Dynamic Radio Cooperation for Downlink Cloud-RANs with Computing Resource Sharing

A novel dynamic radio-cooperation strategy is proposed for Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RANs) consisting of multiple Remote Radio Heads (RRHs) connected to a central Virtual Base Station (VBS) pool. In particular, the key capabilities of C-RANs in computing-resource sharing and real-time communication among the VBSs are leveraged to design a joint dynamic radio clustering and cooperative beamforming scheme that maximizes the downlink weighted sum-rate system utility (WSRSU). Due to the combinatorial nature of the radio clustering process and the non-convexity of the cooperative beamforming design, the underlying optimization problem is NP-hard, and is extremely difficult to solve for a large network. Our approach aims for a suboptimal solution by transforming the original problem into a Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program (MI-SOCP), which can be solved efficiently using a proposed iterative algorithm. Numerical simulation results show that our low-complexity algorithm provides close-to-optimal performance in terms of WSRSU while significantly outperforming conventional radio clustering and beamforming schemes. Additionally, the results also demonstrate the significant improvement in computing-resource utilization of C-RANs over traditional RANs with distributed computing resources.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figures, accepted to IEEE MASS 201

Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.Comment: 26 pages, 6 fgures; IEEE Journals on Selected Areas in Communications, 201

Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication

Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201

Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We study the following classic problem in this setting: "how should the agents divide the value that they collectively create?". One traditional approach in cooperative game theory is to study core stability with the implicit assumption that there are infinite copies of one project, and agents can partition themselves into any number of coalitions. In contrast, we consider a model with a finite number of non-identical projects; this makes computing both high-welfare solutions and core payments highly non-trivial. The main contribution of this paper is a black-box mechanism that reduces the problem of computing a near-optimal core stable solution to the purely algorithmic problem of welfare maximization; we apply this to compute an approximately core stable solution that extracts one-fourth of the optimal social welfare for the class of subadditive valuations. We also show much stronger results for several popular sub-classes: anonymous, fractionally subadditive, and submodular valuations, as well as provide new approximation algorithms for welfare maximization with anonymous functions. Finally, we establish a connection between our setting and the well-studied simultaneous auctions with item bidding; we adapt our results to compute approximate pure Nash equilibria for these auctions.Comment: Under Revie

KALwEN: A New Practical and Interoperable Key Management Scheme for Body Sensor Networks

Key management is the pillar of a security architecture. Body sensor networks(BSNs) pose several challenges -- some inherited from wireless sensor networks(WSNs), some unique to themselves -- that require a new key management scheme to be tailor-made. The challenge is taken on, and the result is KALwEN, a new lightweight scheme that combines the best-suited cryptographic techniques in a seamless framework. KALwEN is user-friendly in the sense that it requires no expert knowledge of a user, and instead only requires a user to follow a simple set of instructions when bootstrapping or extending a network. One of KALwEN's key features is that it allows sensor devices from different manufacturers, which expectedly do not have any pre-shared secret, to establish secure communications with each other. KALwEN is decentralized, such that it does not rely on the availability of a local processing unit (LPU). KALwEN supports global broadcast, local broadcast and neighbor-to-neighbor unicast, while preserving past key secrecry and future key secrecy. The fact that the cryptographic protocols of KALwEN have been formally verified also makes a convincing case

Enabling Privacy-preserving Auctions in Big Data

We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity, volume, variety, and veracity, and we believe any auction mechanism design in the future should take the following factors into consideration: 1) generality (variety); 2) efficiency and scalability (velocity and volume); 3) truthfulness and verifiability (veracity). In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving construction for auction mechanism design in the big data, which prevents adversaries from learning unnecessary information except those implied in the valid output of the auction. More specifically, we considered one of the most general form of the auction (to deal with the variety), and greatly improved the the efficiency and scalability by approximating the NP-hard problems and avoiding the design based on garbled circuits (to deal with velocity and volume), and finally prevented stakeholders from lying to each other for their own benefit (to deal with the veracity). We achieve these by introducing a novel privacy-preserving winner determination algorithm and a novel payment mechanism. Additionally, we further employ a blind signature scheme as a building block to let bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported by the auctioneer. The comparison with peer work shows that we improve the asymptotic performance of peer works' overhead from the exponential growth to a linear growth and from linear growth to a logarithmic growth, which greatly improves the scalability