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    The European Union in the World — A Community of Values

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    These are momentous times in Europe. The Euro has been successfully introduced, the enlargement negotiations are approaching their climax, and the European Convention (“Convention”) is moving towards the drafting of a constitution for a new, continent-wide political entity. At the same time, unrest is manifest, particularly in two areas. On the one hand, many of our citizens, and not just the political elites, are dissatisfied with Europe\u27s performance on the world stage and are concerned about the maintenance of peace and security within the Union. In these areas they would like to see a strengthened, more effective entity-- “more Europe.” On the other hand, their disenchantment with the long reach of European Union (“EU” or “Union”) regulation in the first pillar area of economic policy is growing. The feeling of loss of local control over their destiny and a vague feeling of potential loss of identity within an ever more centralized polity is palpable. Here, they want “less Europe.” In the outside world, change is also the order of the day. The ice-sheet of bipolarity, which overlaid and hid the complexity of international relations during the Cold War, is breaking up at an ever-increasing speed and revealing a world in which two paradigms are competing to become the underlying ordering principles for the new century. The traditional paradigm of interacting Nation States, each pursuing its own separate interests, with alliances allowing the small to compete with the large, is alive and well, and its proponents like Machiavelli or Churchill continue to be in vogue in the literature of international relations and the rhetoric of world leaders. At the same time, there is a school of thought which points to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our societies and the necessity for new forms of global governance to complement national action. It is also becoming abundantly clear that the concept of a “Nation State” is often a fiction, positing as it does an identity between the citizens of a State and the members of a culturally homogenous society. For both reasons, the concept of the Nation State as the principal actor on the world stage, is called into question. The experience of the Union with the sharing of State sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and also to the EU\u27s firm support for the development of the United Nations (“U.N.”) as well as other elements of multilateral governance. It would hardly be wise to suggest that any foreign policy, and certainly not that of the EU, should be based only on this paradigm. Given the recurrent threats to security, which seem to be part of the human condition expressed by some as the “inevitability of war”--the defense of territorial integrity; action against threats of aggression; and resistance to crimes against humanity such as genocide--the ability to conduct a security policy based much more on the old paradigm of interacting interests will continue to be required. That the EU needs to develop such a capability will be taken here as a given. Such a crisis-management capability will be essential to the Union, but will be distinguished here from the more long-term elements of foreign policy, which can be thought of as being designed to reduce the need for crisis management in the context of a security policy to a minimum. The crisis-management area of policy will not be treated further here. The thesis of this Essay is that the same set of political concepts can serve as a guide to the future internal development of the EU and as the basis of such a long-term foreign policy. Furthermore, it suggests that neither should be seen in terms of the balancing of interests but rather, as the expression of a small list of fundamental values. The list is as follows: (1) the rule of law as the basis for relations between members of society; (2) the interaction between the democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision-making; (3) the operation of competition within a market economy as the source of increasing prosperity; (4) the anchoring of the principle of solidarity among all members of society alongside that of the liberty of the individual; (5) the adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development; and (6) the preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society. These values can be seen as the answer to the question posed both, by citizens of the Union and by our fellow citizens of the world: “What does the EU stand for?” In exploring these values we should, however, remember that in the real world there will be occasions on which Realpolitik will intrude and the interest-based paradigm will prevail

    The European Union in the World — A Community of Values

    Get PDF
    These are momentous times in Europe. The Euro has been successfully introduced, the enlargement negotiations are approaching their climax, and the European Convention (“Convention”) is moving towards the drafting of a constitution for a new, continent-wide political entity. At the same time, unrest is manifest, particularly in two areas. On the one hand, many of our citizens, and not just the political elites, are dissatisfied with Europe\u27s performance on the world stage and are concerned about the maintenance of peace and security within the Union. In these areas they would like to see a strengthened, more effective entity-- “more Europe.” On the other hand, their disenchantment with the long reach of European Union (“EU” or “Union”) regulation in the first pillar area of economic policy is growing. The feeling of loss of local control over their destiny and a vague feeling of potential loss of identity within an ever more centralized polity is palpable. Here, they want “less Europe.” In the outside world, change is also the order of the day. The ice-sheet of bipolarity, which overlaid and hid the complexity of international relations during the Cold War, is breaking up at an ever-increasing speed and revealing a world in which two paradigms are competing to become the underlying ordering principles for the new century. The traditional paradigm of interacting Nation States, each pursuing its own separate interests, with alliances allowing the small to compete with the large, is alive and well, and its proponents like Machiavelli or Churchill continue to be in vogue in the literature of international relations and the rhetoric of world leaders. At the same time, there is a school of thought which points to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our societies and the necessity for new forms of global governance to complement national action. It is also becoming abundantly clear that the concept of a “Nation State” is often a fiction, positing as it does an identity between the citizens of a State and the members of a culturally homogenous society. For both reasons, the concept of the Nation State as the principal actor on the world stage, is called into question. The experience of the Union with the sharing of State sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and also to the EU\u27s firm support for the development of the United Nations (“U.N.”) as well as other elements of multilateral governance. It would hardly be wise to suggest that any foreign policy, and certainly not that of the EU, should be based only on this paradigm. Given the recurrent threats to security, which seem to be part of the human condition expressed by some as the “inevitability of war”--the defense of territorial integrity; action against threats of aggression; and resistance to crimes against humanity such as genocide--the ability to conduct a security policy based much more on the old paradigm of interacting interests will continue to be required. That the EU needs to develop such a capability will be taken here as a given. Such a crisis-management capability will be essential to the Union, but will be distinguished here from the more long-term elements of foreign policy, which can be thought of as being designed to reduce the need for crisis management in the context of a security policy to a minimum. The crisis-management area of policy will not be treated further here. The thesis of this Essay is that the same set of political concepts can serve as a guide to the future internal development of the EU and as the basis of such a long-term foreign policy. Furthermore, it suggests that neither should be seen in terms of the balancing of interests but rather, as the expression of a small list of fundamental values. The list is as follows: (1) the rule of law as the basis for relations between members of society; (2) the interaction between the democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision-making; (3) the operation of competition within a market economy as the source of increasing prosperity; (4) the anchoring of the principle of solidarity among all members of society alongside that of the liberty of the individual; (5) the adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development; and (6) the preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society. These values can be seen as the answer to the question posed both, by citizens of the Union and by our fellow citizens of the world: “What does the EU stand for?” In exploring these values we should, however, remember that in the real world there will be occasions on which Realpolitik will intrude and the interest-based paradigm will prevail

