Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed. After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table

Modeling high-performance wormhole NoCs for critical real-time embedded systems

Manycore chips are a promising computing platform to cope with the increasing performance needs of critical real-time embedded systems (CRTES). However, manycores adoption by CRTES industry requires understanding task's timing behavior when their requests use manycore's network-on-chip (NoC) to access hardware shared resources. This paper analyzes the contention in wormhole-based NoC (wNoC) designs - widely implemented in the high-performance domain - for which we introduce a new metric: worst-contention delay (WCD) that captures wNoC impact on worst-case execution time (WCET) in a tighter manner than the existing metric, worst-case traversal time (WCTT). Moreover, we provide an analytical model of the WCD that requests can suffer in a wNoC and we validate it against wNoC designs resembling those in the Tilera-Gx36 and the Intel-SCC 48-core processors. Building on top of our WCD analytical model, we analyze the impact on WCD that different design parameters such as the number of virtual channels, and we make a set of recommendations on what wNoC setups to use in the context of CRTES.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

OutFlank Routing: Increasing Throughput in Toroidal Interconnection Networks

We present a new, deadlock-free, routing scheme for toroidal interconnection networks, called OutFlank Routing (OFR). OFR is an adaptive strategy which exploits non-minimal links, both in the source and in the destination nodes. When minimal links are congested, OFR deroutes packets to carefully chosen intermediate destinations, in order to obtain travel paths which are only an additive constant longer than the shortest ones. Since routing performance is very sensitive to changes in the traffic model or in the router parameters, an accurate discrete-event simulator of the toroidal network has been developed to empirically validate OFR, by comparing it against other relevant routing strategies, over a range of typical real-world traffic patterns. On the 16x16x16 (4096 nodes) simulated network OFR exhibits improvements of the maximum sustained throughput between 14% and 114%, with respect to Adaptive Bubble Routing.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures, to be presented at ICPADS 201

Effects of injection pressure on network throughput

©2006 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.Recent parallel systems use multiple injection ports and various injection policies, but little is known about their impact on network performance. This paper evaluates the influence that these injection interfaces have on maximum sustained throughput in adaptive cut-through torus networks by modeling the number of injection queues (1 or 4), and the allocation of new packets to those queues. Network evaluations for medium to large size 2D tori show that designs with multiple injection ports do not improve performance under uniform traffic. On the contrary, they result in more pressure from the injection interface to acquire the scarce network resources of an already clogged system. Interestingly, for small networks, a single injection FIFO queue, with the HOLB it entails, indirectly provides the much needed injection control. For networks with thousands of nodes and multiple injection channels, as those being implemented in current massively parallel processors, this implicit form of congestion control is not enough. In such systems, restrictive injection policies are required to prevent routers from being flooded with new packets for loads beyond saturation.C. Izu, J. Miguel-Alonso, J.A. Gregori

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio