A Continuous Opinion Dynamics Model Based on the Principle of Meta-Contrast

We propose a new continuous opinion dynamics model inspired by social psychology. It is based on a central assumption of self-categorization theory called principle of meta-contrast. We study the behaviour of the model for several network interactions and show that, in particular, consensus, polarization or extremism are possible outcomes, even without explicit introduction of extremist agents. The model is compared to other existing opinion dynamics models.Opinion Dynamics, Self-Categorization Theory, Consensus, Polarization, Extremism

Dynamic problems for metamaterials: Review of existing models and ideas for further research

Metamaterials are materials especially engineered to have a peculiar physical behaviour, to be exploited for some well-specified technological application. In this context we focus on the conception of general micro-structured continua, with particular attention to piezoelectromechanical structures, having a strong coupling between macroscopic motion and some internal degrees of freedom, which may be electric or, more generally, related to some micro-motion. An interesting class of problems in this context regards the design of wave-guides aimed to control wave propagation. The description of the state of the art is followed by some hints addressed to describe some possible research developments and in particular to design optimal design techniques for bone reconstruction or systems which may block wave propagation in some frequency ranges, in both linear and non-linear fields. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Extremism propagation in social networks with hubs

One aspect of opinion change that has been of academic interest is the impact of people with extreme opinions (extremists) on opinion dynamics. An agent-based model has been used to study the role of small-world social network topologies on general opinion change in the presence of extremists. It has been found that opinion convergence to a single extreme occurs only when the average number of network connections for each individual is extremely high. Here, we extend the model to examine the effect of positively skewed degree distributions, in addition to small-world structures, on the types of opinion convergence that occur in the presence of extremists. We also examine what happens when extremist opinions are located on the well-connected nodes (hubs) created by the positively skewed distribution. We find that a positively skewed network topology encourages opinion convergence on a single extreme under a wider range of conditions than topologies whose degree distributions were not skewed. The importance of social position for social influence is highlighted by the result that, when positive extremists are placed on hubs, all population convergence is to the positive extreme even when there are twice as many negative extremists. Thus, our results have shown the importance of considering a positively skewed degree distribution, and in particular network hubs and social position, when examining extremist transmission

Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem

Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article we formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics: There are the usual normal agents that update their opinions, for instance according the well-known bounded confidence mechanism. But, additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That agent uses opinions as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strategic agent of our benchmark problem tries, during a campaign of a certain length, to influence the ongoing dynamics among normal agents with strategically placed opinions (one per period) in such a way, that, by the end of the campaign, as much as possible normals end up with opinions in a certain interval of the opinion space. Structurally, such a problem is an optimal control problem. That type of problem is ubiquitous. Resorting to advanced and partly non-standard methods for computing optimal controls, we solve some instances of the campaign problem. But even for a very small number of normal agents, just one strategic agent, and a ten-period campaign length, the problem turns out to be extremely difficult. Explicitly we discuss moral and political concerns that immediately arise, if someone starts to analyze the possibilities of an optimal opinion control.Comment: 47 pages, 12 figures, and 11 table