    The European Union in the World — A Community of Values

    Get PDF
    These are momentous times in Europe. The Euro has been successfully introduced, the enlargement negotiations are approaching their climax, and the European Convention (“Convention”) is moving towards the drafting of a constitution for a new, continent-wide political entity. At the same time, unrest is manifest, particularly in two areas. On the one hand, many of our citizens, and not just the political elites, are dissatisfied with Europe\u27s performance on the world stage and are concerned about the maintenance of peace and security within the Union. In these areas they would like to see a strengthened, more effective entity-- “more Europe.” On the other hand, their disenchantment with the long reach of European Union (“EU” or “Union”) regulation in the first pillar area of economic policy is growing. The feeling of loss of local control over their destiny and a vague feeling of potential loss of identity within an ever more centralized polity is palpable. Here, they want “less Europe.” In the outside world, change is also the order of the day. The ice-sheet of bipolarity, which overlaid and hid the complexity of international relations during the Cold War, is breaking up at an ever-increasing speed and revealing a world in which two paradigms are competing to become the underlying ordering principles for the new century. The traditional paradigm of interacting Nation States, each pursuing its own separate interests, with alliances allowing the small to compete with the large, is alive and well, and its proponents like Machiavelli or Churchill continue to be in vogue in the literature of international relations and the rhetoric of world leaders. At the same time, there is a school of thought which points to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our societies and the necessity for new forms of global governance to complement national action. It is also becoming abundantly clear that the concept of a “Nation State” is often a fiction, positing as it does an identity between the citizens of a State and the members of a culturally homogenous society. For both reasons, the concept of the Nation State as the principal actor on the world stage, is called into question. The experience of the Union with the sharing of State sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and also to the EU\u27s firm support for the development of the United Nations (“U.N.”) as well as other elements of multilateral governance. It would hardly be wise to suggest that any foreign policy, and certainly not that of the EU, should be based only on this paradigm. Given the recurrent threats to security, which seem to be part of the human condition expressed by some as the “inevitability of war”--the defense of territorial integrity; action against threats of aggression; and resistance to crimes against humanity such as genocide--the ability to conduct a security policy based much more on the old paradigm of interacting interests will continue to be required. That the EU needs to develop such a capability will be taken here as a given. Such a crisis-management capability will be essential to the Union, but will be distinguished here from the more long-term elements of foreign policy, which can be thought of as being designed to reduce the need for crisis management in the context of a security policy to a minimum. The crisis-management area of policy will not be treated further here. The thesis of this Essay is that the same set of political concepts can serve as a guide to the future internal development of the EU and as the basis of such a long-term foreign policy. Furthermore, it suggests that neither should be seen in terms of the balancing of interests but rather, as the expression of a small list of fundamental values. The list is as follows: (1) the rule of law as the basis for relations between members of society; (2) the interaction between the democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision-making; (3) the operation of competition within a market economy as the source of increasing prosperity; (4) the anchoring of the principle of solidarity among all members of society alongside that of the liberty of the individual; (5) the adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development; and (6) the preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society. These values can be seen as the answer to the question posed both, by citizens of the Union and by our fellow citizens of the world: “What does the EU stand for?” In exploring these values we should, however, remember that in the real world there will be occasions on which Realpolitik will intrude and the interest-based paradigm will prevail

    Trade in financial services : mobile banking in Southern Africa

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    The report will be discussed at a policy discussion workshop that will being together a select group of policy champions from each of the focus countries to discuss appropriate incentives that encourage innovative bank and non-bank led domestic and international m-banking solutions. In this Introduction, the authors summarize the layout of the report, and then touch upon two over-arching issues that need to be taken into account in reading the report. To set the context for m-banking services in the focus countries, chapter two reviews the demand for m-banking services in Southern Africa, particularly in relation to migrant remittances and cross-border payments of trade-related transactions. This analysis is complemented by some international comparisons set out in annex C. On the supply side, chapter three briefly describes the financial and telecommunications landscape in which the development of m-banking is set. The heart of this study is the country diagnostics set out in annex A, which examine, for each country the regulatory issues that are listed in annex B. For ease of reference, the results of the country diagnostics are summarized in chapter four. The country diagnostics include a number of recommendations to overcome the constraints on the development of accessible m-banking in each country and the region, which are developed further in the draft presentation for the workshop in annex D. The main threads of the key recommendations are brought together and summarized in chapter five.Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,Access to Finance,E-Business,Remittances

    The future of social is personal: the potential of the personal data store

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    This chapter argues that technical architectures that facilitate the longitudinal, decentralised and individual-centric personal collection and curation of data will be an important, but partial, response to the pressing problem of the autonomy of the data subject, and the asymmetry of power between the subject and large scale service providers/data consumers. Towards framing the scope and role of such Personal Data Stores (PDSes), the legalistic notion of personal data is examined, and it is argued that a more inclusive, intuitive notion expresses more accurately what individuals require in order to preserve their autonomy in a data-driven world of large aggregators. Six challenges towards realising the PDS vision are set out: the requirement to store data for long periods; the difficulties of managing data for individuals; the need to reconsider the regulatory basis for third-party access to data; the need to comply with international data handling standards; the need to integrate privacy-enhancing technologies; and the need to future-proof data gathering against the evolution of social norms. The open experimental PDS platform INDX is introduced and described, as a means of beginning to address at least some of these six challenges

