35,736 research outputs found
Closed-loop feedback computation model of dynamical reputation based on the local trust evaluation in business-to-consumer e-commerce
Trust and reputation are important factors that influence the success of both traditional transactions in physical social networks and modern e-commerce in virtual Internet environments. It is difficult to define the concept of trust and quantify it because trust has both subjective and objective characteristics at the same time. A well-reported issue with reputation management system in business-to-consumer (BtoC) e-commerce is the “all good reputation” problem. In order to deal with the confusion, a new computational model of reputation is proposed in this paper. The ratings of each customer are set as basic trust score events. In addition, the time series of massive ratings are aggregated to formulate the sellers’ local temporal trust scores by Beta distribution. A logical model of trust and reputation is established based on the analysis of the dynamical relationship between trust and reputation. As for single goods with repeat transactions, an iterative mathematical model of trust and reputation is established with a closed-loop feedback mechanism. Numerical experiments on repeated transactions recorded over a period of 24 months are performed. The experimental results show that the proposed method plays guiding roles for both theoretical research into trust and reputation and the practical design of reputation systems in BtoC e-commerce
Trust beyond reputation: A computational trust model based on stereotypes
Models of computational trust support users in taking decisions. They are
commonly used to guide users' judgements in online auction sites; or to
determine quality of contributions in Web 2.0 sites. However, most existing
systems require historical information about the past behavior of the specific
agent being judged. In contrast, in real life, to anticipate and to predict a
stranger's actions in absence of the knowledge of such behavioral history, we
often use our "instinct"- essentially stereotypes developed from our past
interactions with other "similar" persons. In this paper, we propose
StereoTrust, a computational trust model inspired by stereotypes as used in
real-life. A stereotype contains certain features of agents and an expected
outcome of the transaction. When facing a stranger, an agent derives its trust
by aggregating stereotypes matching the stranger's profile. Since stereotypes
are formed locally, recommendations stem from the trustor's own personal
experiences and perspective. Historical behavioral information, when available,
can be used to refine the analysis. According to our experiments using
Epinions.com dataset, StereoTrust compares favorably with existing trust models
that use different kinds of information and more complete historical
information
Rational Trust Modeling
Trust models are widely used in various computer science disciplines. The
main purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure trustworthiness of a
set of entities based on their behaviors. In this article, the novel notion of
"rational trust modeling" is introduced by bridging trust management and game
theory. Note that trust models/reputation systems have been used in game theory
(e.g., repeated games) for a long time, however, game theory has not been
utilized in the process of trust model construction; this is where the novelty
of our approach comes from. In our proposed setting, the designer of a trust
model assumes that the players who intend to utilize the model are
rational/selfish, i.e., they decide to become trustworthy or untrustworthy
based on the utility that they can gain. In other words, the players are
incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The problem of
trust management can be then approached by game theoretical analyses and
solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Although rationality might be
built-in in some existing trust models, we intend to formalize the notion of
rational trust modeling from the designer's perspective. This approach will
result in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model
can incentivise trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper
parameters into the trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish
players in strategic trust-based interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios).
Furthermore, using a rational trust model, we can prevent many well-known
attacks on trust models. These two prominent properties also help us to predict
behavior of the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses
Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design
Specifying and analysing reputation systems with coordination languages
Reputation systems are nowadays widely used to support decision making in networked systems. Parties in such systems rate each other and use shared ratings to compute reputation scores that drive their interactions. The existence of reputation systems with remarkable differences calls for formal approaches to their analysis. We present a verification methodology for reputation systems that is based on the use of the coordination language Klaim and related analysis tools. First, we define a parametric Klaim specification of a reputation system that can be instantiated with different reputation models. Then, we consider stochastic specification obtained by considering actions with random (exponentially distributed) duration. The resulting specification enables quantitative analysis of properties of the considered system. Feasibility and effectiveness of our proposal is demonstrated by reporting on the analysis of two reputation models
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