Is Authority Always Constructed and Contextual? A Classical Challenge to the Framework for Information Literacy

The 2015 Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education (or Framework) is the latest effort of academic librarians to provide relevant guidance for the teaching of information literacy. One claim made within this “living document,” in line with current academic trends of constructivism and social constructivism, is that “Authority is Constructed and Contextual.” Questions are raised concerning authority’s relationship to the idea of truth, and an effort is made, largely through a Socratic method of inquiry, to delve into the meaning of the Framework’s statement on authority using the further explanations provided concerning this particular “frame,” as well as the context of the entire document. Connections between the nature of authority, responsibility, and the ethical direction of the Framework are considered, and the relevance of the matter of truth is brought to bear here as well. Finally, the conclusion is reached that in light of the investigation’s findings, the current statement that “Authority is Constructed and Contextual” is fraught with significant difficulties, and a statement akin to “Issues of Authority are Contextual and Nuanced” is warranted instead

Incoherent but Reasonable: A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism

A strength of liberal political institutions is their ability to accommodate pluralism, both allowing divergent comprehensive doctrines as well as constructing the common ground necessary for diverse people to live together. A pressing question is how far such pluralism extends. Which comprehensive doctrines are simply beyond the pale and need not be accommodated by a political consensus? Rawls attempted to keep the boundaries of reasonable disagreement quite broad by infamously denying that political liberalism need make reference to the concept of truth, a claim that has been criticized by Joseph Raz, Joshua Cohen, and David Estlund. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms fail due to the fact that political liberalism can remain non-committal on the nature of truth, leaving the concept of truth in the domain of comprehensive doctrines while still avoiding the issues raised by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund. Further substantiating this point is the fact that Rawls would, and should, include parties in the overlapping consensus whose views on truth may be incoherent. Once it is seen that political liberalism allows such incoherence to reasonable parties, it is clear that the inclusion of truth and the requirement of coherence urged by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund requires more of reasonable people than is necessary for a political consensus

Review of \u3cem\u3eKant and Phenomenology\u3c/em\u3e

Photograph of Ted on Barker's Ark, taken Campion Hill site, 13 May 1961 close up portrait. A3

Against Rigid Rules - Keynes's Economic Theory

This paper provides textual evidence of Keynes�s position on monetary policy and shaping international monetary relations. One result of my contribution is that the famous dichotomy 'rules versus discretion' is of no relevance to his economic theory, because he used the term 'rules' not in the meaning of a formal brilliantly designed notion. He definitely made a distinction between non-rigidly-fixed-rules and discretion. I give an explanation why his economic theory is not compatible with principles of constructivism, empiricism and ontological realism by referring to a key term of his economic writings, i.e., discretionary decision.Key words: History of Economic Thought since 1925, Methodology, Central Banking, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

The myth of 'the myth of Irish neutrality': deconstructing concepts of Irish neutrality using international relations theories

A number of academics, journalists and political elites claim that Irish neutrality is a 'myth', and many also characterise public support for Irish neutrality as 'confused' and 'nonrational'. This 'unneutral' discourse in the academic literature and mainstream Irish media is based on an academic thesis, that of an Unneutral Ireland. The Unneutral thesis constructs a particular concept of neutrality in order to draw its conclusion that Ireland is 'unneutral'. Using a poststructuralist approach--a rarity in the discipline of International Relations (IR)--this paper deconstructs concepts of Irish neutrality using a framework of IR theories. The results show that the concept of neutrality put forward in the Unneutral Ireland thesis and the dominant discourses on Irish neutrality are based on a hegemonic IR theory, the theory of neorealism, rather than on seemingly 'objective' scientific research methods. The paper concludes that non-realist theories and approaches may provide a better understanding of Irish neutrality and of the dynamics of public support for Irish neutrality

Against rigid rules: Keynes's economic theory

This paper provides textual evidence of Keynes's position on monetary policy and shaping international monetary relations. One result of my contribution is that the famous dichotomy rules versus discretion is of no relevance to his economic theory, because he used the term rules not in the meaning of a formal brilliantly designed notion.He definitely made a distinction between non-rigidly-fixed-rules and discretion. I give an explanation why his economic theory is not compatible with principles of constructivism, empiricism and ontological realism by referring to a key term of his economic writings, i.e., discretionary decision. --History of economic thought since 1925,Methodology,Central Banking,Inernational monetary arrangements and instititions

From Parmenidean Identity to Beyond Classical Idealism and Epistemic Constructivism

Rockmore’s paper offers a nice discussion on how classical German idealism provides a plausible account of the Parmenidean insight that thought and being are identical and suggests that idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most promising approach to cognition. In this short commentary, I will explore the implications of adopting other interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which arguably lead to different conclusions than the ones drawn by Rockmore. En route to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, I argue that one may adopt an approach on cognition which would be immunized to worries that prompt Rockmore’s elaboration and also embrace (at least) some of its benefits