    Economic Autonomy of Regions in the New Reality

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    The article expands on the concept of new reality (new normal) for Russia, which includes the increased role of individuals and larger economic autonomy of territories in their interaction with the federal center. The rationale is based on the hypothesis that, in the new reality, the improved wellbeing of people and elimination of economic disparities between the territories can be ensured by expanding their economic autonomy, because it leads to the increase in their intellectual, industrial and technological capacity. In this study, the author used the basic provisions of the classical economic theory, the theory of behavioral economics, interdisciplinary approach, and the method of statistical groupings. The article presents the trends in the economic autonomy of the territories, which include a decrease in the number of donor regions and differentiation of territories in terms of their socio-economic indicators. It substantiates the assumption that the differentiation of territories puts constrains on their socio-economic development and may lead to the emergence of a «regional peripheral economy,» the attribute of which is the dependence of the periphery from the center, reduced local initiative, and slowdown of technological development. The article identi es the need to use the mindset of people, their psychological attitudes in the economic development, the «second invisible hand of the market» and «soft power» in order to move beyond the «regional peripheral economy.» The conducted study demonstrates that the expansion of economic autonomy of the territories is not the increased self-isolation of regions and municipal entities, but consists in the need to retain a signi cant part of the income from the production of goods and services created by local people, so that it could be autonomously used by regional and municipal authorities and directed to improving the wellbeing of territory’s residents.The author proposes to prepare a regulatory and legal document in order to ensure and strengthen the economic autonomy of the territories, and makes speci c proposals on the principles of its content and structure.This article has been prepared with the financial support of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Project No. 15–14–7-2

    Seeking Shared Success: Business Model Innovation Through Mergers, Affiliations, and Alliances

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    Learn how alliances, affiliations, and mergers represent a path to enhanced sustainability and greater impact for community foundations. Hear perspectives from community foundation leaders, access tools for considering a new structure, and read case studies from six community foundations

    ‘Interrupted’ landscapes: post-earthquake reconstruction in between urban renewal and social identity of local communities

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    Il presente saggio vuole affrontare il tema della ricostruzione postsismica con un'attenzione alla questione del paesaggio, termine che lega in maniera indissolubile la realtà fisica del territorio a quei valori immateriali (storici, culturali, produttivi, enogastronomici, ecc.) che costituiscono l'identità dei luoghi. In questo senso si intendono “paesaggi interrotti” i luoghi distrutti dal sisma, perchè sono state interrotte le storie che legano gli abitanti al luogo, è stato interrotto quel processo di narrazione continua e di attribuzione di senso e significati che avviene tra una collettività e il suo territorio. La ricerca parte dall'analisi delle recenti ricostruzioni post-sistmiche, che hanno oscillato tra le due idee opposte di new town, poco distanti dalle città distrutte e ricostruzione “dov'era, com'era”. Il saggio indaga la dimensione sociale e semiologica del paesaggio, riflettendo sul tema dell'identità sociale, sull'attaccamento al luogo da parte degli abitanti, anche con l'obiettivo di definire linee guida e strategie progettuali per la ricostruzione sostenibile dei paesi distrutti dal sisma e da altri eventi disastrosi. In particolare vengono definite azioni di governance, strategie resilienti a partire dal coinvolgimento delle comunità locali e buone pratiche per la ricostruzione secondo un approccio paesaggistico al progetto urbano

    Comparative Evaluation of the Performance of Spans of Control Designs in Grain Supply Chains

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    A fuzzy multi-objective linear programming model is used to analyze the performances of three spans of control designs that are observed in the U.S grain industry. Performance of the grain supply chain increases with amount of control and compromise.Crop Production/Industries,
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