A Collaborative Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Prediction Problems

Machine Learning competitions such as the Netflix Prize have proven reasonably successful as a method of "crowdsourcing" prediction tasks. But these competitions have a number of weaknesses, particularly in the incentive structure they create for the participants. We propose a new approach, called a Crowdsourced Learning Mechanism, in which participants collaboratively "learn" a hypothesis for a given prediction task. The approach draws heavily from the concept of a prediction market, where traders bet on the likelihood of a future event. In our framework, the mechanism continues to publish the current hypothesis, and participants can modify this hypothesis by wagering on an update. The critical incentive property is that a participant will profit an amount that scales according to how much her update improves performance on a released test set.Comment: Full version of the extended abstract which appeared in NIPS 201

Tuning the Diversity of Open-Ended Responses from the Crowd

Crowdsourcing can solve problems that current fully automated systems cannot. Its effectiveness depends on the reliability, accuracy, and speed of the crowd workers that drive it. These objectives are frequently at odds with one another. For instance, how much time should workers be given to discover and propose new solutions versus deliberate over those currently proposed? How do we determine if discovering a new answer is appropriate at all? And how do we manage workers who lack the expertise or attention needed to provide useful input to a given task? We present a mechanism that uses distinct payoffs for three possible worker actions---propose,vote, or abstain---to provide workers with the necessary incentives to guarantee an effective (or even optimal) balance between searching for new answers, assessing those currently available, and, when they have insufficient expertise or insight for the task at hand, abstaining. We provide a novel game theoretic analysis for this mechanism and test it experimentally on an image---labeling problem and show that it allows a system to reliably control the balance betweendiscovering new answers and converging to existing ones

A data-driven game theoretic strategy for developers in software crowdsourcing: a case study

Crowdsourcing has the advantages of being cost-effective and saving time, which is a typical embodiment of collective wisdom and community workers’ collaborative development. However, this development paradigm of software crowdsourcing has not been used widely. A very important reason is that requesters have limited knowledge about crowd workers’ professional skills and qualities. Another reason is that the crowd workers in the competition cannot get the appropriate reward, which affects their motivation. To solve this problem, this paper proposes a method of maximizing reward based on the crowdsourcing ability of workers, they can choose tasks according to their own abilities to obtain appropriate bonuses. Our method includes two steps: Firstly, it puts forward a method to evaluate the crowd workers’ ability, then it analyzes the intensity of competition for tasks at Topcoder.com—an open community crowdsourcing platform—on the basis of the workers’ crowdsourcing ability; secondly, it follows dynamic programming ideas and builds game models under complete information in different cases, offering a strategy of reward maximization for workers by solving a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This paper employs crowdsourcing data from Topcoder.com to carry out experiments. The experimental results show that the distribution of workers’ crowdsourcing ability is uneven, and to some extent it can show the activity degree of crowdsourcing tasks. Meanwhile, according to the strategy of reward maximization, a crowd worker can get the theoretically maximum reward