The role of decision rights in co-development initiatives

Problem definition: How should decision rights be allocated between firms occupying different positions in the value chain to maximize the value of a co-development project? Academic/Practical Relevance: We contribute to the OM literature on the benefits and challenges of co-development initiatives by looking at the design of optimal governance structures that specify the allocation of rights to make certain decisions. Our problem is motivated by real-world challenges observed in co-development project initiation discussions between technology companies. We utilize a game-theoretic model to study the allocation of the ex-ante right to set the contract terms and the ex-post right to choose which contract to implement, once the market potential is realized. Results: First, we find that delegating more control to a party, does not necessarily imply that the party will be incentivized to exert greater effort. Specifically, we show that allocating both rights to the seller as opposed to only the ex-ante right, actually reduces his effort. Second, when the buyer has low bargaining power, the ex-post decision right should be delegated to the seller, i.e., the party with lower exposure to the effort-contingent outcome. Otherwise, the ex-post decision right should be delegated to the buyer but the ex-ante right should be held by the seller. Finally, we show that simple contracts with decision rights outperform a spot contract when the ex-post bargaining power of one of the parties is substantially higher. Managerial Implications: Our results offer insights for how managers should structure the optimal governance structure for co-development projects. We also identify when and how companies should delegate rights to their partners to maximize the value of the project. We show that the optimal governance structure depends crucially on the position in the value chain of the party with the higher bargaining power

Decision Structure and Performance of Networked Technology Supply Chains

Supply chains in key growth industries increasingly commercialize a critical piece of technology invented by an upstream technology supplier. The focal technology is licensed to specialist design firms and designed into products, which are fabricated by dedicated large-scale manufacturers. We examine a technology supplier’s licensing decision in such emerging multiparty networked supply chains in which a downstream design firm’s capability may not be publicly known. We find that the supply chain and firm profits are critically affected by whether or not a license agreement between a technology supplier and a design firm is kept confidential from a manufacturer. Instead of licensing to two downstream firms, a technology supplier may also license to an integrated firm with both design and manufacturing capabilities, which forms a conventional vertical supply chain. We compare a networked supply chain with a vertical supply chain and show that the network model can, under some conditions, outperform the integrated configuration and increase profits for all supply chain entities. In particular, a downstream firm can be better off decentralized, with design and manufacturing functions taken by different firms. Our research helps explain the emergence of such networked supply chains and offers insights on how to structure them to improve outcomes.postprin

Contratos de investigación conjunta

83 páginasThe purpose of this thesis is to examine from a legal perspective, the Research and development agreements (hereafter R&D) a contract that is used to transfer technology. Regarding which it will be analyzed: First, its nature. Second, the role played by the free will in the configuration of this type of contracts; And, third, the management of intellectual property rights in this kind of agreements.La presente tesis de grado, tiene por objeto de este escrito es examinar desde una perspectiva jurídica uno de los contratos utilizados para transferir tecnología, en concreto el Research and development agreement (en adelante R&D). Respecto del cual se analizará: Primero, su naturaleza Segundo, el rol que juega la autonomía de la voluntad en la configuración de este tipo de contratos; Y, tercero, la injerencia y manejo de los derechos de propiedad intelectual en esta clase de acuerdos.Abogado(a)Pregrad

DREAM MAKER VS. DREAM TAKER: EFFECTS OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTORS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL BOARDS

The venture capital (VC) business model significantly affects the startup companies they back financially. This study explores a phenomenon that is closely related to the VC business model and fund structure—VC-led time horizon differences among board members. VC-led time horizon differences are where directors are misaligned in terms of their preferred exit times. Since VC funds have a fixed lifetime, this finite horizon causes strong exit pressure toward the end of the fund’s lifespan. Although entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have similar long-term time horizons at the outset of the relationship, factors such as entrepreneurs’ aggressive goal-setting, time-bound VC funds, and the uncertain entrepreneurial process can shift the synchronous time horizons initially shared by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. This dissertation investigates three questions: 1) Why and how often do VC-led time horizon differences arise? 2) How do VC-led time horizon differences affect board dynamics and exit outcomes? and 3) How can startups effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences? The focus of this analysis is on the board of directors, whose members are the most important people in deciding exit strategies, whether through an initial public offering (IPO), merger and acquisition (M&A), or bankruptcy. I conducted a field study to understand the origin of VC-led time horizon differences and their impact on board dynamics. I further tested the impact of VC-led time horizon differences on low-valued exits using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. VC-backed surgical device startups. The findings show that VC-led time horizon differences significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy and low-valued M&As. More importantly, the results of the systematic quantitative analysis suggest how to effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences by selecting certain types of directors (i.e., serial-entrepreneur independent directors, experienced VC directors, and by avoiding investor-executives) as well as the importance of carefully managing stage improvement when facing VC-led time horizon differences. This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance, VC management, entrepreneurship, and time perception. The findings have important practical implications for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and policymakers.Doctor of Philosoph

William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Annual Report 2007

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation has made grants since 1967 to support educational and cultural institutions and to help solve serious social and environmental problems. "Never stifle a generous impulse" was a favorite saying of entrepreneur William R. Hewlett, who established the Hewlett Foundation with his wife, Flora Lamson Hewlett, and their eldest son, Walter B. Hewlett. The Hewlett family's personal generosity has helped make the Foundation one of the nation's largest grantmaking institutions, with assets of approximately $9 billion. The Foundation has grantmaking programs in education, the environment, global development, performing arts, philanthropy, and population; and it also makes grants to aid disadvantaged communities in the Bay Area. Since its inception, the Hewlett Foundation has made grants of over$3 billion to thousands of organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area, across the United States, and around the world