robots

This paper describes an approach to the design of a population of cooperative robots based on concepts borrowed from Systems Theory and Artificial Intelligence. The research has been developed under the SocRob project, carried out by the Intelligent Systems Laboratory at the Institute for Systems and Robotics - Instituto Superior Tecnico (ISR/IST) in Lisbon. The acronym of the project stands both for "Society of Robots" and "Soccer Robots", the case study where we are testing our population of robots. Designing soccer robots is a very challenging problem, where the robots must act not only to shoot a ball towards the goal, but also to detect and avoid static (walls, stopped robots) and dynamic (moving robots) obstacles. Furthermore, they must cooperate to defeat an opposing team. Our past and current research in soccer robotics includes cooperative sensor fusion for world modeling, object recognition and tracking, robot navigation, multi-robot distributed task planning and coordination, including cooperative reinforcement learning in cooperative and adversarial environments, and behavior-based architectures for real time task execution of cooperating robot teams

The Relationship Between Employee Perceptions of the Employment Game and Their Perceptions of Cooperative Knowledge Behavior in High Tech Firms

The relationship between knowledge sharing and organizational performance for high technology start-up companies is not well understood. Using game theory and the concept of competitive advantage through human resource management, I examine employee perceptions of the employment game relating to cooperative knowledge behavior and firm performance as an entry point into researching organizational knowledge utilization. I draw upon classical game theory to develop four measures of perceptions critical to game playing and apply these to organizational situations via a survey instrument. I propose that perceptions of the employment game held by organization members are determinants of cooperative knowledge sharing and subsequently firm performance. I analyze survey data gathered from high-tech workers using both regression and path analysis techniques. The results from this study offer new insights into methods for measuring both the connections between knowledge work and firm performance and the perceptions critical for fostering collaborative knowledge work in high tech firms. Results of the study show a significant relationship between the game theory construct of reciprocity, knowledge building behavior and firm performance. The mediation model was weakly supported but shows potential usefulness for further research in the field of strategic human resource management

Dynamic Policies for Cooperative Networked Systems

A set of economic entities embedded in a network graph collaborate by opportunistically exchanging their resources to satisfy their dynamically generated needs. Under what conditions their collaboration leads to a sustainable economy? Which online policy can ensure a feasible resource exchange point will be attained, and what information is needed to implement it? Furthermore, assuming there are different resources and the entities have diverse production capabilities, which production policy each entity should employ in order to maximize the economy's sustainability? Importantly, can we design such policies that are also incentive compatible even when there is no a priori information about the entities' needs? We introduce a dynamic production scheduling and resource exchange model to capture this fundamental problem and provide answers to the above questions. Applications range from infrastructure sharing, trade and organisation management, to social networks and sharing economy services.Comment: 6-page version appeared at ACM NetEcon' 1

Multi Site Coordination using a Multi-Agent System

A new approach of coordination of decisions in a multi site system is proposed. It is based this approach on a multi-agent concept and on the principle of distributed network of enterprises. For this purpose, each enterprise is defined as autonomous and performs simultaneously at the local and global levels. The basic component of our approach is a so-called Virtual Enterprise Node (VEN), where the enterprise network is represented as a set of tiers (like in a product breakdown structure). Within the network, each partner constitutes a VEN, which is in contact with several customers and suppliers. Exchanges between the VENs ensure the autonomy of decision, and guarantiee the consistency of information and material flows. Only two complementary VEN agents are necessary: one for external interactions, the Negotiator Agent (NA) and one for the planning of internal decisions, the Planner Agent (PA). If supply problems occur in the network, two other agents are defined: the Tier Negotiator Agent (TNA) working at the tier level only and the Supply Chain Mediator Agent (SCMA) working at the level of the enterprise network. These two agents are only active when the perturbation occurs. Otherwise, the VENs process the flow of information alone. With this new approach, managing enterprise network becomes much more transparent and looks like managing a simple enterprise in the network. The use of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) allows physical distribution of the decisional system, and procures a heterarchical organization structure with a decentralized control that guaranties the autonomy of each entity and the flexibility of the network

Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain